The art of war: the oldest military treatise in the world

.'X"

S ^T^ ^

UN Tzu

ON THE

ART OF WA.R

THE OLDEST MILITARY TREATISE IN THE WORLD

TRANSLATED FROM THE CHINESE WITH INTRODUCTION
AND CRITICAL NOTES

BY

LIONEL GILES, M. A.

Assistant in the Department of Oriental Printed Books & MSS.
in the British Museum.

LONDON

LUZAC & C°.
1910

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101

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PRINTED BY E. J. BBILL, LEYDEN (Holland).

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CONTENTS

Page

PREFACE vii

INTRODUCTION

Sun Wu and his Book xi

The Text of Sun Tzu xxx

The Commentators xxxiv

Appreciations of Sun Tzu xlii

Apologies for war xliii

Bibliography 1

Chap. I. Laying Plans i

II. Waging War 9

„ III. Attack by Stratagem 17

„ IV. Tactical Dispositions 26

„ V. Energy 33

„ VI._Weak Points and Strong 42

„ VIL Manoeuvring 55

„ VIII. Variation of Tactics 71

IX,-Xhe Army on the March 80

Terrain 100

The Nine Situations 114

The Attack by Fire 150

„" XIII. The Use of Spies . 160

CHINESE CONCORDANCE 176

INDEX 192

PREFACE

The seventh volume of "Memoires concernant 1'histoire,
les sciences, les arts, les mceurs, les usages, &c., des
Chinois"1 is devoted to the Art of War, and contains,
amongst other treatises, "Les Treize Articles de Sun-tse, "
translated from the Chinese by a Jesuit Father, Joseph
Amiot. Pere Amiot appears to have enjoyed no small
reputation as a sinologue in his day, and the field of his
labours was certainly extensive. But his so-called trans-
lation of Sun Tzu, if placed side by side with the original,
is seen at once to be little better than an imposture. It
contains a great deal that Sun Tzu did not write, and
very little indeed of what he did. Here is a fair speci-
men, taken from the opening sentences of chapter 5 : —

De Vhabilete dans le gouvernement des Troupes. Sun-tse dit : Ayez les
noms de tous les Officiers tant generaux que subalternes; inscrivez-les
dans un catalogue a part, avec la note des talents & de la capacite de
chacun d'eux, afin de pouvoir les employer avec avantage lorsque 1'oc-
casion en sera venue. Faites en sorte que tous ceux que vous devez
commander soient persuades que votre principale attention est de les
preserver de tout dommage. Les troupes que vous ferez avancer centre
1'ennemi doivent etre comme des pierres que vous lanceriez centre des
oeufs. De vous a 1'ennemi il ne doit y avoir d'autre difference que celle
du fort au foible, du vuide au plein. Attaquez a decouvert, mais soyez
vainqueur en secret. Voila en peu de mots en quoi consiste 1'habilete &
toute la perfection meme du gouvernement des troupes.

Throughout the nineteenth century, which saw a wonder-
ful development in the study of Chinese literature, no
translator ventured to tackle Sun Tzu, although his work
was known to be highly valued in China as by far the

1 Published at Paris in 1782.

vm PREFACE

oldest and best compendium of military science. It wa;
not until the year 1905 that the first English translation
by Capt. E. F. Calthrop, R.F.A., appeared at Tokyo
under the title "Sonshi" (the Japanese form of Sun Tzu).
Unfortunately, it was evident that the translator's know
ledge of Chinese was far too scanty to fit him to grappl(
with the manifold difficulties of Sun Tzu. He himsel
plainly acknowledges that without the aid of two Japanes<
gentlemen "the accompanying translation would have beer
impossible." We can only wonder, then, that with thei
help it should have been so excessively bad. It is no
merely a question of downright blunders, from which non<
can hope to be wholly exempt. Omissions were frequent
hard passages were wilfully distorted or slurred over. Sucl
offences are less pardonable. They would not be tolerate(
in any edition of a Greek or Latin classic, and a simila
standard of honesty ought to be insisted upon in trans
lations from Chinese.

From blemishes of this nature, at least, I believe tha
the present translation is free. It was not undertake!
out of any inflated estimate of my own powers; but
could not help feeling that Sun Tzu deserved a bette
fate than had befallen him, and I knew that, at any rate
I could hardly fail to improve on the work of my predeces
sors. Towards the end of 1908, a new and revised editioi
of Capt. Calthrop's translation was published in London
this time, however, without any allusion to his Japanes
collaborators. My first three chapters were then alread;
in the printer's hands, so that the criticisms of Capl
Calthrop therein contained must be understood as refer
ring to his earlier edition. In the subsequent chapters
have of course transferred my attention to the secon>
edition. This is on the whole an improvement on th
other, though there still remains much that cannot pas

1 A rather distressing Japanese flavour pervades the work throughout. Thus, Kir
Ho Lu masquerades as "Katsuryo," Wu and Yu'eh become "Go" and "Etsu," etc. etc,

PREFACE IX

muster. Some of the grosser blunders have been rectified
and lacunae filled up, but on the other hand a certain
number of new mistakes appear. The very first sentence
of the introduction is startlingly inaccurate; and later on,
while mention is made of "an army of Japanese com-
mentators" on Sun Tzu (who are these, by the way?), not
a word is vouchsafed about the Chinese commentators,
who nevertheless, I venture to assert, form a much more
numerous and infinitely more important "army."

A few special features of the present volume may now
be noticed. In the first place, the text has been cut up
into numbered paragraphs, both in order to facilitate cross-
reference and for the convenience of students generally.
The division follows broadly that of Sun Hsing-yen's edition ;
but I have sometimes found it desirable to join two or
more of his paragraphs into one. In quoting from other
works, Chinese writers seldom give more than the bare
title by way of reference, and the task of research is apt
to be seriously hampered in consequence. With a view
to obviating this difficulty so far as Sun Tzu is concerned,
I have also appended a complete concordance of Chinese
characters, following in this the admirable example of
Legge, though an alphabetical arrangement has been
preferred to the distribution under radicals which he
adopted. Another feature borrowed from "The Chinese
Classics" is the printing of text, translation and notes on
the same page ; the notes, however, are inserted, according
to the Chinese method, immediately after the passages to
which they refer. From the mass of native commentary
my aim has been to extract the cream only, adding the
Chinese text here and there when it seemed to present
points of literary interest. Though constituting in itself
an important branch of Chinese literature, very little com-
mentary of this kind has hitherto been made directly acces-
sible by translation. l

1 A notable exception is to be found in Biot's edition of the Chou Li.

X PREFACE

I may say in conclusion that, owing to the printing off
of my sheets as they were completed, the work has not
had the benefit of a final revision. On a review of the
whole, without modifying the substance of my criticisms,
I might have been inclined in a few instances to temper
their asperity. Having chosen to wield a bludgeon, how-
ever, I shall not cry out if in return I am visited with
more than a rap over the knuckles. Indeed, I have been
at some pains to put a sword into the hands of future
opponents by scrupulously giving either text or reference
for every passage translated. A scathing review, even from
the pen of the Shanghai critic who despises "mere trans-
lations," would not, I must confess, be altogether unwel-
come. For, after all, the worst fate I shall have to dread
is that which befel the ingenious paradoxes of George in
The Vicar of Wakefield.

INTRODUCTION

SUN Wu AND HIS BOOK.

Ssu-ma Ch'ien gives the following biography of Sun
Tzu:1- *

Sun Tzu Wu was a native of the Cn'i State. His Art
of War brought him to the notice of f|fj IS Ho Lu, 2 King of 1^
Wu. Ho Lu said to him: I have carefully perused your 13 chapters.
May I submit your theory of managing soldiers to a slight test? — Sun
Tzu replied: You may. — Ho Lu asked: May the test be applied to
women? — The answer was again in the affirmative, so arrangements
were made to bring 180 ladies out of the Palace. Sun Tzu divided them
into two companies, and placed one of the King's favourite concubines
at the head of each. He then bade them all take spears in their hands,
and addressed them thus: I presume you know the difference between
front and back, right hand and left hand? — The girls replied: Yes. -
Sun Tzu went on: When I say "Eyes front," you must look straight
ahead. When I say "Left turn," you must face towards your left hand.
When I say "Right turn," you must face towards your right hand. When
I say "About turn," you must face right round towards the back. —
Again the girls assented. The words of command having been thus ex--
plained, he set up the halberds and battle-axes in order to begin the drill.
Then, to the sound of drums, he gave the order "Right turn." But the
girls only burst out laughing. Sun Tzu said : If words of command are
not clear and distinct, if orders are not thoroughly understood, then the
general is to blame. — So he started drilling them again, and this time
gave the order "Left turn," whereupon the girls once more burst into
fits of laughter. Sun Tzu said : If words of command are not clear and
distinct, if orders are not thoroughly understood, the general is to blame.
But if his orders are clear, and the soldiers nevertheless disobey, then it
is the fault of their officers. — So saying, he ordered the leaders of the
two companies to be beheaded. Now the King of Wu was watching the

1 Shih Chi, ch. 6s.

2 Also written ^ Rf| Ho LU. He reigned from 514 to 496 B.C.

xn INTRODUCTION

scene from the top of a raised pavilion ; and when he saw that his fa-
vourite concubines were about to be executed, he was greatly alarmed
and hurriedly sent down the following message: We are now quite satis-
fied as to our general's ability to handle troops. If We are bereft of these
two concubines, our meat and drink will lose their savour. It is our
wish that they shall not be beheaded. — Sun Tzu replied: Having once
received His Majesty's commission to be general of his forces, there are
certain commands of His Majesty which, acting in that capacity, I am
unable to accept. — Accordingly, he had the two leaders beheaded, and
straightway installed the pair next in order as leaders in their place.
When this had been done, the drum was sounded for the drill once more ;
and the girls went through all the evolutions, turning to the right or to
the left, marching ahead or wheeling back, kneeling or standing, with
perfect accuracy and precision, not venturing to utter a sound. Then
Sun Tzu sent a messenger to the King saying: Your soldiers, Sire, are
now properly drilled and disciplined, and ready for Your Majesty's in-
spection. They can be put to any use that their sovereign may desire;
bid them go through fire and water, and they will not disobey. — But
the King replied: Let our general cease drilling and return to camp. As
for us, We have no wish to come down and inspect the troops. — There-
upon Sun Tzu said: The King is only fond of words, and cannot trans-
late them into deeds. — After that, Ho Lu saw that Sun Tzu was one
who knew how to handle an army, and finally appointed him general.
In the West, he defeated the G§Ji__State and forced his way into Yin
the capital; to the north, he put fear into the States of Ch'i and Chin,
and spread his fame abroad amongst the feudal princes. And Sun Tzu
shared in the might of the King.

About Sun Tzu himself this is all that Ssu-ma Ch'ien
has to tell us in this chapter. But he proceeds to give
a biography of his descendant, J$fr Jj|| Sun Pin, born about
a hundred years after his famous ancestor's death, and
also the outstanding military genius of his time. The
historian speaks of him too as Sun Tzu, and in his preface
we read: % -f- $f jjjj] ft) jfft _E| j£ "Sun Tzu had his feet
cut off and yet continued to discuss the art of war." l
It seems likely, then, that "Pin" was a nickname bestowed
on him after his mutilation, unless indeed the story was
invented in order to account for the name. The crowning
incident of his career, the crushing defeat of his treacherous
rival P'ang Chuan, will be found briefly related on p. 40.

1 Shih Chi, ch. 130 , f. 6 r°.

INTRODUCTION XIII

To return to the elder Sun Tzu. He is mentioned in
two other passages of the Shih Chi: -

In the third year of his reign [512 B.C.] Ho Lu, King of Wu, took
the field with -^ ^ Tzu-hsu [i.e. f£ J| Wu Yiian] and f£j g-g Po
P'ei, and attacked Ch'u. He captured the town of ^ Shu and slew
the two prince's sons who had formerly been generals of Wu. He was
then meditating a descent on §±|$ Ying [the capital]; but the general
Sun Wu said: "The army is exhausted. ' It is not yet possible. We
must wait". . . . 2 [After further successful fighting,] "in the ninth year
[506 B.C.], King Ho Lu of Wu addressed Wu Tzu-hsii and Sun Wu,
saying: "Formerly, you declared that it was not yet possible for us to
enter Ying. Is the time ripe now?" The two men replied: "ChVs
general, -^ ^ Tzu-ch'ang, 3 is grasping and covetous, and the princes
of HI* T'ang and ^^ Ts'ai both have a grudge against him. If Your
Majesty has resolved to make a grand attack, you must win over T'ang
and Ts'ai, and then you may succeed." Ho Lu followed this advice,
[beat Ch'u in five pitched battles and marched into Ying]. 4

This is the latest date at which anything is recorded
of Sun Wu. He does not appear to have survived his
patron, who died from the effects of a wound in 496.

In the chapter entitled ffit fj (the earlier portion of
which M. Chavannes believes to be a fragment of a treatise
on Military Weapons), there occurs this passage : 5

From this time onward, a number of famous soldiers arose, one after
the other : ^~ ;||J Kao-fan, 6 who was employed by the Chin State ;
Wang-tzu, 7 in the service of Ch'i; and Sun Wu, in the service of Wu.
These men developed and threw light upon the principles of war ( m

1 I note that M. Chavannes translates f& *^ "le peuple est e"puise." But in
Sun Tzu's own book (see especially VII §§ 24 — 26) the ordinary meaning of ^&

is "army," and this, I think, is more suitable here.

2 These words are given also in Wu Tzu-hsii's biography, ch. 66, fol. 3 r°.

3 The appellation of ^T Nang Wa.

4 Shih Chi^ ch. 31, fol. 6r°.

5 Ibid. ch. 25, fol. i r°.

6 The appellation of ;jfjfj£ ^& Hu Yen, mentioned in ch. 39 under t^' year 637.

7 ^£ -^ jjjjjj ^ Wang-tzii Chceng-fu, ch. 32, year 607.

XIV INTRODUCTION

It is obvious that Ssu-ma Ch'ien at least had no doubt
about the reality of Sun Wu as an historical personage ;
and with one exception, to be noticed presently, he is by
far the most important authority on the period in question.
It will not be necessary, therefore, to say much of such
a work as the ^ ^ ^ ^ Wu Yiieh Cfcun Cfciu, which
is supposed to have been written by Jj| fl|| Chao Yeh of
the Ist century A.D. The attribution is somewhat doubt-
ful ; but even if it were otherwise, his account would be
of little value, based as it is on the Shih Chi and ex-
panded with romantic details. The story of Sun Tzu will
be found, for what it is worth, in chapter 2. The only
new points in it worth noting are: i) Sun Tzu was first
recommended to Ho Lu by Wu Tzu-hsli. 2) He is called
a native of Wu. x 3) He had previously lived a retired
life, and his contemporaries were unaware of his ability. 2

The following passage occurs in ^£ fjf -^ Huai-nan Tzu :
"When sovereign and ministers show perversity of mind,
it is impossible even for a Sun Tzu to encounter the foe."3
Assuming that this work is genuine (and hitherto no doubt
has been cast upon it), we have here the earliest direct
reference to Sun Tzu, for Huai-nan Tzu died in 122 B.C.,
many years before the Shih Chi was given to the world.

UJ [S] Liu Hsiang (B.C. 80-9) in his %fr ff> says: "The
reason why Sun Wu at the head of 30,000 men beat

1 The mistake is natural enough. Native critics refer to the ^ ^ft !^ ,
a work of the Han dynasty, which says (ch. 2, fol. 3 v° of my edition) : /g P^

"Ten li outside the Wu gate [of the city of ^ Wu, now Soochow in
Kiangsu] there is a great mound, raised to commemorate the entertainment of Sun
Wu of Chci, who excelled in the art of war, by the King of Wu."

M * •? 7 ft ft •

INTRODUCTION XV

Ch'u with 200,000 is that the latter were undisciplined."1
15 ^ tft Teng Ming-shih in his jft R ^ |f || (com-
pleted in 1 1 34) informs us that the surname ^ was be-
stowed on Sun Wu's grandfather by j|Sr £+ Duke Ching
of Ch'i [547-490 B.C.]. Sun Wu's father Sun }J| P'ing,
rose to be a Minister of State in Ch'i, and Sun Wu him-
self, whose style was J| j)|||J Ch'ang-ch'ing, fled to Wu on
account of the rebellion which was being fomented by the
kindred of gj jj& Tcien Pao. He had three sons, of whom
the second, named B|j Ming, was the father of Sun Pin.
According to this account, then, Pin was the grandson
of Wu,3 which, considering that Sun Pin's victory over
^ Wei was gained in 341 B.C., may be dismissed as
chronologically impossible. Whence these data were ob-
tained by Teng Ming-shih I do not know, but of course
no reliance whatever can be placed in them.

An interesting document which has survived from the
close of the Han period is the short preface written by
the great ]f ^ Ts'ao Ts'ao, or H jf£ tffr Wei Wu Ti,
for his edition of Sun Tzu. I shall give it in full : —

I have heard that the ancients used bows and arrows to their advan-
tage. 3 The Lun Yii says : "There must be a sufficiency of military
strength." 4 The Shu Ching mentions "the army" among the "eight
objects of government."5 The I Ching says: " ||jjj 'army' indicates
firmness and justice; the experienced leader will have good fortune."6

2 The Shih Chi, on the other hand, says :

3fa -fjl . I may remark in passing that the name jj£ for one who was a great
warrior is just as suspicious as H^ f°r a man wh° had his feet cut off.

« An allusion to , , II. ,:

jtjjj^ ^ ^ ^|J J[/j[ ^ ^ ~j\ "They attached strings to wood to make
bows, and sharpened wood to make arrows. The use of bows and arrows is to
keep the Empire in awe."

4 !if Jnf XIL 7' 5 IS t? V' iv* 7>

, 7th diagram ( gjg ).

XVI INTRODUCTION

The Shih Ching says : "The King rose majestic in his wrath, and he
marshalled his troops." ' The Yellow Emperor, T'ang the Completer
and Wu Wang all used spears and battle-axes in order to succour their
generation. The Ssu-ma Fa says : "If one man slay another of set pur-
pose, he himself may rightfully be slain." 2 He who relies solely on
warlike measures shall be exterminated; he who relies solely on peaceful
measures shall perish. Instances of this are Fu Ch'ai 3 on the one hand
and Yen Wang on the other. * In military matters, the Sage's rule is
normally to keep the peace, and to move his forces only when occasion
requires. He will not use armed force unless driven to it by necessity. 5
Many books have I read on the subject of war and fighting; but the
work composed by Sun Wu is the profoundest of them all. [Sun Tzu
was a native of the Ch'i state, his personal name was Wu. He wrote
the Art of War in 13 chapters for Ho Lii, King of Wu. Its principles
were tested on women, and he was subsequently made a general. He
led an army westwards, crushed the Ch'u State and entered Ying the
capital. In the north, he kept Ch'i and Chin in awe. A hundred years
and more after his time, Sun Pin lived. He was a descendant of Wu]. 6
In his treatment of deliberation and planning, the importance of rapidity
in taking the field, 7 clearness of conception, and depth of design, Sun

ch. I ( ) ad init. The text of the passage in the

«5) - £ ft ft A % A $t

3 The son and successor of Ho Lu. He was finally defeated and overthrown by
^J jg| Kou Chien, King of Yiieh, in 473 B.C. See post.

4 King Yen of |fj£ Hsu, a fabulous being, of whom Sun Hsing-yen says in

his preface: ^ ffjj j£ "His humanity brought him to destruction." See Shih
Chi^ ch. 5, f. i z/c, and M. Chavannes' note, Memoires Historiques^ torn. II, p. 8.
i TV, Skn, HU. ch. 90: $ ^ J- £ ^ gfc £ £ ^ gj| H

B & :fc ft 1= A # B IS ^ B 0TJT 5t A 1* B

» * * tr * mn .1 * 4 »-A -^ Jt * «k.» *

m^n&mmz.

6 The passage I have put in brackets is omitted in the T'-u Shu, and may be
an interpolation. It was known, however, to j*J| ^ |j} Chang Shou-chieh of
the T'ang dynasty, and appears in the Tlai P^ing Yu Lan.

7 Ts'ao Kung seems to be thinking of the first part of chap. II, perhaps
especially of § 8.

INTRODUCTION XVII

Tzfi stands beyond the reach of carping criticism. My contemporaries,
however, have failed to grasp the full meaning of his instructions, and
while putting into practice the smaller details in which his work abounds,
they have overlooked its essential purport. That is the motive which has
led me to outline a rough explanation of the whole. *

One thing to be noticed in the above is the explicit
statement that the 1 3 chapters were specially composed
for King Ho Lu. This is supported by the internal
evidence of I. § 15, in which it seems clear that some
ruler is addressed.

In the bibliographical section of the Han Shu, 3 there
is an entry which has given rise to much discussion :
^^-f-A + H ^^1^ "The works of Sun Tzu
of Wu in 82 p'ien (or chapters), with diagrams in 9 chuan."
It is evident that this cannot be merely the 13 chapters
known to Ssu-ma Ch'ien, or those we possess to-day.
Chang Shou-chieh in his jjj ff g j£ J|| refers to an edition
of Sun Tzu's -ft jj- of which the " 1 3 chapters" formed
the first chuan, adding that there were two other chuan
besides. 3 This has brought forth a theory, that the bulk
of these 82 chapters consisted of other writings of Sun
Tzii - - we should call them apocryphal — similar to the
^{j ^ Wen Ta, of which a specimen dealing with the
Nine Situations 4 is preserved in the :J|| J& T^ung Tien,
and another in Ho Shih's commentary. It is suggested

» ft*

A A«

A # # s # am & « A IB

at A * z

3 The -|j^ ~7yT =^ mentions two editions of Sun Tzii in 3 chuan, namely

fc«? -a

* See chap. XL

xvm INTRODUCTION

that before his interview with Ho Lu, Sun Tzu had only
written the 13 chapters, but afterwards composed a sort
of execresis in the form of question and answer between
himself and the King. || $ jfj Pi I-hsiin, author of the
^ jy. £fe ^ Sun Tzu Hsu Lu, backs this up with a
quotation from the Wu Yueh Cfcun Cfciu: "The King of
Wu summoned Sun Tzu, and asked him questions about
the art of war. Each time he set forth a chapter of his
work, the King could not find words enough to praise
him." l As he points out, if the whole work was ex-
pounded on the same scale as in the above-mentioned
fragments, the total number of chapters could not fail to
be considerable. 3 Then the numerous other treatises at-
tributed to Sun Tzu3 might also be included. The fact
that the Han Chih mentions no work of Sun Tzu except
the 82 p'ien, whereas the Sui and T'ang bibliographies
give the titles of others in addition to the "13 chapters,"
is good proof, Pi I-hsiin thinks, that all of these were
contained in the 82 p^ien. Without pinning our faith to
the accuracy of details supplied by the Wu Yuek Cfcun
Cfciu, or admitting the genuineness of any of the treatises
cited by Pi I-hslin, we may see in this theory a probable
solution of the mystery. Between Ssu-ma Ch'ien and Pan
Ku there was plenty of time for a luxuriant crop of for-
geries to have grown up under the magic name of Sun
Tzu, and the 82 p'ien may very well represent a collected
edition of these lumped together with the original work.

3 Such as the /\ |8j[ |jj , quoted in ^|J ^ Cheng Hsuan's commentary on
the Ckon Li, the ffc g| ^ |Eff £ fe and „££ j£ || £ , mentioned in

*e Rt ^fe Sui C'"h-' and the S ~f" ^. ij[ jjj£ , in 'he Han Tang Chih.

INTRODUCTION XIX

It is also possible, though less likely, that some of them
existed in the time of the earlier historian and were pur-
posely ignored by him. l

Tu Mu, after Ts'ao Kung the most important commen-
tator on Sun Tzu, composed the preface to his edition 3
about the middle of the ninth century. After a somewhat
lengthy defence of the military art, 3 he comes at last to
Sun Tzu himself, and makes one or two very startling
assertions : -- "The writings of Sun Wu," he says, "originally
comprised several hundred thousand words, but Ts'ao Ts'ao,
the Emperor Wu Wei, pruned away all redundancies and
wrote out the essence of the whole, so as to form a single
book in 1 3 chapters." 4 He goes on to remark that Ts'ao
Ts'ao's commentary on Sun Tzu leaves a certain proportion
of difficulties unexplained. This, in Tu Mu's opinion, does
not necessarily imply that he was unable to furnish a com-
plete commentary. 5 According to the Wei Chih, Ts'ao
himself wrote a book on war in something over 100,000
words, known as the ^ |J . It appears to have been of
such exceptional merit that he suspects Ts'ao to have used
for it the surplus material which he had found in Sun Tzu.
He concludes, however, by saying: "The Hsin Shu is now
lost, so that the truth cannot be known for certain." 6

Tu Mu's conjecture seems to be based on a passage

1 On the other hand, it is noteworthy that -* Wu Tzu, which is now
in 6 chapters, has 48 assigned to it in the Han Chih. Likewise, the pt| m£
Chttng Yung is credited with 49 chapters, though now in one only. In the case of
such very short works, one is tempted to think that jg|| might simply mean "leaves."

2 See T-u Shu, |g || M, ch. 442, j| ^ 2.

3 An extract will be found on p. xlv.

4 se % m 9 Ji m. -m w

1 r » ff I

XX INTRODUCTION

in the ^ |jf $$ §^ "Wei Wu Ti strung together Sun Wu's
Art of War," l which in turn may have resulted from a
misunderstanding of the final words of Ts'ao Kung's preface:

#fc ft 1S fl&H 1^ This> as Sun Hsing-yen points out,2
is only a modest way of saying that he made an explana-
tory paraphrase, 3 or in other words, wrote a commentary
on it. On the whole, the theory has met with very little
acceptance. Thus, the (Jtj J|[ ^ |J says:4 "The mention
of the 13 chapters in the Shih Chi shows that they were
in existence before the Han Chih, and that later accretions
are not to be considered part of the original work. Tu
Mu's assertion can certainly not be taken as proof." 5

There is every reason to suppose, then, that the 13
chapters existed in the time of Ssu-ma Ch'ien practically
as we have them now. That the work was then well
known he tells us in so many words: "Sun Tzu's 13
Chapters and Wu Ch'i's Art of WTar are the two books
that people commonly refer to on the subject of military
matters. Both of then are widely distributed, so I will
not discuss them here." 6 But as we go further back,
serious difficulties begin to arise. The salient fact which
has to be faced is that the Tso Chuan, the great con-
temporary record, makes no mention whatever of Sun

frlr Q

4

99,

INTRODUCTION XXI

W u^ either as a general or as a writer. It is natural, in
view of this awkward circumstance, that many scholars
should not only cast doubt on the story of Sun Wu as
given in the Shih Chi, but even show themselves frankly
sceptical as to the existence of the man at all. The most
powerful presentment of this side of the case is to be
found in the following disquisition by IPf ^(C Aj> Yeh
Shui-hsin : l -

It is stated in Ssu-ma Ch'ien's history that Siin Wu was a native of
the Ch'i State, and employed by Wu; and that in the^eign of Ho Lu
he crushed Ch'u, entered Ying, and was a great general. But in Tso's
Commentary no Sun Wu appears at all. It is true that Tso's Commen-
tary need not contain absolutely everything that other histories contain.
But Tso has not omitted to mention vulgar plebeians and hireling ruf-
fians such as Ying K'ao-shu, a Ts'ao Kuei, 3 Chu Chih-wu 4 and Chuan
She-chu. 5 In the case of Sun Wu, whose fame and achievements were
so brilliant, the omission is much more glaring. Again, details are given,
in their due order, about his contemporaries Wu Yuan and the Minister
P'ei. 6 Is it credible that Sun Wu alone should have been passed over?7

In point of literary style, Sun Tzu's work belongs to the same school
as Kuan Tzu,* the Liu T'ao,* and the Yueh Yu, 10 and may have

1 Yeh shih of the Sunsdynasty [1151—1223]. see

ch. 221, ff. 7, 8.

2 See Tso Chuan, [§ /£± , I. 3 ad fin. and XI. 3 ad init. He hardly deserves
to be bracketed with assassins.

3 See pp. 66, 128.

* See Tso Chuan, fit ^ , XXX. 5.

5 See p. 128. Chuan Chu is the abbreviated form of his name.

6 7. e. Po Pcei. See ante.

m m z m

8 The nucleus of this work is probably genuine, though large additions have
been made by later hands. Kuan Chung died in 645 B. C.

9 See infra, p. 1.

10 I do not know what work this is, unless it be the last chapter of the |||| =|^> .
Why that chapter should be singled out, however, is not clear.

XXII INTRODUCTION

been the production of some private scholar living towards the end of
the "Spring and Autumn" or the beginning of the "Warring States" period. »
The story that his precepts were actually applied by the Wu State, is
merely the outcome of big talk on the part of his followers. 2

From the flourishing period of the Chou dynasty 3 down to the time of
the a Spring and Autumn," all military commanders were statesmen as well,
and the class of professional generals, for conducting external campaigns,
did not then exist. It was not until the period of the "Six States" *
that this custom changed. Now although Wu was an uncivilised State,
is it conceivable that Tso should have left unrecorded the fact that Sun
Wu was a great general and yet held no civil office? What we are told,
therefore, about Jang-chu 5 and Sun Wu, is not authentic matter, but
the reckless fabrication of theorising pundits. The story of Ho Lu's ex-
periment on the women, in particular, is utterly preposterous and in-
credible. 6

Yeh Shui-hsin represents Ssu-ma Ch'ien as having- said
that Sun Wu crushed Ch'u and entered Ying. This is
not quite correct. No doubt the impression left on the
reader's mind is that he at least shared in these exploits;
but the actual subject of the verbs $£ , A > M an^ II
is certainly |ff) fjg , as is shown by the next words :

•^ •¥* H- ^ JJ M • 7 The fact may or may not t>e

significant; but it is nowhere explicitly stated in the Shih
Chi either that Sun Tzti was general on the occasion of

' About 480 B. C.

'n^m^-^

*B %ilj ft A

That is, I suppose, the age of Wu Wang and Chou Rung.

4 In the 3rd century B. C.

5 Ssu-ma Jang-chu, whose family name was |JJ Tien, lived in the latter half
of the 6th century B. C., and is also believed to have written a work on war. See
Shih Chi, ch. 64, and infra, p. 1.

.

See the end of the passage quoted from the Shih Chi on

p. xii.

INTRODUCTION XXIII

the taking of Ying, or that he even went there at all.
Moreover, as we know that Wu Yuan and Po Pcei both
took part in the expedition, and also that its success was
largely due to the dash and enterprise of ^ |f| Fu Kai,
Ho Lu's younger brother, it is not easy to see how yet
another general could have played a very prominent part
in the same campaign.

$ft 1H 3& Ch'en Chen-sun of the Sung dynasty has
the note : l —

Military writers look upon Sun Wu as the father of their art. But the
fact that he does not appear in the Tso Chuan, although he is said to
have served under Ho Lii King of Wu, makes it uncertain what period
he really belonged to. 2

He also says : —
The works of Sun Wu and Wu Ch'i may be of genuine antiquity. 3

It is noticeable that both Yeh Shui-hsin and Ch'en
Chen-sun, while rejecting the personality of Sun Wu as
he figures in Ssu-ma Ch'ien's history, are inclined to ac-
cept the date traditionally assigned to the work which
passes under his name. The author of the Hsu Lu fails
to appreciate this distinction, and consequently his bitter
attack on Ch'en Chen-sun really misses its mark. He
makes one or two points, however, which certainly tell in
favour of the high antiquity of our "13 chapters." "Sun
Tzu," he says, "must have lived in the age of Ching
Wang [519—476], because he is frequently plagiarised in
subsequent works of the Chou, Ch4n and Han dynasties." 4

1 In the ^jiL ^jJ£ jij# -9|j f a classified catalogue of his family library.

' See Win Hsien T'ung K'ao, eh. 221, 1. 9 r° : \£ £ =j & % jjflj ^

fi yn 4 it A x • li n ffi ? j& M .^- ii. ^''.M il if

Bf A-tfc-

3 See Hsu Lu, f. ,4 ,°

Here is a list of the passages in Sun Tzii from which

XXIV INTRODUCTION

The two most shameless offenders in this respect are Wu
Chli and Huai-nan Tzu, both of them important historical
personages in their day. The former lived only a century
after the alleged date of Sun Tzu, and his death is known
to have taken place in 381 B.C. It was to him, according
to Liu Hsiang, that *§* ^3 Tseng Shen delivered the Tso
Chuan, which had been entrusted to him by its author. l
Now the fact that quotations from the Art of War,
acknowledged or otherwise, are to be found in so many
authors of different epochs, establishes a very strong
probability that there was some common source anterior
to them all, - - in other words, that Sun Tzu's treatise was
already in existence towards the end of the 5th century B. C.
Further proof of Sun Tzu's antiquity is furnished by the
archaic or wholly obsolete meanings attaching to a number
of the words he uses. A list of these, which might perhaps
be extended, is given in the Hsu Lu; and though some
of the interpretations are doubtful, the main argument is
hardly affected thereby. 3 Again, it must not be forgotten
that Yeh Shui-hsin, a scholar and critic of the first rank,
deliberately pronounces the style of the 13 chapters to

either the substance or the actual words have been appropriated by early authors:
VII. 9; IX. 175 I. 24 (l|k |g| jj|). IX. 23; IX. i, 3, 7; V. i; III. 18; XL
58; VII. 31; VII. 24; VII. 26; IX. 15; IX. 4 (bis) (^ -^). III. 8; IV. 7
(Itlf-7*) VII^I95v-I4;in2(g|^^). III. 8; XL 2; I. 19; XI. 58;
X. 10 & VI. I (U ^fti ' ^wo °^ t^ie aDOve are given as quotations). V. 13;

IV' 2 - IX- XI> I25 XI' 30; I- 135 VII. 19 & IV. 7; VII. 32;

VII. 25; IV. 20 & V. 23; IX. 43; V. 15; VII. 26; V. 4 & XI. 39; VIII. ii ;

' See Legge's Classics, vol. V, Prolegomena p. 27. Legge thinks that the Tso
Chuan must have been written in the 5th century, but .not before 424 B.C.

2 The instances quoted are: — III. 14, 15: ||J is said to be equivalent to || ;

IL I5: M = K; VIL 28: H - ,t ; XL 6o: ^ - 1¥ 5 XL 24; the use

of pj instead of g| (the later form); XI. 64: f^ = >^; IX. 3: ^g = ^;
III. u: JJI and |ft^ antithetically opposed in the sense of ffiff ML and
XL 6:» =XI

INTRODUCTION XXV

belong to the early part of the fifth century. Seeing that
he is actually engaged in an attempt to disprove the
existence of Sun Wu himself, we may be sure that he
would not have hesitated to assign the work to a later
date had he not honestly believed the contrary. And it
is precisely on such a point that the judgment of an
educated Chinaman will carry most weight. Other internal
evidence is not far to seek. Thus, in XIII. § i, there is
an unmistakable allusion to the ancient system of land-
tenure which had already passed away by the time ol
Mencius, who was anxious to see it revived in a modified
form. L The only warfare Sun Tzu knows is that carried
on between the various feudal princes ( ^ ^ ), in which
armoured chariots play a large part. Their use seems to
have entirely died out before the end of the Chou dynasty.
He speaks as a man of Wu, a state \vhich ceased to
exist as early as 473 B. C. On this I shall touch presently.
But once refer the work to the 5th century or earlier,
and the chances of its being other than a dona fide pro-
duction are sensibly diminished. The great age of forgeries
did not come until long after. That it should have been
forged in the period immediately following 473 is parti-
cularly unlikely, for no one, as a rule, hastens to identify
himself with a lost cause. As for Yeh Shui-hsin's theory,
that the author was a literary recluse, 3 that seems to me
quite untenable. If one thing is more apparent than an-
other after reading the maxims of Sun Tzu, it is that their
essence has been distilled from a large store of personal
observation and experience. They reflect the mind not
only of a born strategist, gifted with a rare faculty of gene-
ralisation, but also of a practical soldier closely acquainted
with the military conditions of his time. To say nothing

1 See Mencius III. I. iii. 13 — 20.

2 | 1 j /|>fC |Jjl ~JT need not be pressed to mean an actual dweller in the
mountains. I think it simply denotes a person living a retired life and standing
aloof from public affairs.

XXVI INTRODUCTION

of the fact that these sayings have been accepted and
endorsed by all the greatest captains of Chinese history,
they offer a combination of freshness and sincerity, acute-
ness and common sense, which quite excludes the idea
that they were artificially concocted in the study. If we
admit, then, that the 13 chapters were the genuine pro-
duction of a military man living towards the end of the
"Ch'un Ch4u" period, are we not bound, in spite of the
silence of the Tso Chuan, to accept Ssu-ma Ch'ien's ac-
count in its entirety? In view of his high repute as a
sober historian, must we not hesitate to assume that the
records he drew upon for Sun Wu's biography were false
and untrustworthy? The answer, I fear, must be in the
negative. There is still one grave, if not fatal, objection
to the chronology involved in the story as told in the
Shih Chi, which, so far as I am aware, nobody has yet
pointed out. There are two passages in Sun Tzu in which he
alludes to contemporary affairs. The first is in VI. §21: —

Though according to my estimate the soldiers of Yiieh exceed our own
in number, that shall advantage them nothing in the matter of victory.
I say then that victory can be achieved.

The other is in XI. § 30 : -

Asked if an army can be made to imitate the shuai-jan, I should answer,
Yes. For the men of Wu and the men of Yiieh are enemies; yet if they
are crossing a river in the same boat and are caught by a storm, they
will come to each other's assistance just as the left hand helps the right.

These two paragraphs are extremely valuable as evidence
of the date of composition. They assign the work to the
period of the struggle between Wu and Yueh. So much
has been observed by Pi I-hsun. But what has hitherto
escaped notice is that they also seriously impair the cre-
dibility of Ssu-ma Ch'ien's narrative. As we have seen
above, the first positive date given in connection with
Sun Wu is 5 1 2 B. C. He is then spoken of as a general,
acting as confidential adviser to Ho Lu, so that his alleged
introduction to that monarch had already taken place,

INTRODUCTION XXVII

and of course the 1 3 chapters must have been written
earlier still. But at that time, and for several years after,
down to the capture of Ying in 506, ^ Chlu, and not
Yiieh, was the great hereditary enemy of Wu. The two
states, Ch'u and Wu, had been constantly at war for over
half a century, 1 whereas the first war between Wu and
Ylieh was waged only in 510, 2 and even then was no
more than a short interlude sandwiched in the midst 01
the fierce struggle with Ch'u. Now Ch'u is not mentioned
in the 13 chapters at all. The natural inference is that
they were written at a time when Ylieh had become the
prime antagonist of Wu, that is, after Ch'u had suffered
the great humiliation of 506. At this point, a table of
dates may be found useful.

B.C.

5H
512

510

tween the two states.
5°9

or
508
506

505

5°4
497
496

Accession of Ho Lu.

Ho Lu attacks Ch'u, but is dissuaded from entering !g[$ Ying, the

capital. Shih Chi mentions Sun Wu as general.
Another attack on Ch'u.
Wu makes a successful attack on Yiieh. This is the first war be-

Ch'u invades Wu, but is signally defeated at J& jl^ Yii-chang.
Ho Lu attacks Ch'u with the aid of T'ang and Ts'ai. Decisive

battle of yjv^l Jljf; Po-chii, and capture of Ying. Last mention

of Sun Wu in Shih Chi.
Yiieh makes a raid on Wu in the absence of its army. Wu is

beaten by Ch'in and evacuates Ying.
Ho Lu sends 4 £ Fu Ch'ai to attack Ch'u.

""*

^J {j|| Kou Chien becomes King of Yiieh.

Wu attacks Yiieh, but is defeated by Kou Chien at #|| ^ Tsui-li.
Ho Lu is killed.

1 When Wu first appears in the Ch'-un CWiu in 584, it is already at variance
with its powerful neighbour. The Cfrun Ch'-iu first mentions Yiieh in 537, the
Tso Chuan in 60 1.

This is explicitly stated in the Tso Chuan, ft3 ^. XXXII, 2 : W J& >ffe

XXVIII INTRODUCTION

B.C.

494

and enters the capital of Yueh.
485 '

or

484
482

Fu Ch'ai defeats Kou Chien in the great battle of $ Fu-chiao,

Kou Chien renders homage to Wu. Death of Wu Tztt-hsu.
Kou Chien invades Wu in the absence of Fu Ch'ai.

47 Further attacks by Yueh on Wu.
476

475
473

Kou Chien lays siege to the capital of Wu.
Final defeat and extinction of Wu.

The sentence quoted above from VI. § 21 hardly strikes
me as one that could have been written in the full flush
of victory. It seems rather to imply that, for the moment
at least, the tide had turned against Wu, and that she
was getting the worst of the struggle. Hence we may
conclude that our treatise was not in existence in 505,
before which date Yueh does not appear to have scored
any notable success against Wu. Ho Lu died in 496, so
that if the book was written for him, it must have been
during the period 505—496, when there was a lull in the
hostilities, Wu having presumably been exhausted by its
supreme effort against Chcu. On the other hand, if we
choose to disregard the tradition connecting Sun Wu's name
with Ho Lu, it might equally well have seen the light
between 496 and 494, or possibly in the period 482—473,
when Yueh was once again becoming a very serious
menace. l We may feel fairly certain that the author,
whoever he may have been, was not a man of any great
eminence in his own day. On this point the negative
testimony of the Tso Chuan far outweighs any shred of
authority still attaching to the Shih Chi, if once its other
facts are discredited. Sun Hsing-yen, however, makes a
feeble attempt to explain the omission of his name from

1 There is this to be said for the later period, that the feud would tend to
grow more bitter after each encounter, and thus more fully justify the language
used in XI. § 30.

INTRODUCTION XXIX

the great commentary. It was Wu Tzu-hsii, he says,
who got all the credit of Sun Wu's exploits, because the
latter (being an alien) was not rewarded with an office
in the State. 1

How then did the Sun Tzu legend originate? It may
be that the growing celebrity of the book imparted by
degrees a kind of factitious renown to its author. It was
felt to be only right and proper that one so _weiL-yersed
in thescience o£ja£ar- should have solid achievements to
his credit as well. Now the capture of Ying was un-
doubtedly the greatest feat of arms in Ho Lu's reign ; it
made a deep and lasting impression on all the surrounding
states, and raised Wu to the short-lived zenith of her
power. Hence, what more natural, as time went on, than
that the acknowledged master of strategy, Sun Wu, should
be popularly identified with that campaign, at first perhaps
only in the sense that his brain conceived and planned
it; afterwards, that it was actually carried out by him in
conjunction with Wu Yuan, 3 Po P'ei and Fu Kai?

It is obvious that any attempt to reconstruct even the
outline of Sun Tzu's life must be based almost wholly on
conjecture. With this necessary proviso, I should say that
he probably entered the service of Wu about the time
of Ho Lu's accession, and gathered experience, though
only in the capacity of a subordinate officer, during the
intense military activity which marked the first half of
that prince's reign. 3 If he rose to be a general at all,
he certainly was never on an equal footing with the three

i See his preface to Sun Tzu: »

2 With Wu Yuan himself the case is just the reverse: — a spurious treatise on
war has been fathered on him simply because he was a great general. Here we
have an obvious inducement to forgery. Sun Wu, on the other hand, cannot have
been widely known to fame in the 5th century.

3 See Tso Chuan, fc ^ , 4th year (506), § 14: g $J ^ [t|J $L ^ g*

^ ^fC ^ 6Bf UFrom the date of Kin£ Cnao's accession [515] there was no
year in which Ch'u was not attacked by Wu."

XXX INTRODUCTION

above mentioned. He was doubtless present at the in-
vestment and occupation of Ying, and witnessed Wu's
sudden collapse in the following year. Ylieh's attack at
this critical juncture, when her rival was embarrassed on
every side, seems to have convinced him that this upstart
kingdom was the great enemy against whom every effort
would henceforth have to be directed. Sun Wu was thus
a well-seasoned warrior when he sat down to write his
famous book, which according to my reckoning must have
appeared towards the end, rather than the beginning, ot
Ho Lu's reign. The story of the women may possibly
have grown out of some real incident occurring about the
same time. As we hear no more of Sun Wu after this
from any source, he is hardly likely to have survived his
patron or to have taken part in the death-struggle with
Ylieh, which began with the disaster at Tsui-li.

If these inferences are approximately correct, there is
a certain irony in the fate which decreed that China's
most illustrious man of peace should be contemporary
with her greatest writer on war.

THE TEXT OF SUN Tzij.

I have found it difficult to glean much about the history
of Sun Tzu's text. The quotations that occur in early
authors go to show that the "13 chapters" of which Ssu-
ma Ch'ien speaks were essentially the same as those now
extant. We have his word for it that they were widely
circulated in his day, and can only regret that he refrained
from discussing them on that account. 1 Sun Hsing-yen
says in his preface: —

During the Ch'in and Han dynasties Sun Tzu's Art of War was in

»*^4.A..- • 7^^ — """^ i"*""" " "^TT7"r~ .. X.

mysterious import, and were unwillineMto ex

1 See supra^ p. xx.

INTRODUCTION XXXI

the benefit of posterity. Thus it came about that Wei Wu was the first
to write a commentary on it. '

As we have already seen, there is no reasonable ground
to suppose that Ts'ao Kung tampered with the text. But
the text itself is often so obscure, and the number of
editions which appeared from that time onward so great,
especially during the T'ang and Sung dynasties, that it
would be surprising if numerous corruptions had not managed
to creep in. Towards the middle of the Sung period, by
which time all the chief commentaries on Sun Tzu were
in existence, a certain ^ ^ ^ Chi Tlien-pao published
a work in 15 chuan entitled -f- ^ $j> 3f* ^ ££ "Sun Tzu
with the collected commentaries of ten writers." 3 There
was another text, with variant readings put forward by
Chu Fu of ^ J|L Ta-hsing, 3 which also had supporters
among the scholars of that period ; but in the Ming editions,
Sun Hsing-yen tells us, these readings were for some
reason or other no longer put into circulation. * Thus,
until the end of the i8th century, the text in sole pos-
session of the field was one derived from Chi T'ien-pao's
edition, although no actual copy of that important work
was known to have surrived. That, therefore, is the text
of Sun Tzu which appears in the War section of the great
Imperial encyclopaedia printed in 1726, the ~j!t ^f*" HO 1§*
^H jfc fat Chin T'u Shu Chi Ch'eng. Another copy at
my disposal of what is practically the same text, with
slight variations, is that contained in the ^ ffs; -j- — • ^
"Eleven philosophers of the Chou and Ch'in dynasties"

a # ffl ^ ir

2S« %&%&•

3 Alluded to on p. xvii, note 3*

XXXII INTRODUCTION

[1758]. And the Chinese printed in Capt. Calthrop's first
edition is evidently a similar version which has filtered
through Japanese channels. So things remained until
•££ M t/T Sun Hsing-yen [1752-1818], a distinguished
antiquarian and classical scholar, l who claimed to be an
actual descendant of Sun Wu, 2 accidentally discovered a
copy of Chi T'ien-pao's long-lost work, when on a visit
to the library of the §p $& Hua-yin temple. 3 Appended
to it was the ^ jjfc / Skno of J|$ £ ji^ Cheng Yu-hsien,
mentioned in the T^ung Chih, and also believed to have
perished. 4 This is what Sun Hsing-yen designates as the
"j^f ^5C or Jg( ^ "original edition (or text)" — a rather
misleading name, for it cannot by any means claim to
set before us the text of Sun Tzu in its pristine purity.
Chi T'ien-pao was a careless compiler, 6 and appears to
have been content to reproduce the somewhat debased
version current in his day, without troubling to collate it

1 A good biographical notice, with a list of his works, will be found in the

H $J It A H Sfr> ch- «8> to

• Preface * /,,,

y\^ -Jjjj "My family comes from Lo-an, and we are really descended from Sun
Tztt. I am ashamed to say that I only read my ancestor's work from a literary
point of view, without comprehending the military technique. So long have we
been enjoying the blessings of peace!"

3 Hua-yin is about 14 miles from yjj| ^ T'ung-kuan on the eastern border of
Shensi. The temple in question is still visited by those about to make the ascent
of the 3p [Jj or Western Sacred Mountain. It is mentioned in the ~fc HH

, ch. 32, f. 22, as the : -

% ^ -Ji jfe ^ J^ If ' 41-111 asituated five

east of the district city of Hua-yin. The temple contains the Hua-shan tablet in
scribed by the T'ang Emperor Hsiian Tsuncr [713—755] "

5 Cf. Sua Hsing-yen's remark h frapos of his mistakes in the names and order
of the commentators: *

INTRODUCTION XXXIII

with the earliest editions then available. Fortunately, two
versions of Sun Tzu, even older than the newly discovered
work, were still extant, one buried in the T'ung Tien,
Tu Yu's great treatise on the Constitution, the other
similarly enshrined in the T^ai P'ing Yii Lan encyclo-
paedia. In both the complete text is to be found, though
split up into fragments, intermixed with other matter, and
scattered piecemeal over a number of different sections.
Considering that the Yu^Lan takes us back to the year
983, and the T'ung Tien about 200 years further still,
to the irii^J^_of^hje_J.t_aii^_jlyna^^ ', the value of these
early transcripts of Sun Tzu can hardly be overestimated.
Yet the idea of utilising them does not seem to have oc-
curred to anyone until Sun Hsing-yen, acting under Govern-
ment instructions, undertook a thorough recension of the
text. This is his own account : —

Because of the numerous mistakes in the text of Sun Tzu which his
editors had handed down, the Government ordered that the ancient edition
[of Chi T'ien-pao] should be used, and that the text should be revised
and corrected throughout. It happened that Wu Nien-hu, the Governor
Pi Kua, and Hsi, a graduate of the second degree, had all devoted them-
selves to this study, probably surpassing me therein. Accordingly, I have
had the whole work cut on blocks as a text-book for military men. l

The three individuals here referred to had evidently
been occupied on the text of Sun Tzu prior to Sun Hsing-
yen's commission, but we are left in doubt as to the work
they really accomplished. At any rate, the new edition,
when ultimately produced, appeared in the names of Sun
Hsing-yen and only one co-editor, J^ J{ tjjj[ Wu Jen-chi.
They took the "original text" as their basis, and by careful
comparison with the older versions, as well as the extant
commentaries and other sources of information such as

C

XXXIV INTRODUCTION

the / Shuo, succeeded in restoring a very large number
of doubtful passages, and turned out, on the whole, what
must be accepted as the closest approximation we are
ever likely to get to Sun Tzu's original work. This is
what will hereafter be denominated the "standard text."

The copy which I have used belongs to a re-issue dated
1877. It is in 6 pen, forming part of a well-printed set
of 23 early philosophical works in 83 pen. 1 It opens with
a preface by Sun Hsing-yen (largely quoted in this intro-
duction), vindicating the traditional view of Sun Tzu's life
and performances, and summing up in remarkably concise
fashion the evidence in its favour. This is followed by
Ts'ao Kung's preface to his edition, and the biography
of Sun Tzu from the Shih Chi, both translated above.
Then come, firstly, Cheng Yu-hsien's I Shuo, 3 with author's
preface, and next, a short miscellany of historical and
bibliographical information entitled ^ -^ ^ ^ Sun Tzu
Hsu Lu, compiled by ||f. J£( £3] Pi I-hsiin. As regards
the body of the work, each separate sentence is followed
by a note on the text, if required, and then by the various
commentaries appertaining to it, arranged in chronological
order. These we shall now proceed to discuss briefly,
one by one.

THE COMMENTATORS.

•Sun Tzu can boast an exceptionally long and distinguished

roll of commentators, which would do honour to any classic.

Hfc 87 ^ Ou-yang Hsiu remarks on this fact, though he

wrote before the tale was complete, and rather ingeniously

explains it by saying that the artifices of war, being in-

1 See my "Catalogue of Chinese Books" (Luzac & Co., 1908), no. 40.

This is a discussion of 29 difficult passages in Sun Tzti, namely: I. 2; 26;
16; II. 9 & 105 III. 3; HI & VII; III. 17; IV. 4; 6; V. 3; 10 & n; 14; the
headings of the 13 chapters, with special reference to chap. VII; VII. 5; 15 & 16;
27; 33, &c.; VIII. 1-6; IX. n; X. 1-20; XI. 23; 31; 19; 43; VII. 12-14 & XI.
52; XI. 56; XIII. 15 & 16; 26; XIII in general.

INTRODUCTION XXXV

exhaustible, must therefore be susceptible of treatment in
a great variety of ways. l

1 • W ^ Ts'ao Ts'ao or ~§f ^ Ts'ao Kung, afterwards
known as ^ j£ ffi Wei Wu Ti [A.D. 155-220]. There
is hardly any room for doubt that the earliest commentary
on Sun Tzu actually came from the pen of this extra-
ordinary man, whose biography in the San fato Chih 3
reads like a romance. One of the greatest military geniuses-
that the world has seen, and Napoleonic in the scale of
his operations, he was especially famed for the marvellous
rapidity of his marches, which has found expression in the
line m 1" & W II «fc PI "^Ik of Ts'ao Ts'ao, and
Ts'ao Ts'ao will appear." Ou-yang Hsiu says of him that
he was a great captain who "measured his strength against
Tung Cho, Lu Pu and the two Yuan, father and son,
and vanquished them all ; whereupon he divided the Empire
of Han with Wu and Shu, and made himself king. It is
recorded that whenever a council of war was held by
Wei on the eve of a far-reaching campaign, he had all
his calculations ready, those generals who made use of
them did not lose one battle in ten ; those who ran counter
to them in any particular saw their armies incontinently
beaten and put to flight." 3 Ts'ao Kung's notes on Sun
Tzu, models of austere brevity, are so thoroughly charac-
teristic of the stern commander known to history, that it
is hard indeed to conceive of them as the work of a mere
litterateur. Sometimes, indeed, owing to extreme com-

Preface to Mei Yao-ch'en's edition: ^

~ tin M^

s See ch.

XXXVI INTRODUCTION

pression, they are scarcely intelligible and stand no less
in need of a commentary than the text itself. 1 As we
have seen, Ts'ao Rung is the reputed author of the ffi fj,
a book on war in 100,000 odd words, now lost, but
mentioned in the ||| ^ . 3

2- InL J^t Meng Shih. The commentary which has come
down to us under this name is comparatively meagre, and
nothing about the author is known. Even his personal name
has not been recorded. Chi T'ien-pao's edition places him
after Chia Lin, and f§ 4^ 3l£ Ch'ao Kung-wu also assigns
him to the T'ang dynasty, 3 but this is obviously a mistake,
as his work is mentioned in the |^ |J |g |§ ^ . In Sun
Hsing-yen's preface, he appears as Meng Shih of the Liang
dynasty [502—557]. Others would identify him with ^ |f£
Meng K'ang of the 3rd century. In the ^ jjj J|
he is named last of the 3£ ^ "Five Commentators
the others being Wei Wu Ti, Tu Mu, Ch'en Hao and
Chia Lin.

3. ^ ^ Li Ch'iian of the 8th century was a well-
known writer on military tactics. His -fc E=J (^ $§£ nas
been in constant use down to the present day. The JH ^
mentions ^ #[» ^ ^ (lives of famous generals from the
Chou to the T'ang dynasty) as written by him. 5 He is
also generally supposed to be the real author of the popular
Taoist tract, the |^ ^f $g. According to Ch'ao Kung-wu
and the T'ien-i-ko catalogue, 6 he followed the ^ £u ^g ^
text of Sun Tzu, which differs considerably from those

,
"

Catalogue of the library of the Fan

family at Ningpo, - , fol. I2 ^ : ^ |± ^ (g ^ ^| fig ^ ^

"His commentary is frequently obscure 5 it furnishes a clue, but does not fully
develop the meaning." 2 See ^g yjj , ch. 141 ad init.

3 ^F^w Hsien T'-ung K^ao^ ch. 221, f. 9^°. 4 Ch. 207, f. 5 r°.

5 It is interesting to note that M. Pelliot has recently discovered chapters i, 4
and 5 of this lost work in the "Grottos of the Thousand Buddhas." See B. E. F. E. O,
t. VIII, nos. 3—4, p. 525. 6 LoCt cit.

INTRODUCTION XXXVII

now extant. His notes are mostly short and to the point,
and he frequently illustrates his remarks by anecdotes
from Chinese history.

4. ti'fe Tu Yu O^ed 8l2) did n°t publish a separate
commentary on Sun Tzu, his notes being taken from the
T^ung Tien, the encyclopaedic treatise on the Constitution
which was his life-work. They are largely repetitions of
Ts'ao Kung and Meng Shih, besides which it is believed
that he drew on the ancient commentaries of ^ ^ Wang
Ling and others. Owing to the peculiar arrangement of
the T^ung Tien, he has to explain each passage on its
merits, apart from the context, and sometimes his own
explanation does not agree with that of Ts'ao Kung,
whom he always quotes first. Though not strictly to be
reckoned as one of the "Ten Commentators," he was
added to their number by Chi T'ien-pao, being wrongly
placed after his grandson Tu Mu.

5- ti$C Tu MU (803-852) is perhaps best known as
a poet — a bright star even in the glorious galaxy of
the T'ang period. We learn from Ch'ao Kung-wu that
although he had no practical experience of war, he was
extremely fond of discussing the subject, and was more-
over well read in the military history of the Cfcun Ck'iu
and Chan Kuo eras. l His notes, therefore, are well worth
attention. They are very copious, and replete with historical
parallels. The gist of Sun Tzu's work is thus summarised
by him: "Practise benevolence and justice, but on the
other hand make full use of artifice and measures of ex-
pediency." 3 He further declared that all the military

i Wen Hsien T^ung K^ao, ch. 221, f . 9 : {ft f | >$ $fr ffi ^ g |&

2 Preface to his commentary (T<-u Shu, j J& , ch. 442):

XXXVIII INTRODUCTION

triumphs and disasters of the thousand years which had
elapsed since Sun Wu's death would, upon examination,
be found to uphold and corroborate, in every particular,
the maxims contained in his book. : Tu Mu's somewhat
spiteful charge against Ts'ao Kung has already been con-
sidered elsewhere.

6- $jt (}!| Ch'en Hao appears to have been a contemp-
orary of Tu Mu. Ch'ao Kung-wu says that he was im-
pelled to write a new commentary on Sun Tzu because
Ts'ao Kung's on the one hand was too obscure and subtle,
and that of Tu Mu on the other too long-winded and
diffuse.2 Ou-yang Hsiu, writing in the middle of the nth
century, calls Ts'ao Kung, Tu Mu and Ch'en Hao the
three chief commentators on Sun Tzu (5Ei ^£), and observes
that Ch'en Hao is continually attacking Tu Mu's short-
comings. His commentary, though not lacking in merit,
must rank below those of his predecessors.

7- W ffi Chia Lin is known to have lived under the
T'ang dynasty, for his commentary on Sun Tzu is men-
tioned in the jfijf ^ and was afterwards republished by
$£ HJ Chi Hsieh of the same dynasty together with those
of Meng Shih and Tu Yu. 3 It is of somewhat scanty
texture, and in point of quality, too, perhaps the least
valuable of the eleven.

8- $1 Jl E£ Mei Yao-ch'en (1002-1060), commonly
known by his "style" as Mei H -$£ Sheng-yu, was, like
1 u Mu, a poet of distinction. His commentary was pub-
lished with a laudatory preface by the great Ou-yang
Hsiu, from which we may cull the following: -

Later scholars have misread Sun Tzu, distorting his words and trying
to make them square with their own one-sided views. Thus, though

1 **' & ft'% # ft ? A4M* $ jft*f |ft

* #l ttc £ •

INTRODUCTION XXXIX

commentators have not been lacking, only a few have proved equal to
the task. My friend Sheng-yu has not fallen into this mistake. In at-
tempting to provide a critical commentary for Sun Tzu's "work, he does
not lose sight of the fact that these sayings were intended for states en-
gaged in internecine warfare; that the author is not concerned with the
military conditions prevailing under the sovereigns of the three ancient
dynasties, ' nor with the nine punitive measures prescribed to the Minister
of War. 2 Again, Sun Wu loved brevity of diction, but his meaning is
always deep. Whether the subject be marching an army, or handling
soldiers, or estimating the enemy, or controlling the forces of victory, it
is always systematically treated; the sayings are bound together in strict
logical sequence, though this has been obscured by commentators who
have probably failed to grasp their meaning. In his own commentary,
Mei Sheng-yu has brushed aside all the obstinate prejudices of these
critics, and has tried to bring out the true meaning of Sun Tzu himself.
In this way, the clouds of confusion have been dispersed and the sayings
made clear. I am convinced that the present work deserves to be handed
down side by side with the three great commentaries; and for a great
deal that they find in the sayings, coming generations will have constant
reason to thank my friend Sheng-yu. 3

Making some allowance for the exuberance of friendship,
I am inclined to endorse this favourable judgment, and
would certainly place him above Ch'en Hao in order
of merit.

1 The Hsia, the Shang and the Chou. Although the last-named was nominally
existent in Sun Tzii's day, it retained hardly a vestige of power, and the old mili-
tary organisation had practically gone by the board. I can suggest no other ex-
planation of the passage.

2 See Chou Li, XXIX. 6-10.

• see r« s*., r m, ch. 9o, f. ,„.

XL INTRODUCTION

9- 3E 1=[ Wang Hsi, also of the Sung dynasty, is
decidedly original in some of his interpretations, but much
less judicious than Mei Yao-ch'en, and on the whole not
a very trustworthy guide. He is fond of comparing his
own commentary with that of Ts'ao Kung, but the com-
parison is not often flattering to him. We learn from
Ch'ao Kung-wu that Wang Hsi revised the ancient text
of Sun Tzu, filling up lacunae and correcting mistakes. l

10. '(of $& $$9 Ho Yen-hsi of the Sung dynasty. The
personal name of this commentator is given as above by
JfU jftj. Cheng Ch'iao in the T'ung Chih, written about
the middle of the twelfth century, but he appears simply
as 'fof J^ Ho Shih in the Yu Hai, and Ma Tuan-lin quotes
Ch'ao Kung-wu as saying that his personal name is un-
known. There seems to be no reason to doubt Cheng
Ch'iao's statement, otherwise I should have been inclined
to hazard a guess and identify him with one yfBf -^ ^
Ho Ch'u-fei, the author of a short treatise on war entitled
'Off ffjjjf, who lived in the latter part of the nth century. 2
Ho Shih's commentary, in the words of the T'ien-i-ko
catalogue, ^ fff ^L j£ "contains helpful additions" here
and there, but is chiefly remarkable for the copious ex-
tracts taken, in adapted form, from the dynastic histories
and other sources.

1 1 - §11 Bl Chang Yii. The list closes with a com-
mentator of no great originality perhaps, but gifted with
admirable powers of lucid exposition. His commentary is
based on that of Ts'ao Kung, whose terse sentences he
contrives to expand and develop in masterly fashion.
Without Chang Yu, it is safe to say that much of Tslao
Kung's commentary would have remained cloaked in its
pristine obscurity and therefore valueless. His work is
not mentioned in the Sung history, the T'ung K'ao, or

m

See |HJ Jjjl £ m, ch. 99, f.

INTRODUCTION XLI

the Yu Hai, but it finds a niche in the T'ung Chih,
which also names him as the author of the ^j $$• *$$
"Lives of Famous Generals." l

It is rather remarkable that the last-named four should
all have flourished within so short a space of time. Ch'ao
Kung-wu accounts for it by saying: "During the early
years of the Sung dynasty the Empire enjoyed a long
spell of peace, and men ceased to practise the art of war.
But when [Chao] Yiian-hao's rebellion came [1038-42]
and the frontier generals were defeated time after time,
the Court made strenuous enquiry for men skilled in war,
and military topics became the vogue amongst all the high
officials. Hence it is that the commentators of Sun Tzu
in our dynasty belong mainly to that period." '

Besides these eleven commentators, there are several
others whose work has not come down to us. The Sui
Shu mentions four, namely ££ /|| Wang Ling (often quoted
by Tu Yu as J -J-); ijg -^ $j$ Chang Tzu-shang; f|f ffj
Chia Hsu of Ut Wei-,3 and #£ £ Shen Yu of ^ Wu.
The T^ang Shu adds $fc ^ Sun Hao, and the T^ing Chih
jjlf •=*• Hsiao Chi, while the T'u Shu mentions a Ming
commentator, ^ }|ij 3£ Huang Jun-yii. It is possible that
some of these may have been merely collectors and editors
of other commentaries, like Chi T;ien-pao and Chi Hsieh,
mentioned above. Certainly in the case of the latter, the
entry ${* ^ xi J£ ^ m tne T^ung K'ao, without the fol-
lowing note, would give one to understand that he had
written an independent commentary of his own.

There are two works, described in the Ssu K'u Ch'uan

1 This appears to be still extant. See Wylie's "Notes," p. 91 (new edition).
• T**g A-X he. ci,.: fc J|j ^ ^ ^ ^ # T A ^ ^ ^

3 A notable person in his day. His biography is given in the San Kuo Chih^ ch. 10.

XLII INTRODUCTION

Shu l and no doubt extremely rare, which I should much
like to have seen. One is entitled $fa ^ j^ |5f , in 5 chuan.
It gives selections from four new commentators, probably
of the Ming dynasty, as well as from the eleven known to
us. The names of the four are $$ jf; Hsieh Yuan ; ^ |||
Chang Ao; 2$5 ^ Li Tslai; and ^ yg \ ^ Huang Chih-
cheng. The other work is ^ -^ f|| f|fc in 4 chuan, compiled
by J|[$ ^ Cheng Tuan of the present dynasty. It is a com-
pendium of information on ancient warfare, with special
reference to Sun Tzu's 1 3 chapters.

APPRECIATIONS OF SUN Tzu.

Sun Tzu has exercised a potent fascination over the
minds of some of China's greatest men. Among the famous
generals who are known to have studied his pages with
enthusiasm may be mentioned ^ {=f Han Hsin (d. B.C.
I96),2 ay| Feng I (d. A.D. 34), 3 g || Lu Meng
(d. 219), 4 and -gj- ^ Yo Fei (i 103-1 141). 5 The opinion
of Ts'ao Kung, "wHo~ disputes with Han Hsin the highest
place in Chinese military annals, has already been recorded. 6
Still more remarkable, in one way, is the testimony of
purely literary men, such as ^ ^J Su Hsiin (the father
of Su Tung-p'o), who wrote several essays on military
topics, all of which owe their chief inspiration to Sun Tzu.
The following short passage by him is preserved in the
Yu Hai:1 —

1 Ch. ioo, ff. 2, 3. 2 see p. 144. 3 Hou Han S/iu, ch. 17 ad init.

4 San Kuo Chih^ ch. 54, f. ioz/° (commentary).
6 Sung Shih, ch. 365 ad init.

0 The few Europeans who have yet had an opportunity of acquainting themselves
with Sun Tzti are not behindhand in their praise. In this connection, I may per-
haps be excused for quoting from a letter from Lord Roberts, to whom the sheets
of the present work were submitted previous to publication: "Many of Sun Wu's
maxims are perfectly applicable to the present day, and no. 1 1 on page 77 is one
that the people of this country would do well to take to heart "

1 Ch. 140, f. 13^°.

INTRODUCTION XLIIT

Sun Wu's saying, that in war one cannot make certain of conquering, *
is very different indeed from what other books tell us. 2 Wu Ch'i was a
man of the same stamp as Sun Wu: they both wrote books on war, and
they are linked together in popular speech as "Sun and Wu." But Wu
Ch'i's remarks on war are less weighty, his rules are rougher and more
crudely stated, and there is not the same unity of plan as in Sun
work, wherej:he style is terse,but themeaning fully brought out»

The ^ ^| fH 3?|, ch. 17, contains the following extract
from the 5| pf] ffi ^ "Impartial Judgments in the Garden
of Literature" by Jf|$ j|* Cheng Hou : -

Sun Tzu's 13 chapters are not only the staple and base of all military
men's training, but also compel the most careful attention of scholars and
men of letters. His sayings are terse yet elegant, simple yet profound,
perspicuous and eminently practical. Such works as the Lun Yu, the
/ Ching and the great Commentary, 4 as well as the writings of Mencius,
Hsiin K'uang and Yang Chu, all fall below the level of Sun Tzu. 5

Chu Hsi, commenting on this, fully admits the first
part of the criticism, although he dislikes the audacious
comparison with the venerated classical works. Language
of this sort, he says, "encourages a ruler's bent towards
unrelenting warfare and reckless militarism." 6

APOLOGIES FOR WAR.

Accustomed as we are to think of China as the greatest
peace-loving nation on earth, we are in some danger of

1 See IV. § 3.

2 The allusion may be to Mencius VI. 2. ix. 2 :

4 The Tso Chuan.

m m % ro * in ffi w JB m

XLIV INTRODUCTION

forgetting that her experience of war in all its phases has
also been such as no modern State can parallel. Her
long military annals stretch back to a point at which they
are lost in the mists of time. She had built the Great
Wall and was maintaining a huge standing army along
her frontier centuries before the first Roman legionary
was seen on the Danube. What with the perpetual col-
lisions of the ancient feudal States, the grim conflicts with
Huns, Turks and other invaders after the centralisation of
government, the terrific upheavals which accompanied the
overthrow of so many dynasties, besides the countless
rebellions and minor disturbances that have flamed up and
flickered out again one by one, it is hardly too much to
say that the clash of arms has never ceased to resound
in one portion or another of the Empire.

No less remarkable is the succession of illustrious cap-
tains to whom China can point with pride. As in all
countries, the greatest are found emerging at the most
fateful crises of her history. Thus, Po Ch'i stands out
conspicuous in the period when Ch'in was entering upon
her final struggle with the remaining independent states.
The stormy years which followed the break-up of the Ch'in
dynasty are illumined by the transcendent genius of Han
Hsin. When the House of Han in turn is tottering to
its fall, the great and baleful figure of Ts'ao Ts'ao do-
minates the scene. And in the establishment of the Pang
dynasty, one of the mightiest tasks achieved by man, the
superhuman energy of Li Shih-min (afterwards the Emperor
T'ai Tsung) was seconded by the brilliant strategy of Li
Ching. None of these generals need fear comparison with
the greatest names in the military history of Europe.

In spite of all this, the great body of Chinese sentiment,
from Lao Tzu downwards, and especially as reflected in
the standard literature of Confucianism, has been consistently
pacific and intensely opposed to militarism in any form.
It is such an uncommon thing to find any of the literati

INTRODUCTION XLV

defending warfare on principle, that I have thought it
worth while to collect and translate a few passages in
which the unorthodox view is upheld. The following, by
Ssu-ma Ch'ien, shows that for all his ardent admiration of
Confucius, he was yet no advocate of peace at any price : -

Military weapons are the means used by the Sage to punish violence
and cruelty, to give peace to troublous times, to remove difficulties and
dangers, and to succour those who are in peril. Every animal with blood
in its veins and horns on its head will fight when it is attacked. How
much more so will man, who carries in his breast the faculties of love
and hatred, joy and anger! When he is pleased, a feeling of affection
springs up within him; when angry, his poisoned sting is brought into
play. That is the natural law which governs his being .... What then
shall be said of those scholars of our time, blind to all great issues, and
without any appreciation of relative values, who can only bark out their
stale formulas about "virtue" and "civilisation," condemning the use of
military weapons? They will surely bring our country to impotence and
dishonour and the loss of her rightful heritage; or, at the very least,
they will bring about invasion and rebellion, sacrifice of territory and
general enfeeblement. Yet they obstinately refuse to modify the position
they have taken up. The truth is that, just as in the family the teacher
must not spare the rod, and punishments cannot be dispensed with in the
State, so military chastisement can never be allowed to fall into abeyance
in the Empire. All one can say is that this power will be exercised
wisely by some, foolishly by others, and that among those who bear arms
some will be loyal and others rebellious. *

The next piece is taken from Tu Mu's preface to his
commentary on Sun Tzu : -

War may be defined as punishment, which is one of the functions of
government. It was the profession of Chung Yu and Jan Ch'iu, both

1 Shih Chi, ch. 25, fol. i:

itt m nfr a fc & % g

£ & z

XLVI INTRODUCTION

disciples of- Confucius. Nowadays, the holding of trials and hearing of
litigation, the imprisonment of offenders and their execution by flogging
in the market-place, are all done by officials. But the wielding of huge
armies, the throwing down of fortified cities, the haling of women and
children into captivity, and the beheading of traitors -— this is also work
which is done by officials. The objects of the rack * and of military
weapons are essentially the same. There is no intrinsic difference be-
tween the punishment of flogging and cutting off heads in war. For the
lesser infractions of law, which are easily dealt with, only a small amount
of force need be employed : hence the institution of torture and flogging.
For more serious outbreaks of lawlessness, which are hard to suppress, a
greater amount of force is necessary: hence the use of military weapons
and wholesale decapitation. In both cases, however, the end in view is
to get rid of wicked people, and to give comfort and relief to the good 2 . . . .

Chi-sun a,sked Jan Yu, saying: "Have you. Sir, acquired your military
aptitude by study, or is it innate?" Jan Yu replied: "It has been ac-
quired by study." 3 "How can that be so," said Chi-sun, "seeing that
you are a disciple of Confucius?" "It is a fact," replied Jan Yu; "I was
taught by Confucius. It is fitting that the great Sage should exercise
both civil and military functions, though to be sure my instruction in the
art of fighting has not yet gone very far."

Now, who the author was of this rigid distinction between the "civil"
and the "military," and the limitation of each to a separate sphere of
action, or in what year of which dynasty it was first introduced, is more
than I can say. But, at any rate, it has come about that the members
of the governing class are quite afraid of enlarging on military topics, or
do so only in a shamefaced manner. If any are bold enough to discuss
the subject, they are at once set down as eccentric individuals of coarse
and brutal propensities. This is an extraordinary instance of the way in

1 The first instance of ^fc ^^ given in the P'-'ei Wen Yun Fu is from Ssu-ma
Ch'ien's letter to 'fjj- 4^ Jen An (see AJT vjg ? cn. 41, f. 9 r°), where M. Chavannes
translates it "la cangue et la chaine." But in the present passage it seems rather
to indicate some single instrument of torture.

3 Cf. SAIA Chi, ch. 47, f. ii

INTRODUCTION XLVII

which, through sheer lack of reasoning, men unhappily lose sight of fun-
damental principles. l

When the Duke of Chou was minister under Ch'eng Wang, he regulated
ceremonies and made music, and venerated the arts of scholarship and
learning; yet when the barbarians of the River Huai revolted, 2 he sal-
lied forth and chastised them. When Confucius held office under the
Duke of Lu, and a meeting was convened at Chia-ku, 3 he said : "If
pacific negotiations are in progress, warlike preparations should have been
made beforehand." He rebuked and shamed the Marquis of Ch'i, who
cowered under him and dared not proceed to violence. How can it be
said that these two great Sages had no knowledge of military matters? *

We have seen that the great Chu Hsi held Sun Tzu
in high esteem. He also appeals to the authority of the
Classics : -

Our Master Confucius, answering Duke Ling of Wei, said: "I have
never studied matters connected with armies and battalions." 5 Replying
to K'ung Wen-tzu, he said: "I have not been instructed about buff-coats
and weapons." 6 But if we turn to the meeting at Chia-ku, 7 we find
that he used armed force against the men of Lai, 8 so that the marquis
of Ch'i was overawed. Again, when the inhabitants of Pi revolted, he
ordered his officers to attack them, whereupon they were defeated and
fled in confusion. 9 He once uttered the words : "If I fight, I con-

0 * ?i •? li ¥ * ft # 0

tr * * * m £ ift Sf-

2 See Shti Ching^ preface § 55.

3 See Tso Chuan, Jj£ ^ X. 2 ; Shih Chi, ch. 47, f. 4 r°

4 J3 * # JA BE

» Lun KB, XV. i.

6 Tso Chuan^ j ^. , XI. 7. 7 See supra.

8 Tso Chuan, X. 2. 9 Ibid. XII. 5; CA*Vz K«i ch-

XLVIII INTRODUCTION

quer." * And Jan Yu also said : "The Sage exercises both civil and mil-
itary functions."2 Can it be a fact that Confucius never studied or
received instruction in the art of war? We can only say that he did not
specially choose matters connected with armies and fighting to be the
subject of his teaching. 3

Sun Hsing-yen, the editor of Sun Tzu, writes in similar
strain : —

Confucius said: "I am unversed in military matters." * He also said:
"If I fight, I conquer." * Confucius ordered ceremonies and regulated
music. Now war constitutes one of the five classes of State ceremonial, 5
and must not be treated as an independent branch of study. Hence,
the words "I am unversed in" must be taken to mean that there are
things which even an inspired Teacher does not know. Those who have
to lead an army and devise stratagems, must learn the art of war. But
if one can command the services of a good general like Sun Tzu, who
was employed by Wu Tzti-hsu, there is no need to learn it oneself.
Hence the remark added by Confucius : "If I fight, I conquer." 6

The men of the present day, however, wilfully interpret these words
of Confucius in their narrowest sense, as though he meant that books on
the art of war were not worth reading. With blind persistency, they
adduce the example of Chao Kua, who pored over his father's books to
no purpose, 7 as a proof that all military theory is useless. Again, seeing

1 have failed to trace this utterance. See note 2 on p. xliii.

2 See supra.

- IN « & m m A ffi m & ti ft A z

ft M 6 ff ± £ ft £ HB ftA ft 1? B.3U M &

* See supra.

5 Vh., Epf jjjg , the other four being "=jy , |X| , !jj| and J|£ "worship,
mourning, entertainment of guests and festive rites." See Shu Ching, II. I. iii. 8,
and Chou Li, IX. fol. 49.

« Preface to Sun Tzu: ^^.g^^^^^^^^^

E m & m s. m z - ^ M

See p. 166.

INTRODUCTION XLIX

that books on war have to do with such things as opportunism in design-
ing plans, and the conversion of spies, they hold that the art is immoral
and unworthy of a sage. These people ignore the fact that the studies
of our scholars and the civil administration of our officials also require
steady application and practice before efficiency is reached. The ancients
were particularly chary of allowing mere novices to botch their work. l
Weapons are baneful 2 and fighting perilous: and unless a general is in
constant practice, he ought not to hazard other men's lives in battle. 3
Hence it is essential that Sun Tzu's 13 chapters should be studied. *

Hsiang Liang used to instruct his nephew Chi 5 in the art of war.
Chi got a rough idea of the art in its general bearings, but would not
pursue his studies to their proper outcome, the consequence being that
he was finally defeated and overthrown. He did not realise that the
tricks and artifices of war are beyond verbal computation. Duke Hsiang
of Sung G and King Yen of Hsu 7 were brought to destruction by their
misplaced humanity. The treacherous and underhand nature of war
necessitates the use of guile and stratagem suited to the occasion. There
is a case on record of Confucius himself having violated an extorted
oath, 8 and also of his having left the Sung State in disguise. 9 Can we
then recklessly arraign Sun Tzu for disregarding truth and honesty?10

1 This is a rather obscure allusion to Tso Chuan, ^tQ fl<* , XXXI. 4, where

>^c -*-^

Tzu-ch^an says: ^ ^ E^ ^ ^ |jg ^ ^ JJL || "If you have a piece
of beautiful brocade, you will not employ a mere learner to make it up."
* Cf. Too Te Ching, ch. 31: & % ^ f£ £ $$ .

3 Sun Hsing-yen might have quoted Confucius again. See Lun Yu, XIII. 29, 30.

A

5 Better known as Hsiang ^j Yii [B.C. 233-202].

6 The third among the ^ 4t\ (or tfH) enumerated on p. 141. For the in-

• • * I r-l -^Jyv

cident referred to, see Tso Chuan, 4&L /fe , XXII. 4.

7 See supra, p. xvi, note 4. 8 Shih Chi, ch. 47, f. 7 r°.

9 Ibid., ch. 38, f. 8z>°.

10 ig ^ ^5, m ft fch 43

L INTRODUCTION

BIBLIOGRAPHY.

The following are the oldest Chinese treatises on war,
after Sun Tzu. The notes on each have been drawn
principally from the 0 jj £ ^ fgj ^ g ^ Stf #«
ch'uan shu chien ming mu lu, ch. 9, fol. 22 sqq.

1 . -^ -^ Wu Tzu, in i chuan or 6 ^ chapters. By ^
^g Wu Ch'i (df. B.C. 381). A genuine work. See Shih
Chi, ch. 65.

2. Hj ,lf ^ Ssu-ma Fa, in i chuan or 5 chapters.
Wrongly attributed to fjf) J| fj| |£ Ssu-ma Jang-chu of
the 6th century B.C. Its date, however, must be early,
as the customs of the three ancient dynasties are con-
stantly to be met with in its pages. * See Shih Chi, ch. 64.

The Ssu K^u Ch'uan Shu (ch. 99, f. i) remarks that
the oldest three treatises on war, Sun Tzu, Wu Tzu and
the Ssu-ma Fa, are, generally speaking, only concerned
with things strictly military - - the art of producing, col-
lecting, training and drilling troops, and the correct theory
with regard to measures of expediency, laying plans, trans-
port of goods and the handling of soldiers 2 - - in strong
contrast to later works, in which the science of war is
usually blended with metaphysics, divination and magical
arts in general.

3- ^ §@ Liu T'ao, in 6 chuan or 60 chapters. At-
tributed to g H Lii Wang (or Lii ^ Shang, also

known as ^ /^ T'ai Kung) of the 1 2th century B.C. 3 But

3 See p. 174. Further details on T'ai Kung will be found in the Shih Chi,
ch. 32 ad init. Besides the tradition which makes him a former minister of Chou
Hsin, two other accounts of him are there given, according to which he would
appear to have been first raised from a humble private station by Wen Wang.

INTRODUCTION LI

its style does not belong to the era of the Three Dynasties. 1
1^ M W Lu Timing (550-625 A.D.) mentions the work,

and enumerates the headings of the six sections, ^, jj£,
J5% ' ^K) » HI anc* ^t ' so t^iat t^ie forgery cannot have been

later than the Sui dynasty.

4- It IS "7" Wei Liao Tzu» in 5 chuan. Attributed
to Wei Liao (4th cent. B.C.), who studied under the famous
JJjL & ^r Kuei-ku Tzu. The g| ^, under ^ ^, men-
tions a book of Wei Liao in 31 chapters, whereas the
text we possess contains only 24. Its matter is sound
enough in the main, though the strategical devices differ
considerably from those of the Warring States period. 3
It has been furnished with a commentary by the well-
known Sung philosopher ij|f jjfc Chang Tsai.

5- H 0& San Liieh, in 3 chuan. Attributed to J| ^ ^
Huang-shih Kung, a legendary personage who is said to
have bestowed it on Chang Liang (d. B.C. 187) in an
interview on a bridge. 8 But here again, the style is not
that of works dating from the Ch'in or Han period. The
Han Emperor Kuang Wu [A.D. 25—57] apparently quotes
from it in one of his proclamations; but the passage in
question may have been inserted later on, in order to
prove the genuineness of the work. We shall not be far
out if we refer it to the Northern Sung period [420-478
A.D., or somewhat earlier. 4

3 See Han Shu, Jg j^ ^ , ch. 40. The work is there called^ ^ .& ££ .

Hence it has been confused with the Liu T~ao. The T~u Shu attributes both the
Liu T-ao and the San Liieh to Tlai Kung.

* && 7'tt#it M *ff'£ ft ••$.! 2

4k -^j?> l/j[ ImF •%&. ~jfc H}| pf ?^ . Another work said to have been written
by Huang-shih Kung, and also included in the military section of the Imperial
Catalogue, is the -|pr ips Su Shu in i chuan. A short ethical treatise of Taoist

Lil INTRODUCTION

6. ^ f§ <& ftjj ij Li Wei Rung Wen Tui, in 3 sections.
Written in the form of a dialogue between T'ai Tsung
and his great general ^ jf| Li Ching, it is usually ascribed
to the latter. Competent authorities consider it a forgery,
though the author was evidently well versed in the art
of war. l

7. ^ ip| & $; Li Ching Ping Fa (not to be confounded
with the foregoing) is a short treatise in 8 chapters, preserved
in the Tung Tien, but not published separately. This
fact explains its omission from the Ssu K'u Ch'uan Shu.

8- S ^ $S Wu Ch<i ching> 3 m i ^-««». Attributed
to the legendary minister Jjj^ Jg Feng Hou, with exegetical
notes by $$ $fc ^ Kung-sun Hung of the Han dynasty
(d. B.C. 121), and said to have been eulogised by the
celebrated general Jf pj| Ma Lung (d. A.D. 300). Yet
the earliest mention of it is in the ^ ^. Although a
forgery, the work is well put together. 3

Considering the high popular estimation in which ^
^ ^ Chu-ko Liang has always been held, it is not sur-
prising to find more than one work on war ascribed to
his pen. Such are (i) the -f- ^ ^ Shih Liu Ts'e
( i chuan\ preserved in the ^< ^ ^C ft Yung Lo Ta Tien ;

(2) ?ff $L Chiang Yuan (i ^.)- and (3) Aj) § Hsin Shu

(i ch.\ which steals wholesale from Sun Tzu. None of
these has the slightest claim to be considered genuine.

savour, having no reference whatever to war, it is pronounced a forgery from the
hand of ^^ |^ _ml Chang Shang-ying (d. 1121), who edited it with commentary.

Correct Wylie's "Notes," new edition, p. 90, and Courant's "Catalogue des Livres
Chinois," no. 5056.

We are told in the ^ ^ J? that the above six works, together with Sun Tzii,
were those prescribed for military training in the j^ J|i. period (1078-85). See
Yu Hai, ch. 140, f. 4 r°.
2 Also written g ^ j and | J Wu Chi Ching.

INTRODUCTION LIII

Most of the large Chinese encyclopaedias contain ex-
tensive sections devoted to the literature of war. The
following" references may be found useful : —

Tung Tien (circa 800 A.D.), ch. 148-162.

T<ai P'in§ Yii Lan (983), ch. 270-359.
3$C fit M ^ W^n Hsien T'ung K'ao (13* cent.), ch. 221.
35 '/S Yii Hai (13th cent.), ch. 140, 141.
H yf HII H" San Ts'ai T'u Hui (16* cent.), \ ^ ch. 7, 8.
If IS $3 ^ Kuang Po Wu Chih (1607), ch. 31, 32.
}f ^|||J;ChHen Ch'io Lei Shu (1632), ch. 75.
?K3 SS iS ® Yiian Chien Lei Han (1710), ch. 206-229.
"ifr -4* H S ^1 J?!c Ku Chin T<u Shu Chi Ch'eng (1726),

section XXX, ^jr/. ch. 81-90.

g| ^jgc^Ji^ Hsu Wen Hsien T4ung K'ao (1784),

ch. 121-134.

M 18 ^ tft ^t H Huang Ch'ao Ching Shih Wen Pien

(1826), ch. 76, 77.

The bibliographical sections of certain historical works
also deserve mention : —

•^ g| ^ Ch'ien Han Shu, ch. 30.
|5jf ^ Sui Shu, ch. 32-35.
3j| jg m Chiu T'ang Shu, ch. 46, 47.
^ff )§ ^ Hsin T'ang Shu, ch. 57-60.

Sung Shih, ch. 202-209.

T'ung Chih («>^ 1150), ch. 68.

To these of course must be added the great Catalogue
of the Imperial Library: -

K'u Ch'iian Shu Tsung
Mu T'i Yao (1790), ch. 99, 100.

I. LAYING PLANS.

This is the only possible meaning of g-|-, which M. Amiot and Capt.
Calthrop wrongly translate "Fondements de 1'art militaire" and "First
principles" respectively. Ts'ao Kung says it refers to the deliberations
in the temple selected by the general for his temporary use, or as we
should say, in his tent. See §26.

i . Sun Tzii said : The art of war is of vital importance
to the State.

2. It is a matter of life and death, a road either to
safety or to ruin. Hence it is a subject of inquiry which
can on no account be neglected.

3. The art of war, then, is governed by five constant
factors, to be taken into account in one's deliberations,
when seeking to determine the conditions obtaining in
the field.

The old text of the Tung Tien has $r $g £ J# ft jfc £ || ,

etc. Later editors have inserted l|j after j£ , and J^ before ^-|* .
The former correction is perhaps superfluous, but the latter seems neces-
sary in order to make sense, and is supported by the accepted reading
in § 12, where the same words recur. I am inclined to think, however,
that the whole sentence from jdfc to 'H|| is an interpolation and has
no business here at all. If it be retained, Wang Hsi must be right in
saying that g-(- denotes the "seven considerations" in § 13. 'fjfj are
the circumstances or conditions likely to bring about victory or defeat.
The antecedent of the first is J ; of the second, J^ • >

4. -

contains the idea of "comparison with the enemy," which cannot well
be brought out here, but will appear in § 12. Altogether, difficult though
it is, the passage is not so hopelessly corrupt as to justify Capt. Calthrop
in burking it entirely.

4. These are : (i) The Moral Law ; (2) Heaven ; (3) Earth ;
(4) The Commander; (5) Method and discipline.

It appears from what follows that Sun Tzti means by j|f^ a Principle
of harmony, not unlike the Tao of Lao Tzu in its moral aspect. One
might be tempted to render it by "morale," were it not considered as an
attribute of the ruler in § 13.

5, 6. The Moral Law causes the people to be in
complete accord with their ruler, so that they will follow
him regardless of their lives, undismayed by any danger.

The original text omits ^ ^jjj, inserts an J£J after each ~flj*, and
omits JjjJ after ffjj . Capt. Calthrop translates : "If the ruling authority
be upright, the people are united" • — a very pretty sentiment, but wholly
out of place in what purports to be a translation of Sun Tzu.

7. Heaven signifies night and day, cold and heat, times
and seasons.

The commentators, I think, make an unnecessary mystery of (^ ||J|? .
Thus Meng Shih defines the words as Mil & Tjft &S "the hard and

Inl'J s\^ JHL /MO

the soft, waxing and waning," which does not help us much. Wang Hsi,
however, may be right in saying that what is meant is jUj ^ ^ "the
general economy of Heaven," including the five elements, the four sea-
sons, wind and clouds, and other phenomena.

8. Earth comprises distances, great and small; danger
and security; open ground and narrow passes; the chances
of life and death.

^E ^fe (omitted by Capt. Calthrop) may have been included here
because the safety of an army depends largely on its quickness to turn
these geographical features to account.

10. & ^ ft id g- g ± ffl

9. 7^£ Commander stands for the virtues of wisdom,
sincerity, benevolence, courage and strictness.

The five cardinal virtues of the Chinese are (i) f"! humanity or
benevolence; (2) l|| uprightness of mind; (3) jj|J| self-respect, self-control,
or "proper feeling;" (4) ^ wisdom; (5) -jpj sincerity or good faith. Here
>JU and >j=| are put before ^^ , and the two military virtues of "courage"
and "strictness" substituted for l|h and ifi® .

10. By Method and discipline are to be understood the
marshalling of the army in its proper subdivisions, the
gradations of rank among the officers, the maintenance
of roads by which supplies may reach the army, and the
control of military expenditure.

The Chinese of this sentence is so concise as to be practically unintel-
ligible without commentary. I have followed the interpretation of Ts'ao
Kung, who joins |Qj ^j|J and again ^ J^ . Others take each of the
six predicates separately. f[j| has the somewhat uncommon sense of
"cohort" or division of an army. Capt. Calthrop translates: "Partition
and ordering of troops," which only covers ^ ^j|J .

1 1 . These five heads should be familiar to every general :
he who knows them will be victorious; he who knows
them not will fail.

12. Therefore, in your deliberations, when seeking to
determine the military conditions, let them be made the
basis of a comparison, in this wise : -

The Yu Lan has an interpolated ^ before g-J* . It is obvious, how-
ever, that the ^L ^jf Just enumerated cannot be described as g-f.
Capt. Calthrop, forced to give some rendering of the words which he had
omitted in § 3, shows himself decidedly hazy: "Further, with regard to
these and the following seven matters, the condition of the enemy must
be compared with our own." He does not appear to see that the seven
queries or considerations which follow arise directly out of the Five heads,
instead of being supplementary to them.

& & ft m ±

i& V II ft** it 4

13. (i) Which of the two sovereigns is imbued with the
Moral law?

I. e., "is in harmony with his subjects." Cf. § 5.

(2) Which of the two generals has most ability?

(3) With whom lie the advantages derived from Heaven
and Earth?

See §§ 7, 8.

(4) On which side is discipline most rigorously enforced?

Tu Mu alludes to the remarkable story of Ts'ao Ts'ao (A. D. 155 — 220),
who was such a strict disciplinarian that once, in accordance with his
own severe regulations against injury to standing crops, he condemned
himself to death for having allowed his horse to shy into a field of corn !
However, in lieu of losing his head, he was persuaded to satisfy his sense
of justice by cutting off his hair. Ts'ao Ts'ao's own comment on the
present passage is characteristically curt: |§* fft ^ ^ ^ ffjj jjfc |^
f{when you lay down a law, see that it is not disobeyed; if it is disobeyed,
the offender must be put to death."

(5) Which army is the stronger?

Morally as well as physically. As Mei Yao-ch'en puts it, ptj Jfft £[» |^ ,

which might be freely rendered "esprit de corps and 'big battalions.'"

(6) On which side are officers and men more highly
trained ?

Tu Yu quotes 3E -^ as saying: "Without constant practice, the of-
ficers will be nervous and undecided when mustering for battle; without
constant practice, the general will be wavering and irresolute when the
crisis is at hand."

(7) In which army is there the greater constancy both
in reward and punishment?

IJJ , literally "clear;" that is, on which side is there the most absolute
certainty that merit will be properly rewarded and misdeeds summarily
punished ?

14. By means of these seven considerations I can fore-
cast victory or defeat.

I?- I^ 0 ftf ffS i&J fllfe

15. The general that hearkens to my counsel and acts
upon it, will conquer: — let such a one be retained in
command! The general that hearkens not to my counsel
nor acts upon it, will suffer defeat: — let such a one be
dismissed !

The form of this paragraph reminds us that Sun Tzu's treatise was
composed expressly for the benefit of his patron ||f] ^ Ho Lii, king
of the Wti State. It is not necessary, however, to understand ^j before
@ ^ (as some commentators do), or to take *|^ as "generals under
my command."

1 6. While heeding the profit of my counsel, avail your-
self also of any helpful circumstances over and beyond
the ordinary rules.

Capt. Calthrop blunders amazingly over this sentence: "Wherefore,
with regard to the foregoing, considering that with us lies the advantage,
and the generals agreeing, we create a situation which promises victory."
Mere logic should have kept him from penning such frothy balderdash.

17. According as circumstances are favourable, one
should modify one's plans.

Sun Tzu, as a practical soldier, will have none of the "bookish theoric."
He cautions us here not to pin our faith to' abstract principles; "for," as
Chang Yii puts it, "while the main laws of strategy can be stated clearly
enough for the benefit of all and sundry, you must be guided by the
actions of the enemy in attempting to secure a favourable position in
actual warfare." On the eve of the battle of Waterloo, Lord Uxbridge,
commanding the cavalry, went to the Duke of Wellington in order to
learn what his plans and calculations were for the morrow, because, as
he explained, he might suddenly find himself Commander-in-chief and
would be unable to frame new plans in a critical moment. The Duke
listened quietly and then said: "Who will attack the first to-morrow — I
or Bonaparte?" "Bonaparte," replied Lord Uxbridge. "Well," continued
the Duke, "Bonaparte has not given me any idea of his projects; and as
my plans will depend upon his, how can you expect me to tell you what
mine are ?" *

* "Words on Wellington," by Sir W. Fraser.

18- ^ % H M.

ft 4t& ff :$ 2 7 1^ K ^ £ 78 ft W4M:

Sfcifii^za

20. ^ij fffi if ;£ ii ffn $t £

21. » rffl ffi 2 ffi BB & 2

22. & ffi) £ 2. J& ffi If 2

1 8. All warfare is based on deception.

The truth of this pithy and profound saying will be admitted by every
soldier. Col. Henderson tells us that Wellington, great in so many mili-
tary qualities, was especially distinguished by "the extraordinary skill with
which he concealed his movements and deceived both friend and foe."

/i 9. Hence, when able to attack, we must seem unable;
when using our forces, we must seem inactive; when we
are near, we must make the enemy believe we are far
away; when far away, we must make him believe we
are near.

20. Hold out baits to entice the enemy. Feign dis-
order, and crush him.

JJ5(, as often in Sun Tzu, is used in the sense of *j|c. It is rather
remarkable that all the commentators, with the exception of Chang Yii,
refer ja^ to the enemy: "when he is in disorder, crush him." It is
more natural to suppose that Sun Tzu is still illustrating the uses of
deception in war.

21. If he is secure at all points, be prepared for him.
If he is in superior strength, evade him.

The meaning of jjj is made clear from chap. VI, where it is opposed
to ||[ "weak or vulnerable spots." jjtji » according to Tu Yu and other
commentators, has reference to the keenness of the men as well as to
numerical superiority. Capt. Calthrop evolves an extraordinarily far-fetched
translation: "If there are defects, give an appearance of perfection, and
awe the enemy. Pretend to be strong, and so cause the enemy to
avoid you" !

22. If your opponent is of choleric temper, seek to ir-
ritate him. Pretend to be weak, that he may grow arrogant.

I follow Chang Yu in my interpretation of :&% . j|l is expanded by
Mei Yao-ch'en into ^ J^ j|r jg . Wang Tzu, quoted by Tu Yu,

23.

fcUZfe £ *Ht ffl

25- ift^lt^

20.

says that the good tactician plays with his adversary as a cat plays with
a mouse, first feigning weakness and immobility, and then suddenly
pouncing upon him.

23. If he is taking his ease, give him no rest.

This is probably the meaning, though Mei Yao-ch'en has the note:

K% •$& ^ i^C $f $$. ^ ^ "while we are taking our ease, wait for

the enemy to tire himself out." The Yu Lan has jtj| ffjj ^ ^

"Lure him on and tire him out." This would seem also to have been

Ts'ao Kung's text, judging by his comment J,/j[ 7Ji|J »j& ^ .

If his forces are united, separate them.

Less plausible is the interpretation favoured by most of the commen-
tators: "If sovereign and subject are in accord, put division between them."

24. Attack him where he is unprepared, appear where
you are not expected.

25. These military devices, leading to victory, must not
be divulged beforehand.

This seems to be the way in which Ts'ao Kung understood the
passage, and is perhaps the best sense to be got out of the text as
it stands. Most of the commentators give the following explanation :
"It is impossible to lay down rules for warfare before you come into
touch with the enemy." This would be very plausible if it did not
ignore [J^ , which unmistakably refers to the maxims which Sun Tzu
has been laying down. It is possible, of course, that jj£ may be a later
interpolation, in which case the sentence would practically mean: "Suc-
cess in warfare cannot be taught." As an alternative, however, I would
venture to suggest that a second ^ may have fallen out after "jjj*, so
that we get : "These maxims for succeeding in war are the first that ought
to be imparted."

26. Now the general who wins a battle makes many
calculations in his temple ere the battle is fought.

8

Chang Yii tells us that in ancient times it was customary for a temple
to be set apart for the use of a general who was about to take the field,
in order that he might there elaborate his plan of campaign. Capt. Calthrop
misunderstands it as "the shrine of the ancestors," and gives a loose and
inaccurate rendering of the whole passage.

The general who loses a battle makes but few cal-
culations beforehand. Thus do many calculations lead to
victory, and few calculations to defeat: how much more
no calculation at all! It is by attention to this point that
I can foresee who is likely to win or lose.

II. WAGING WAR.

Ts'ao Kung has the note: ^^^ "He who

wishes to fight must first count the cost," which prepares us for the dis-
covery that the subject of the chapter is not what we might expect from
the title, but is primarily a consideration of ways and means.

i. Sun Tzu said: In the operations of war, where there
are in the field a thousand swift chariots, as many heavy
chariots, and a hundred thousand mail-clad soldiers,

were lightly built and, according to Chang Yii, used for
the attack ; the "ffi ifi were heavier, and designed for purposes of defence.
Li Ch'iian, it is true, says that the latter were light, but this seems hardly
probable. Capt. Calthrop translates "chariots" and "supply wagons"
respectively, but is not supported by any commentator. It is interesting
to note the analogies between early Chinese warfare and that of the
Homeric Greeks. In each case, the war-chariot was the important factor,
forming as it did the nucleus round which was grouped a certain number
of foot-soldiers. With regard to the numbers given here, we are informed
that each swift chariot was accompanied by 75 footmen, and each heavy
chariot by 25 footmen, so that the whole army would be divided up into
a thousand battalions, each consisting of two chariots and a hundred men.

with provisions enough to carry them a thousand li,

2.78 modern li go to a mile. The length may have varied slightly
since Sun Tzu's time.

the expenditure at home and at the front, including enter-
tainment of guests, small items such as glue and paint,

10

2.

3. A $ en; IN H M ^ &

and sums spent on chariots and armour, will reach the
total of a thousand ounces of silver per day.

ty , which follows ?||! in the textus receptus, is important as indicating
the apodosis. In the text adopted by Capt. Calthrop it is omitted, so
that he is led to give this meaningless translation of the opening sentence :
"Now the requirements of War are such that we need 1,000 chariots,"
etc. The second JJP, which is redundant, is omitted in the Yu Lan.

-5~^

-3^ ^ , like -^J- Jji above, is meant to suggest a large but indefinite
number. As the Chinese have never possessed gold coins, it is incorrect
to translate it "1000 pieces of gold."

Such is the cost of raising an army of 100,000 men.

Capt. Calthrop adds: "You have the instruments of victory," which he
seems to get from the first five characters of the next sentence.

2. When you engage in actual fighting, if victory is
long in coming, the men's weapons will grow dull and
their ardour will be damped.

The Yu Lan omits ^ ; but though ^ ^ is certainly a bold phrase,
it is more likely to be right than not. Both in this place and in § 4,
the Tlung Tien and Yu Lan read jji|j (in the sense of "to injure") in-
stead of $|,.

If you lay siege to a town, you will exhaust your strength.
As synonyms to Jjjl are given jjj^ , $p , |p| and ^ .

3. Again, if the campaign is protracted, the resources
of the State will not be equal to the strain.

9\. ^ Sift means literally, "If there is long exposure of the army."
Of -^ in this sense K'ang Hsi cites an instance from the biography of

W fS Tou Jun§ in tne Hou Han Shui wnere tne commentary defines
it by H . Cf. also the following from the |r^ g ^ : ^ j|f ^

^ US ^ %k "General, you have long been exposed to all weathers."

1 1

4.

4. Now, when your weapons are dulled, your ardour
damped, your strength exhausted and your treasure spent,
other chieftains will spring up to take advantage of your
extremity. Then no man, however wise, will be able to
avert the consequences that must ensue.

Following Tu Yu, I understand ^ in the sense of "to make good,"
i. e. to mend. But Tu Mu and Ho Shih explain it as "to make good
plans" — for the future.

5. Thus, though we have heard of stupid haste in war,
cleverness has never been seen associated with long delays.

This concise and difficult sentence is not well explained by any of the
commentators. Ts'ao Kung, Li Ch'iian, Meng Shih, Tu Yu, Tu Mu and
Mei Yao-ch'en have notes to the effect that a general, though naturally
stupid, may nevertheless conquer through sheer force of rapidity. Ho
Shih says: "Haste may be stupid, but at any rate it saves expenditure of
energy and treasure; protracted operations may be very clever, but they
bring calamity in their train." Wang Hsi evades the difficulty by remarking :
"Lengthy operations mean an army growing old, wealth being expended,
an empty exchequer and distress among the people; true cleverness in-
sures against the occurrence of such calamities." Chang Yii says: "So
long as victory can be attained, stupid haste is preferable to clever dila-
toriness." Now Sun Tzu says nothing whatever, except possibly by im-
plication, about ill-considered haste being better than ingenious but lengthy
operations. What he does say is something much more guarded, namely
that, while speed may sometimes be injudicious, tardiness can never be
anything but foolish — if only because it means impoverishment to the
nation. Capt. Calthrop indulges his imagination with the following:
"Therefore it is acknowledged that war cannot be too short in duration.
But though conducted with the utmost art, if long continuing, misfortunes
do always appear." It is hardly worth while to note the total disappearance
of ;j*(J jj|j| in this precious concoction. In considering the point raised
here by Sun Tzti, the classic example of Fabius Cunctator will inevitably
occur to the mind. That general deliberately measured the endurance of
Rome against that of Hannibal's isolated army, because it seemed to him
that the latter was more likely to suffer from -a long campaign in a strange
country. But it is quite a moot question whether his tactics would have
proved successful in the long run. Their reversal, it is true, led to Can-
nae; but this only establishes a negative presumption in their favour.

12

6. There is no instance of a country having benefited
from prolonged warfare.

The Yu Lan has [gj instead of g| — evidently the mistake of
a scribe.

7. It is only one who is thoroughly acquainted with the
evils of war that can thoroughly understand the profitable
way of carrying it on.

That is, with rapidity. Only one who knows the disastrous effects of a
long war can realise the supreme importance of rapidity in bringing it to
a close. Only two commentators seem to favour this interpretation, but
it fits well into the logic of the context, whereas the rendering, "He who
does not know the evils of war cannot appreciate its benefits," is distinctly
pointless.

8. The skilful soldier does not raise a second levy,
neither are his supply-waggons loaded more than twice.

Once war is declared, he will not waste precious time in waiting for
reinforcements, nor will he turn his army back for fresh supplies, but
crosses the enemy's frontier without delay. This may seem an audacious
policy to recommend, but with all great strategists, from Julius Caesar to
Napoleon Buonaparte, the value of time — that is, being a little ahead
of your opponent — has counted for more than either numerical superiority
or the nicest calculations with regard to commissariat. |sj| is used in
the sense of ^ . The T'ung Tien and Yu Lan have the inferior reading
^. The commentators explain ^f\ ~ JJ& by saying that the wag-
gons are loaded once before passing the frontier, and that the army is
met by a further consignment of supplies on the homeward march. The
Yu Lan, however, reads ^. here as well.

9. Bring war material with you from home, but forage
on the enemy. Thus the army will have food enough
for its needs.

|H , "things to be used," in the widest sense. It includes all the im-
pedimenta of an army, apart from provisions.

13

3 ft ft tt € &tt & * M ft &

m * * g * 1 m w ** it *8

10. Poverty of the State exchequer causes an army to
be maintained by contributions from a distance. Con-
tributing to maintain an army at a distance causes the
people to be impoverished.

The beginning of this sentence does not balance properly with the next,
though obviously intended to do so. The arrangement, moreover, is so
awkward that I cannot help suspecting some corruption in the text. It
never seems to occur to Chinese commentators that an emendation may
be necessary for the sense, and we get no help from them here. Sun
Tzu says that the cause of the people's impoverishment is Jg| jjffjjj ; it is
clear, therefore, that the words have reference to some system by which
the husbandmen sent their contributions of corn to the army direct.
But why should it fall on them to maintain an army in this way, except
because the State or Government is too poor to do so? Assuming then
that ^^ ought to stand first in the sentence in order to balance j|£
(the fact that the two words rhyme is significant), and thus getting rid of
|S| ^ > we are still left with J^ [Jjjj , which latter word seems to me
an obvious mistake for ^ . "Poverty in the army" is an unlikely ex-
pression, especially as the general has just been warned not to encumber
his army with a large quantity of supplies. If we suppose that (jj|}
somehow got written here instead of [H (a very simple supposition, as
we have jj£ j^ (jjjj in the next sentence), and that later on somebody,
scenting a mistake, prefixed the gloss H ^ to ^^ , without however
erasing J^ (Jj|j , the whole muddle may be explained. My emended
text then would be " etc<

1 1 . On the other hand, the proximity of an army causes
prices to go up ; and high prices cause the people's sub-
stance to be drained away.

jj£, that is, as Wang Hsi says, before the army has left its own ter-
ritory. Ts'ao Kung understands it of an army that has already crossed
the frontier. Capt. Calthrop drops the J^ , reading j^£ £j|j ^ , but
even so it is impossible to justify his translation "Repeated wars cause
high prices."

12. When their substance is drained away, the peasantry
will be afflicted by heavy exactions.

H

A ' JJ JB »^4Ui W II I
-b

14. «

Cf. Mencius VII. 2. xiv. 2, where j£ g* has the same meaning as

JEt ^ • -£ was an ancient measure of land- The ful1 table> as §iven

by f^ ^ ^, may not be out of place here: 6/^ = 1^; 100 ^ =

i ^; ico^^1 ^; 3 ^t = i M; 3 M = i #; 4^=1 eL;

4S=iJ^; 4 j£ = i 'fij • According to the Chou Li, there were nine
husbandmen to a iJJ:, which would assign to each man the goodly al-
lowance of 100 jjjj^ (of which 6.6 now go to an acre). What the values
of these measures were in Sun Tzti's time is not known with any certainty.
The lineal f^, however, is supposed to have been about 20 cm. ^
may include levies of men, as well as other exactions.

V/I3, 14. With this loss of substance and exhaustion of
strength, the homes of the people will be stripped bare,
and three-tenths of their incomes will be dissipated;

The Yu Lan omits gj Jjp . I would propose the emended reading

'/I SB HlI Eft > etc- In yiew of tne fact tnat we nave St jifi in tne
S'* /M~I y^-^ i •^j '^

two preceding paragraphs, it seems probable that ^J is a scribe's mistake
for j||J , Jp having been added afterwards to make sense. p£| jjjj| ^

^ J^ ^Cj literally: "Within the middle plains there is emptiness in
the homes." For F£ Jgr cf. Shih Ching II. 3. vi. 3 and II. 5. n. 3. With

regard to -f> £ 3£ ^ , Tu Mu says: ^ || -f ^ ^ ^ {fj ,

and Wang Hsi : ^ .^ -^ 4±. ^ ; that is, the people are mulcted not
of y3^, but of T7¥, of their income. But this is hardly to be extracted
from our text. Ho Shih has a characteristic tag: ||0 Jxj[ fji '1^ 2J!C

Sm^^^JgA±*fi^fi'lt "The *»& being
regarded as the essential part of the State, and food as the people's heaven,
is it not right that those in authority should value and be careful of
both?"

while Government expenses for broken chariots, worn-out
.horses, breast-plates and helmets, bows and arrows, spears
and shields, protective mantlets, draught-oxen and heavy
waggons, will amount to four-tenths of its total revenue.

15

31 1 ^ - +

The K# Lan has several various readings here, the more important of
which are «Jjj? for the less common ^ (read /'z'2), "~J"' for j^, and

Ji 2fc. for j£ ^«, which latter, if right, must mean "oxen from the
country districts" (cf. supra, § 12). For the meaning of >H| , see note
on III, § 4. Capt. Calthrop omits to translate fr. ^ ^ jjl .

15. Hence a wise general makes a point of foraging
on the enemy. One cartload of the enemy's provisions is
equivalent to twenty of one's own, and likewise a single
picul of his provender is equivalent to twenty from one's
own store.

Because twenty cartloads will be consumed in the process of transporting
one cartload to the front. According to Ts'ao Kung, a ||f = 6 ffi 4 gij. ,

or 64 g>J, but according to Meng Shih, 10 ffl make a |jf. The ^

picul consisted of 70 ^j* catties (Tu Mu and others say 120). lg ^f,
literally, "beanstalks and straw."

1 6. Now in order to kill the enemy, our men must be
roused to anger ; that there may be advantage from defeating
the enemy, they must have their rewards.

These are two difficult sentences, which I have translated in accordance
with Mei Yao-ch'en's paraphrase. We may incontinently reject Capt.
Calthrop's extraordinary translation of the first: "Wantonly to kill and
destroy the enemy must be forbidden." Ts'ao Kung quotes a jingle cur-
rent in his day: ^ ft % ± ^ ^^ ffl| <£ ± ^ Q. Tu
Mu says: "Rewards are necessary in order to make the soldiers see the
advantage of beating the enemy ; thus, when you capture spoils from the
enemy, they must be used as rewards, so that all your men may have a
keen desire to fight, each on his own account. Chang Yu takes ^c|J as
the direct object of J^( , which is not so good.

17. Therefore in chariot fighting, when ten or more
chariots have been taken, those should be rewarded who
took the first.

i6

is.

Capt. Calthrop's rendering is : "They who are the first to lay their hands
on more than ten of the enemy's chariots, should be encouraged." We
should have expected the gallant captain to see that such Samson-like
prowess deserved something more substantial than mere encouragement.
T. omits |jj£ , and has Jjj/J _£, in place of the more archaic g^ _^ .

Our own flags should be substituted for those of the
enemy, and the chariots mingled and used in conjunction
with ours. The captured soldiers should be kindly treated

A 1

and kept.

i8./ This is called, using the conquered foe to augment
/onown strength. ^ ^ f . ^ ^f^ff^^,

. In war,* then, let your great object be victory, not
engthy campaigns. r*&2sC,£

As Ho Shih remarks: ^^pf^C^^'Srif ^w*r is not a
/ thing to be trifled with." Sun Tzu here reiterates the main lesson which
this chapter is intended to enforce.

20. Thus it may be known that the leader of armies
is the arbiter of the people's fate, the man on whom it
depends whether the nation shall be in peace or in peril.

In the original text, there is a /jh before the J$J .

« jk ft

III. ATTACK BY STRATAGEM.

1. Sun Tzu said: In the practical art of war, the best
thing of all is to take the enemy's country whole and
intact; to shatter and destroy it is not so good. So, too,
it is better to capture an army entire than to destroy it,
to capture a regiment, a detachment or a company entire
than to destroy them.

A jj[ "army corps," according to Ssu-ma Fa, consisted nominally of
12500 men; according to Ts'ao Kung, a j^j contained 500 men, a 7jj£
any number between 100 and 500, and a '(JL any number between 5
and 100. For the last two, however, Chang Yii gives the exact figures
of TOO and 5 respectively.

2. Hence to fight and conquer in all your battles is
not supreme excellence; supreme excellence consists in
breaking the enemy's resistance without fighting.

Here again, no modern strategist but will approve the words of the old
Chinese general. Moltke's greatest triumph, the capitulation of the huge
French army at Sedan, was won practically without bloodshed.

3. Thus the highest form of generalship is to baul
the enemy's plans ;

2

4 .

I.e., as Li Ch'iian says (<f& 3( jft $ &)> "> their very inception.
Perhaps the word "baulk" falls short of expressing the full force of ^ ,
which implies not an attitude of defence, whereby one might be content
to foil the enemy's stratagems one after another, but an active policy of
counter-attack. Ho Shih puts this very clearly in his note: "When the
enemy has made a plan of attack against us, we must anticipate him by
delivering our own attack first."

the next best is to prevent the junction of the enemy's
forces ;

Isolating him from his allies. We must not forget that Sun Tzti, in
speaking of hostilities, always has in mind the numerous states or princi-
palities into which the China of his day was split up.

the next in order is to attack the enemy's army in the field ;

When he is already in full strength,
and the worst policy of all is to besiege walled cities.

The use of the word J5£ is somewhat unusual, which may account for
the reading of the modern text : S ~J\ JJ£ JjjjJJ .

4. The rule is, not to besiege walled cities if it can
possibly be avoided.

Another sound piece of military theory. Had the Boers acted upon it
in 1899, and refrained from dissipating their strength before Kimberley,
Mafeking, or even Ladysmith, it is more than probable that they would
have been masters of the situation before the British were ready seriously
to oppose them.

The preparation of mantlets, movable shelters, and various
implements of war, will take up three whole months;

It is not quite clear what |J| were. Ts'ao Kung simply defines them
as ^ ;jtjg "large shields," but we get a better idea of them from Li Ch'iian,
who says they were to protect the heads of those who were assaulting
the city walls at close quarters. This seems to suggest a sort of Roman
testudo, ready made. Tu Mu says they were "what are now termed
j|2 ffi" (wheeled vehicles used in repelling attacks, according to K'ang
Hsi), but this is denied by Ch'en Hao. See supra, II. 14. The name
is also applied to turrets on city walls. Of |j|f 4H (fen yuri) we get

19

5 . %. -* 0 g & m m m z w ± H » z -

a fairly clear description from several commentators. They were wooden
missile-proof structures on four wheels, propelled from within, cove-
red over with raw hides, and used in sieges to convey parties of men
to and from the walls, for the purpose of filling up the encircling moat
with earth. Tu Mu adds that they are now called ~fc j||| "wooden
donkeys." Capt. Calthrop wrongly translates the term, "battering-rams."
I follow Ts'ao Kung in taking J=T as a verb, co-ordinate and synonymous
with /jj|£ . Those commentators who regard jj|£ as an adjective equiva-
lent to -^ "long," make JL presumably into a noun.

and the piling up of mounds over against the walls will
take three months more.

The J£|J |||| (or Jjjj , in the modern text) were great mounds or ram-
parts of earth heaped up to the level of the enemy's walls in order to
discover the weak points in the defence, and also to destroy the jjfe ^
fortified turrets mentioned in the preceding note. Tu Yu quotes the Tso

5. The general, unable to control his irritation, will
launch his men to the assault like swarming ants,

Capt. Calthrop unaccountably omits this vivid simile, which, as Ts'ao
Kung says, is taken from the spectacle of an army of ants climbing a
wall. The meaning is that the general, losing patience at the long delay,
may make a premature attempt to storm the place before his engines of
war are ready.

with the result that one-third of his men are slain, while
the town still remains untaken. Such are the disastrous
effects of a siege.

We are reminded of the terrible losses of the Japanese before Port
Arthur, in the most recent siege which history has to record. The T'-ung
Tien reads ^ J$ ^ £ jg; . . . ||J ^ ± $L . . . # $ £ <£ .

For "|H^ J the Yu Lan has fQ ^K . Capt. Calthrop does not translate
and mistranslates

6. Therefore the skilful leader subdues the enemy's
troops without any fighting; he captures their cities with-

\

2O

7.

out laying siege to them; he overthrows their kingdom
without lengthy operations in the field.

Chia Lin notes that he only overthrows the [j|| , that is, the Govern-
ment, but does no harm to individuals. The classical instance is Wu
Wang, who after having put an end to the Yin dynasty was acclaimed
"Father and mother of the people."

7. With his forces intact he will dispute the mastery
of the Empire, and thus, without losing a man, his triumph
will be complete.

Owing to the double meanings of & , ^ [= ^ ] and ^ |J , the
latter part of the sentence is susceptible of quite a different meaning:
"And thus, the weapon not being blunted by use, its keenness remains
perfect." Chang Yii says that ^pjj is "the advantage of a prosperous
kingdom and a strong army."
x This is the method of attacking by stratagem.

8. It is the rule in war, if our forces are ten to the enemy's
one, to surround him ; if five to one, to attack him ;

Straightaway, without waiting for any further advantage.
if twice as numerous, to divide our army into two.

Note that ^ does not refer to the enemy, as in the two ^preceding
clauses. This sudden change of object is quite common in Chinese.
Tu Mu takes exception to the saying; and at first sight, indeed, it appears
to violate a fundamental principle of war. Ts'ao Kung, however, gives
a clue to Sun Tzti's meaning: ty ^ j|£ — ||J — $ij ^ ]£ —
t$;f ^ij pj "Being two to the enemy's one, we may use one parlf; of our
army in the regular way, and the other for some special diversion." [For
explanation of j£ and ^ , see V. 3, note.] Chang Yu thus further
elucidates the point : "If our force is twice as numerous as that of the
enemy, it should be split up into two divisions, one to meet the enemy
in front, and one to fall upon his rear; if he replies to the frontal attack,
he may be crushed from behind; if to the rearward attack, he may be
crushed in front. This is what is meant by saying that "one part may
be used in the regular way, and the other for some special diversion."
Tu Mu does not understand that dividing one's army is simply an irre-
gular, just as concentrating it is the regular, strategical method, and he
is too hasty in calling this a mistake."

21

»• 1& HI it ifc £ & n sfe JS Z * ^ M'J B^ 3! £

9. If equally matched, we can offer battle;

Li Ch'iian, followed by Ho Shih, gives the following paraphrase:
=fc 2£ ^t $f£ Wfe *& 3£ ® "If attackers and attacked are equally

_H ^Pl XV IKl*. |R- |=t Pi ~T*\

matched in strength, only the able general will fight." He thus takes
j||2 as though it were j||| ^jf , which is awkward.

if slightly inferior in numbers, we can avoid the enemy ;
The Tu Shu has ^f* instead of i^fc , which is hardly distinguishable in sense

-J A^— •

from :jjn| in the next clause. The meaning, "we can watch the enemy," is
certainly a great improvement on the above; but unfortunately there ap-
pears to be no very good authority for the variant. Chang Yu reminds
us that the saying only applies if the other factors are equal; a small
difference in numbers is often more than counterbalanced by superior
energy and discipline.

if quite unequal in every way, we can flee from him.

10. Hence, though an obstinate fight may be made
by a small force, in the end it must be captured by the
larger force.

In other words: "C'est magnifique; mais ce n'est pas la guerre."

11. Now the general is the bulwark of the State: if
the bulwark is complete at all points, the State will be
strong ; if the bulwark is defective, the State will be weak.

K!i cannot be restricted to anything so particular as in Capt. Calthrop's
translation, "divided in his allegiance." It is simply keeping up the
metaphor suggested by ^ . As Li Ch'uan tersely puts it: (Sjjji j|f£ -{j^

ft&$W*Jfc:&M "C/l'*> gap' indicates deficiency; if the
general's ability is not perfect (i. e. if he is not thoroughly versed in his
profession), his army will lack strength."

12. There are three ways in which a ruler can bring
misfortune upon his army: —

22

1 «. '"""""""'

13. (i) By commanding the army to advance or to
retreat, being ignorant of the fact that it cannot obey.
This is called hobbling the army.

Ts'ao Kung weakly defines ^ as :jjjp "control," "direct." Cf. § 17
ad Jin. But in reality it is one of those graphic metaphors which from
time to time illuminate Sun Tzu's work, and is rightly explained by Li
Ch'uanas=:^. He adds the comment: #fl ^ ]g| JgL $$ tijfa || ^ .
"It is like tying together the legs of a thoroughbred, so that it is unable
to gallop." One would naturally think of "the ruler" in this passage as
being at home, and trying to direct the movements of his army from a
distance. But the commentators understand just the reverse, and quote
the saying of T'ai Kung: g^pTJ^^t^^S^PTja^t
pfa ^jin "A kingdom should not be governed from without, an army
should not be directed from within." Of course it is true that, during
an engagement, 'or when in close touch with the enemy, the general
should not be in the thick of his own troops, but a little distance apart.
Otherwise, he will be liable to misjudge the position as a whole, and
give wrong orders.

14. (2) By attempting to govern an army in the same
way as he administers a kingdom, being ignorant of the
conditions which obtain in an army. This causes restless-
ness in the soldier's minds.

Ts'ao Kung's note is: 5 ^ ^ A B B ^ ^ A 5 /H ^

"Pf Ji^l j?p ^ ill > which may be freely translated : "The military sphere
and the civil sphere are wholly distinct; you can't handle an army in kid
gloves." And Chang Yu says: "Humanity and justice (fc f^ ) are the
principles on which to govern a state, but not an army; opportunism
and flexibility ( |H $jjk ), on the other hand, are military rather than

civic virtues." |ij ^ jj| ^ jg£ , "to assimilate the governing of an
army" - to that of a State, understood. The Tung Tien has ^
inserted before JiJ , here and in § 15.

23

B5 n =

T5- (3) By employing the officers of his army without
discrimination,

That is, he is not careful to use the right man in the right place.
through ignorance of the military principle of adaptation to
circumstances. This shakes the confidence of the soldiers.

I follow Mei Yao-ch'en here. The other commentators make ~jf\ ^JJ
etc. refer, not to the ruler, as in §§ 13, 14, but to the officers he employs.

Thus Tu Yu says: ^ ^ ^ ^ ff f| ^ 1^ ft $ 1£ & "If

a general is ignorant of the principle of adaptability, he must not be en-
trusted with a position of authority." Tu Mu quotes •p? ~fc ^ : "The
skilful employer of men will employ the wise man, the brave man, the
covetous man, and the stupid man. For the wise man delights in
establishing his merit, the brave man likes to show his courage in action,
the covetous man is quick at seizing advantages, and the stupid man has
no fear of death." The Tung Tien reads j|f U ^ , which Tu Yu
explains as |j j|j£ "is utterly defeated." Capt. Calthrop gives a very
inaccurate rendering : "Ignorant of the situation of the army, to interfere
in its dispositions."

1 6. But when the army is restless and distrustful, trouble
is sure to come from the other feudal princes. This is
simply bringing anarchy into the army, and flinging vic-
tory away.

Most of the commentators take HI in the sense of ^E, which it

seems to bear also in the Li Chi, ^ jjl£ . I. 18. [^|7 is there given
as its equivalent, but Legge tries notwithstanding to retain the more
usual sense, translating "draw . . . back," which is hardly defensible.]
Tu Mu and Wang Hsi, however, think jj| Jj|f means "leading up to the
enemy's victory."

17. Thus we may know that there are five essentials

24

for victory: (i) He will win who knows when to fight
and when not to fight.

Chang Yii says: "If he can fight, he advances and takes the offensive;
if he cannot fight, he retreats and remains on the defensive. He will
invariably conquer who knows whether it is right to take the offensive
or the defensive."

(2) He will win who knows how to handle both superior
and inferior forces.

This is not merely the general's ability to estimate numbers correctly,
as Li Ch'iian and others make out. Chang Yii expounds the saying more
satisfactorily: "By applying the art of war, it is possible with a lesser
force to defeat a greater, and vice versa. The secret lies in an eye for
locality, and in not letting the right moment slip. Thus Wu Tzii says:
'With a superior force, make for easy ground; with an inferior one, make
for difficult ground.'"

(3) He will win whose army is animated by the same
spirit throughout all its ranks.

Ts'ao Kung refers j^ ~"f\ less well to sovereign and subjects.

(4) He will win who, prepared himself, waits to take
the enemy unprepared.

(5) He will win who has military capacity and is not
interfered with by the sovereign.

Tu Yu quotes £ ^ as saying: =|fg#;g-&ifc#,M

"It is the sovereign's function to give broad instructions, but to decide
on battle is the function of the general." It is needless to dilate on the
military disasters which have been caused by undue interference with
operations in the field on the part of the home government. Napoleon
undoubtedly owed much of his extraordinary success to the fact that he
was not hampered by any central authority, — that he was, in fact, H&

J -Tfi • /*"

and jg in one.

Victory lies in the knowledge of these five points.
Literally, "These five things are knowledge of the principle of victory."
1 8. Hence the saying: If you know the enemy and
know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred

25

battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for
every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. ^

Ch'iian cites the case of p g| Fu Chien, prince of Ch'in,

who in 383 A.D. marched with a vast army against the ^- Chin Emperor.
When warned not to despise an enemy who could command the services
of such men as ||J- ^^ Hsieh An and ^g ^ Huan Ch'ung, he boast-
fully replied : "I have the population of eight provinces at my back, in-
fantry and horsemen to the number of one million; why, they could dam
up the Yangtsze River itself by merely throwing their whips into the
stream. What danger have I to fear?" Nevertheless, his forces were
soon after disastrously routed at the y|j|2 Fei River, and he was obliged
to beat a hasty retreat.

If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will
succumb in every battle, x^

The modern text, represented by the ^ *jj£ ^ ^ and Tu 6/^,has jjfc
J|£ , which I should be inclined to adopt in preference to ^ here, though
the Tung Tien and Yu Lan both have the latter. Chang Yu oifers the
best commentary on ^fl fj£ ffl S • He says that these words "have
reference to attack and defence: knowing the enemy enables you to take
the offensive, knowing yourself enables you to stand on the defensive."
He adds: ^^^^t^^S?fe^^ "Attack is the secret
of defence; defence is the planning of an attack." It would be hard to
find a better epitome of the root-principle of war.

2.

IV. TACTICAL DISPOSITIONS.

^U is a very comprehensive and somewhat vague term. Literally,
"form," "body," it comes to mean "appearance," "attitude" or "disposition ;"
and here it is best taken as something between, or perhaps combining,
"tactics" and "disposition of troops." Ts'ao Kung explains it as jp[ ^

^ifc^il^ii^il^ffi^'l^-tfc "marching and counter-

marching on the part of the two armies with a view to discovering each
other's condition." Tu Mu says: "It is through the ^ dispositions of
an army that its condition may be discovered. Conceal your dispositions
(3&| JfJ)> and your condition will remain secret, which leads to victory;
show your dispositions, and your condition will become patent, which
leads to defeat." Wang Hsi remarks that the good general can &|& Jfa
it ^ 13 Hfc J£t ^3j ^ "secure success by modifying his tactics to
meet those of the enemy." In the modern text, the title of the chapter
appears as j|f ^ , which Capt. Calthrop incorrectly translates "the order
of battle."

1. Sun Tzu said: The good fighters of old first put
themselves beyond the possibility of defeat, and then
waited for an opportunity of defeating the enemy.

2. To secure ourselves against defeat lies in our own
hands, but the opportunity of defeating the enemy is
provided by the enemy himself.

That is, of course, by a mistake on his part. Capt. Calthrop has:
"The causes of defeat come from within; victory is born in the enemy's
camp," which, though certainly an improvement on his previous attempt,
is still incorrect.

27

3- I

4-

3. Thus the good fighter is able to secure himself
against defeat,

"By concealing the disposition of his troops, covering up his tracks,
and taking unremitting precautions" (Chang Yii).

but cannot make certain of defeating the enemy.

The original text reads ^ j|j£ ^ ~pj* Jj^ , which the modern text has
further modified into £ ^ jj£\ ~p* J . Capt. Calthrop makes out the

impossible meaning, "and further render the enemy incapable of victory."

4. Hence the saying: One may know how to conquer
without being able to do it.

Capt. Calthrop translates: "The conditions necessary for victory may
be present, but they cannot always be obtained," which is more or less
unintelligible.

5 . Security against defeat implies defensive tactics ; ability
to defeat the enemy means taking the offensive.

For ^p ~p[* Jj|p I retain the sense which it undoubtedly bears in
§§ i — 3, in spite of the fact that the commentators are all against me.
The meaning they give, "He who cannot conquer takes the defensive,"
is plausible enough, but it is highly improbable that ^ should suddenly
become active in this way. An incorrect variant in the Yii Lan is

6. Standing on the defensive indicates insufficient strength •
attacking, a superabundance of strength.

7. The general who is skilled in defence hides in the
most secret recesses of the earth;

Literally, "hides under the ninth earth," which is a metaphor indicating
the utmost secrecy and concealment, so that the enemy may not know

28

his whereabouts. The ^ Jjjj of this passage have of course no connection
with the - jj "Nine situations" of chap. XI.

he who is skilled in attack flashes forth from the topmost
heights of heaven.

Another metaphor, implying that he falls on his adversary like a thun-
derbolt, against which there is no time to prepare. This is the opinion*
of most of the commentators, though Ts'ao Kung, followed by Tu Yu,
explains fyjfc as the hills, rivers, and other natural features which will
afford shelter or protection to the attacked, and ^ as the phases of
weather which may be turned to account by the attacking party. Capt.
Calthrop's "The skilful in attack push to the topmost heaven" conveys
no meaning at all.

Thus on the one hand we have ability to protect our-
selves; on the other, a victory that is complete.

Capt. Calthrop draws on a fertile imagination for the following: "If
these precepts be observed, victory is certain."

8. To see victory only when it is within the ken of
the common herd is not the acme of excellence.

As Ts'ao Kung remarks, ^ ^ "the thing is to see the plant

before it has germinated," to foresee the event before the action has begun.
Li Ch'iian alludes to the story of Han Hsin who, when about to attack
the vastly superior army of Jj| Chao, which was strongly entrenched in
the city of jfc ^ Ch'eng-an, said to his officers: "Gentlemen, we are
going to annihilate the enemy, and shall meet again at dinner." The
officers hardly took his words seriously, and gave a very dubious assent.
But Han Hsin had already worked out in his mind the details of a clever
stratagem, whereby, as he foresaw, he was able to capture the city and
inflict a crushing defeat on his adversary. For the full story, see ^ JS
ff > chap. 34, ^ >jg ^ . Capt. Calthrop again blunders badly with :
"A victory, even if popularly proclaimed as such by the common folk,
may not be a true success."

9. Neither is it the acme of excellence if you fight and
conquer and the whole Empire says, "Well done!"

True excellence being, as Tu Mu says : (^ |j| j|| ^| ^ jty ffi
H $5f 'fifc Z, H 1^ ^ jfJL -j/J "To Plar> secretly, to move sur-

29

tit ft * tt * if ft £ # JK * » 11*11 It

reptitiously, to foil the enemy's intentions and baulk his schemes, so
that at last the day may be won without shedding a drop of blood."
Sun Tzti reserves his approbation for things that

"the world's coarse thumb
And finger fail to plumb."

10. To lift an autumn hair is no sign of great strength;

^ ft is explained as the fur of a hare, which is finest in autumn,
when it begins to grow afresh. The phrase is a very common one in Chinese
writers. Cf. Mencius, I. i. vii. 10, and Chuang Tzti, ffi ;[[> *Jj£, et al.

to see sun and moon is no sign of sharp sight; to hear
the noise of thunder is no sign of a quick ear.

Ho Shih gives as real instances of strength, sharp sight and quick
hearing: Jf^ ||| Wu Huo, who could lift a tripod weighing 250 stone;
JS§ ^fc. Li Chu, who at a distance of a hundred paces could see objects
no bigger than a mustard seed ; and [Jjjj lj|lf Shih K'uang, a blind musician
who could hear the footsteps of a mosquito.

1 1 . What the ancients called a clever fighter is one
who not only wins, but excels in winning with ease.

The original text, followed by the Tu ^«,has
But this is an alteration evidently intended to smooth the awkwardness of
H^ W^ §3 ^ ^ ifc ' wkicn means literally : "one who, conquering,
excels in easy conquering." Mei Yao-ch'en says: "He who only sees the
obvious, wins his battles with difficulty; he who looks below the surface
of things, wins with ease."

12. Hence his victories bring him neither reputation for
wisdom nor credit for courage.

Tu Mu explains this very well: "Inasmuch as his victories are gained
over circumstances that have not come to light, the world at large knows
nothing of them, and he wins no reputation for wisdom; inasmuch as
the hostile state submits before there has been any bloodshed, he receives
no credit for courage."

13.

13. He wins his battles by making no mistakes.

Ch'en Hao says: "He plans no superfluous marches, he devises no
futile attacks." The connection of ideas is thus explained by Chang Yu :
"One who seeks to conquer by sheer strength, clever though he may be
at winning pitched battles, is also liable on occasion to be vanquished;
whereas he who can look into the future and discern conditions that are
not yet manifest, will never make a blunder and therefore invariably win."
Li Ch'iian thinks that the character ~fifc should be J^ "to have doubts."
But it is better not to tamper with the text, especially . when no improve-
ment in sense is the result.

Making no mistakes is what establishes the certainty of
victory, for it means conquering an enemy that is already
defeated.

The T'-u Shu omits jj£\ . ^^ is here = jW . Chia Lin says it is put for ^jp

in the sense of ^jjfc ; but this is far-fetched. Capt. Calthrop altogether
ignores the important word ^ .

14. Hence the skilful fighter puts himself into a position
which makes defeat impossible, and does not miss the
moment for defeating the enemy.

A ^ • ti "coimsel of perfection," as Tu Mu truly observes.

Jj|j need not be confined strictly to the actual ground occupied by the
troops. It includes all the arrangements and preparations which a wise
general will make to increase the safety of his army.

15. Thus it is that in war the victorious strategist only
seeks battle after the victory has been won, whereas he
who is destined to defeat first fights and afterwards looks
for victory.

Ho Shih thus expounds the paradox: "In warfare, first lay plans which
will^ ensure victory, and then lead your army to battle: if you will not
begin with stratagem but rely on brute strength alone, victory will no
longer be assured."

fcflf ***<**«<*

1 6. The consummate leader cultivates the moral law,
and strictly adheres to method and discipline;

For ^ and ££, see supra, I. 4 sqq. I think that Chang Yu is
wrong in altering their signification here, and taking them as
^ and $|J £ ^ ££ respectively.

thus it is in his power to control success.

17. In respect of military method, we have, firstly,
Measurement; secondly, Estimation of quantity; thirdly,
Calculation; fourthly, Balancing of chances; fifthly, Victory.

1 8. Measurement owes its existence to Earth; Estimation
of quantity to Measurement; Calculation to Estimation of
quantity ; Balancing of chances to Calculation ; and Victory
to Balancing of chances.

It is not easy to distinguish the four terms j|£ -j|j* f|£ 7pp| very
clearly. The first seems to be surveying and measurement of the ground,
which enable us to jjj form an estimate of the enemy's strength, and
'to Jjr make calculations based on the data thus obtained; we are thus
led to ;|p| a general weighing-up, or comparison of the enemy's chances
with our own; if the latter turn the scale, then Jj|p victory ensues. The
chief difficulty lies in j£ , which some commentators take as a calculation
of numbers^ thereby making it nearly synonymous with ~JT? . Perhaps
-M] is rather a consideration of the enemy's general position or con-
dition ('|*j{| or ^^ ^ip1)? while (^ is the estimate of his numerical strength.
On the other hand, Tu Mu defines f|!£ as ^ j£ , and adds : jjSji jjjy

B ^ M H fl ffl t^ H Wi & "the question of relative strength
having been settled, we can bring the varied resources of cunning into
play." Ho Shih seconds this interpretation, which is weakened, however,
by the fact that ;|p| is given as logically consequent on jjjf ; this cer-
tainly points to the latter being a calculation of numbers. Of Capt.
Calthrop's version the less said the better.

32

19. A victorious army opposed to a routed one, is as a
pound's weight placed in the scale against a single grain.

Literally, "a victorious army is like an J^ i (20 oz.) weighed against
a <|i j^« (^ oz.); a routed army as a j^w weighed against an i" The
point is simply the enormous advantage which a disciplined force, flushed
with victory, has over one demoralised by defeat. Legge, in his note on
Mencius, I. 2. ix. 2, makes the Jj^ to be 24 Chinese ounces, and cor-
rects Chu Hsi's statement that it equalled 20 oz. only. But Li Ch'iian
of the T'ang dynasty here gives the same figure as Chu Hsi.

20. The onrush of a conquering force is like the bursting
of pent-up waters into a chasm a thousand fathoms deep.
So much for tactical dispositions.

The construction here is slightly awkward and elliptical, but the general
sense is plain. The Tu Shu omits jj*-^. A|j7/=8^or Chinese feet.

V.

2.

V. ENERGY.

^jj; here is said to be an older form of 3jk; Sun Tzu, however, would
seem to have used the former in the sense of "power," and the latter
only in the sense of "circumstances." The fuller title -^ ^i is found
in the T*u Shu and the modern text. Wang Hsi expands it into /jif!| 33)*
^ ^JJP "tne application, in various ways, of accumulated power;" and
Chang Yu says: # #$ ft & && # & #1$ "When the
soldiers' energy has reached its height, it may be used to secure victory."

i. Sun Tzu said: The control of a large force is the
same in principle as the control of a few men : it is merely
a question of dividing up their numbers.

That is, cutting up the army into regiments, companies, etc., with
subordinate officers in command of each. Tu Mu reminds us of Han
Hsin's famous reply to the first Han Emperor, who once said to him:
"How large an army do you think I could lead?" "Not more than 100,000
men, your Majesty." "And you?" asked the Emperor. "Oh!" he an-
swered, "the more the better" ( ^ ^ ^ yjft If). Chang Yu gives
the following curious table of the subdivisions of an army: — 5 men
make a ^|J; 2 ^|J make a fc; 5 fc make a |^; 2 [^ make a *£? ;

2 make a ; 2 make a - ; 2 - make a ;6 ; 2 >fe make a

^.; 2 |fl|!. make a W . A j|? or army corps thus works out at 3200
men. But cf. III. § i, note. For ^ , seel. § 10. It is possible that ^
in that paragraph may also be used in the above technical sense.

2. Fighting with a large army under your command is
nowise different from fighting with a small one : it is merely
a question of instituting signs and signals.

3

34

One must be careful to avoid translating pj ^ "fighting
large number," no reference to the enemy being intended. ^, is ex-
plained by Ts'ao Kung as denoting flags and banners, by means of which
every soldier may recognise his own particular regiment or company, and
thus confusion may be prevented. ^ he explains as drums and gongs,
which from the earliest times were used to sound the advance and the
retreat respectively. Tu Mu defines ^ as |5jj[ ^ "marshalling the
troops in order," and takes ^g as the flags and banners. Wang Hsi also
dissents from Ts'ao Kung, referring ^ to the ordering of the troops by
means of banners, drums and gongs, and -^ to the various names by
which the regiments might be distinguished. There is much to be said
for this view.

3. To ensure that your whole host may withstand the
brunt of the enemy's attack and remain unshaken — this
is effected by manoeuvres direct and indirect.

For jj£\ , there is another reading Ijj , "all together," adopted by Wang
Hsi and Chang Yu. We now come to one of the most interesting parts
of Sun Tzu's treatise, the discussion of the j£ and the ^ . As it is
by no means easy to grasp the full significance of these two terms, or to
render them at all consistently by good English equivalents, it may be
as well to tabulate some of the commentators' remarks on the subject
before proceeding further. Li Ch'iian: ^j^^jE^Hj^ii^
"Facing the enemy is cheng, making lateral diversions is chli" Chia Lin:
H tfc #1 IE g| $t ffi Jl/j[ ^ & "In presence of the enemy, your
troops should be arrayed in normal fashion, but in order to secure victory
abnormal manoeuvres must be employed." Mei Yao-ch'en : J|ff ^|J -fjj*

$ $ jE^MftZWjMi&Z uc»* is active> '""s is

passive; passivity means waiting for an opportunity, activity brings the
victory itself." Ho Shih:

E "We must

cause the enemy to regard our straightforward attack as one that is secretly
designed, and vice versa; thus cheng may also be chlit and ch'i may also be
cheng" He instances the famous exploit of Han Hsin, who when marching
ostensibly against [{£» ^ Lin-chin (now j|JJ ^ Chao-i in Shensi), sud-
denly threw a large force across the Yellow River in wooden tubs, utterly
disconcerting his opponent. [Ch'ien Han Shu, ch. 34.] Here, we are told, the
march on Lin-chin was ~|P , and the surprise manoeuvre was ^ . Chang
Yu gives the following summary of opinions on the words : "Military writers

*£*>t^ # #*A*^

-fa&^JbUrt cJU^t^fj

35 ^^fc^C^ly .
t»*ife

5. j

do not all agree with regard to the meaning of chli and cheng. Jj^J* j|j=? -^

Wei Liao Tzu [4* cent. B.C.] says: ZE^^^D^^M'^
'Direct warfare favours frontal attacks, indirect warfare attacks from the
rear.' Ts'ao Kung says: 'Going straight out to join battle is a direct
operation; appearing on the enemy's rear is an indirect manoeuvre.'
^fc Jjjjjji ^ Li Wei-kung [6th and 7th cent. A.D.] says: 'In war, to march
straight ahead is nieng; turning movements, on the other hand, are ch'i*
These writers simply regard cheng as cheng, and ch'i as ch'i; they do nqt
note that the two are mutually interchangeable and run into each other
like the two sides of a circle [see infra, § n]. A comment of the T'ang
Emperor T'ai Tsung goes to the root of the matter : 'A chli manoeuvre
may be cheng, if we make the enemy look upon it as cheng; then our
real attack will be chli, and vice versa. The whole secret lies in confusing
the enemy, so that he cannot fathom our real intent.'" To put it per-
haps a little more clearly : any attack or other operation is Jp , on which
the enemy has had his attention fixed; whereas that is ^-, which takes him
by surprise or comes from an unexpected quarter. If the enemy perceives
a movement which is meant to be ^- , it immediately becomes Jp .

at the impact of your army may be like a grind-
stone dashed against an egg — this is effected by the
science of weak points and strong.

^ jj t literally "the hollow and the solid," is the title of chap. VI. 5^
tuan is the T:u Shu reading, Cf^ hsia that of the standard text. It ap-
pears from K'ang Hsi that there has been much confusion between the
two characters, and indeed, it is probable that one of them has really
crept into the language as a mistake for the other.

5. In all fighting, the direct method may be used for
joining battle, but indirect methods will be needed in order
to secure victory.

Chang Yu says: &^W^$1»g^$Wg^

"Steadily develop indirect tactics, either by pounding the enemy's flanks
or falling on his rear." A brilliant example of "indirect tactics" which
decided the fortunes of a campaign was Lord Roberts' night march round
the Peiwar Kotal in the second Afghan war. *

* "Forty-one Years in India," chap. 46.

36

7.

8-

9-

6. Indirect tactics, efficiently applied, are inexhaustible as
Heaven and Earth, unending as the flow of rivers and
streams;

is the universally accepted emendation for -^ , the reading of the

like the sun and moon, they end but to begin anew; like
the four seasons, they pass away but to return once more.

Tu Yu and Chang Yii understand this of the permutations of -^ and
7F. • But at present Sun Tzu is not speaking of "jP at all> unless, in-
deed, we suppose with JUJ ^ Jjp Cheng Yu-hsien that a clause relating
to it has fallen out of the text. Of course, as has already been pointed
out, the two are so inextricably interwoven in all military operations,
that they cannot really be considered apart. Here we simply have an
expression, in figurative language, of the almost infinite resource of a
great leader.

7. There are not more than five musical notes,

yet the combinations of these five give rise to more
melodies than can ever be heard.

8. There are not more than five primary colours,

j J blue, yellow, red, white and black.

yet in combination they produce more hues than can ever
be seen.

9. There are not more than five cardinal tastes,
St $ B$C ~tf* 1? sour' acrid> salt> sweet, bitter.

yet combinations of them yield more flavours than can
ever be tasted.

37

IE

io. In battle, there are not more than two methods of
attack — the direct and the indirect; yet these two in
combination give rise to an endless series of manoeuvres.

/ 1 1 . The direct and the indirect lead on to each other
in turn. It is like moving in a circle — you never come
to an end. Who can exhaust the possibilities of their
combination ?

The Tu Shu adds ^ . The final j£ may refer either to the circle

or, more probably, to the -^ Jp ^ ^|& understood. Capt. Calthrop
is wrong with: "They are a mystery that none can penetrate."

12. The onset of troops is like the rush of a torrent
which will even roll stones along in its course.

13. The quality of decision is like the well-timed swoop
of a falcon which enables it to strike and destroy its victim.

For Jjjj£ the Yu Lan reads Ijpjf , which is also supported by a quotation

in the g J^ fjj; ^ [3rd cent. B.C.]. j[jj in this context is a word
which really defies the best efforts of the translator. Tu Mu says that
it is equivalent to |[jj jjj; ||| j^£ "the measurement or estimation of
distance." But this meaning does not quite fit the illustrative simile in
§15. As applied to the falcon, it seems to me to denote that instinct
of self-restraint which keeps the bird from swooping on its quarry until
the right moment, together with the power of judging when the right
moment has arrived. The analogous quality in soldiers is the highly im-
portant one of being able to reserve their fire until the very instant at
which it will be most effective. When the "Victory" went into action
at Trafalgar at hardly more than drifting pace, she was for several minutes
exposed to a storm of shot and shell before replying with a single gun.
Nelson coolly waited until he was within close range, when the broadside
he brought to bear worked fearful havoc on the enemy's nearest ships.
That was a case of iSJ .

38

15.

14. Therefore the good fighter will be terrible in his
onset, and prompt in his decision.

Tu Yu defines |[j} here by the word ||||f , which is very like "decision"
in English, ^g is certainly used in a very unusual sense, even if, as the
commentators say, it = jj£ . This would have reference to the measurement
of distance mentioned above, letting the enemy get near before striking.
But I cannot help thinking that Sun Tzu meant to use the word in a
figurative sense comparable to our own idiom "short and sharp." Cf. Wang
Hsi's note, which after describing the falcon's mode of attack, proceeds :

^£^WbHii1ttl&^f "This is Just how the 'psychological
moment' should be seized in war." I do not care for Capt. Calthrop's
rendering : "The spirit of the good fighter is terrifying, his occasions sudden."

15. Energy may be likened to the bending of a cross-
bow; decision, to the releasing of the trigger.

"Energy" seems to be the best equivalent here for ijjfa , because the
comparison implies that the force is potential, being stored up in the bent
cross-bow until released by the finger on the trigger. None of the com-
mentators seem to grasp the real point of the simile.

1 6. Amid the turmoil and tumult of battle, there may
be seeming disorder and yet no real disorder at all; amid
confusion and chaos, your array may be without head or
tail, yet it wlfln5e~probf ''againSF defeat.

J& |f|j, literally "formation circular", is explained by Li Ch'iian as

IS |H) Hf ifc "without back or front." Mei Yao-ch'en says: "The sub-
divisions of the army having been previously fixed, and the various signals
agreed upon, the separating and joining, the dispersing and collecting
which will take place in the course of a battle, may give the appearance
of disorder when no real disorder is possible. Your formation may be
without head or tail, your dispositions all topsy-turvy, and yet a rout of
your forces quite out of the question." It is a little difficult to decide
whether pj g[ and ^ [gj should not be taken as imperatives: "fight
in disorder (for the purpose of deceiving the enemy), and you will be
secure against real disorder." Cf. I. § 20: pjj Jj( .

39

disorder postulates perfect discipline;
simulated fear postulates courage; simulated weakness
postulates strength.

In order to make the translation intelligible, it is necessary to tone
down the sharply paradoxical form of the original. Ts'ao Kung throws
out a hint of the meaning in his brief note : -^ ^ ^ [j^ *Jj|j -jj^
"These things all serve to destroy formation and conceal one's condition."
But Tu Mu is the first to put it quite plainly : "If you wish to feign con-
fusion in order to lure the enemy on, you must first have perfect discipline;
if you wish to display timidity in order to entrap the enemy, you must
have extreme courage ; if you wish to parade your weakness in order to
make the enemy over-confident, you must have exceeding strength."

1 8. Hiding order beneath the cloak of disorder is simply
a question of subdivision ;

See supra, § i.

concealing courage under a show of timidity presupposes
a fund of latent energy; — "ffififc ^k^£

It is passing strange that the commentators should unaemana
as "circumstances" — a totally different sense from that which it has
previously borne in this chapter. Thus Tu Mu says: Jjjl^ y£f ^|J ^

i*ffi)^S&i$:A#^:a»'l*& "seei"g that we .are

favourably circumstanced and yet make no move, the enemy will believe
that we are really afraid."

masking strength with weakness is to be effected by tactical
dispositions. ' - - ^^U^^i^l^ ^L^^^^C^f.

Chang Yii relates the following anecdote of Kao Tsu/the first Han
Emperor: "Wishing to crush the Hsiung-nu, he sent out spies to report on
their condition. But the Hsiung-nu, forewarned, carefully concealed all their
able-bodied men and well-fed horses, and only allowed infirm soldiers and
emaciated cattle to be seen. The result was that the spies one and all
recommended the Emperor to deliver his attack, ijj: j^ Lou Ching alone
opposed them, saying: "When two countries go to war, they are naturally
inclined to make an ostentatious display of their strength. Yet our spies
have seen nothing but old age and infirmity. This is surely some ruse
on the part of the enemy, and it would be unwise for us to attack."
The Emperor, however, disregarding this advice, fell into the trap and
found himself surrounded at Po-teng."

4o

20.

19. Thus one who is skilful at keeping the enemy on
the move maintains deceitful appearances, according to
which the enemy will act.

Ts'ao Kung's note is ^ J|| ^ fy "Make a display of weakness
and want," but Tu Mu rightly points out that ^ does not refer only to
weakness : "If our force happens to be superior to the enemy's, weakness
may be simulated in order to lure him on; but if inferior, he must be
led to believe that we are strong, in order that he may keep off. In fact,
all the enemy's movements should be determined by the signs that we
choose to give him." The following anecdote of Jjj^ J]J| Sun Pin, a

descendant of Sun Wu, is related at length in the £ ffg, chap. 65: In
341 B.C., the gC Ch'i State being at war with |j| Wei, sent gj ^ Tien
Chi and Sun Pin against the general ^ y^| P'ang Chiian, who happened
to be a deadly personal enemy of the latter. Sun Pin said : "The Ch'i
State has a reputation for cowardice, and therefore our adversary despises
us. Let us turn this circumstance to account." Accordingly, when the
army had crossed the border into Wei territory, he gave orders to show
100,000 fires on the first night, 50,000 on the next, and the night after
only 20,000. P'ang Chiian pursued them hotly, saying to himself1: "I
knew these men of Ch'i were cowards : their numbers have already fallen
away by more than half." In his retreat, Sun Pin came to a narrow
defile, which he calculated that his pursuers would reach after dark.
Here he had a tree stripped of its bark, and inscribed upon it the words :
"Under this tree shall P'ang Chuan die." Then, as night began to fall,
he placed a strong body of archers in ambush near by, with orders to
shoot directly they saw a light. Later on, P'ang Chuan arrived at the
spot, and noticing the tree, struck a light in order to read what was
written on it. His body was immediately riddled by a volley of arrows,
and his whole army thrown into confusion. [The above is Tu Mu's
version of the story; the Shih Chi, less dramatically but probably with
more historical truth, makes P'ang Chuan cut his own throat with an
exclamation of despair, after the rout of his army.]

He sacrifices something, that the enemy may snatch at it.

20. By holding out baits, he keeps him on the march;
then with a body of picked men he lies in wait for him.
This would appear to be the meaning if we retain 3X, which Mei
Yao-ch'en explains as TSC "men of spirit." The Tu Shu reads

-filfe

22.

39 ^ JW Si 3f RiJ ih

an emendation suggested by 3§ Jg| Li Ching. The meaning then
would be, "He lies in wait with the main body of his troops.".

2 1 . The clever combatant looks to the effect of combined
energy, and does not require too much from individuals.

Tu Mu says : "He first of all considers the power of his army in the
bulk; afterwards he takes individual talent into account, and uses each
man according to his capabilities. He does not demand perfection from
the untalented."

Hence his ability to pick out the right men and to utilise
combined energy.

Another reading has ^ instead of 3jjjfc. It would be interesting if
Capt. Calthrop could tell us where the following occurs in the Chinese:
"yet, when an opening or advantage shows, he pushes it to its limits."

22. When he utilises combined energy, his fighting men
become as it were like unto rolling logs or stones. For
it is the nature of a log or stone to remain motionless
on level ground, and to move when on a slope; if four-
cornered, to come to a standstill, but if round-shaped, to
go rolling down.

Ts'ao Kung calls this fj£ Q 4& ffj8< "the use of natural or inherent
power." Capt. Calthrop ignores the last part of the sentence entirely.
In its stead he has: "So await the opportunity, and so act when the
opportunity arrives" • — another absolutely gratuitous interpolation. The
Tlung Tien omits ^£ .

23. Thus the energy developed by good fighting men
is as the momentum of a round stone rolled down a
mountain thousands of feet in height. So much on the
subject of energy.

The T'ung Tien omits || . The chief lesson of this chapter, in Tu
Mu's opinion, is the paramount importance in war of rapid evolutions
and sudden rushes. "Great results," he adds, "can thus be achieved with
small forces."

VI

0rt ./fa. |4.*
)L 7C ^

VI. WEAK POINTS AND STRONG.

Chang Yu attempts to explain the sequence of chapters as follows:
"Chapter IV, on Tactical Dispositions, treated of the offensive and the
defensive; chapter V, on Energy, dealt with direct and indirect methods.
The good general acquaints himself first with the theory of attack and
defence, and then turns his attention to direct and indirect methods. He
studies the art of varying and combining these two methods before pro-
ceeding to the subject of weak and strong points. For the use of direct
or indirect methods arises out of attack and defence, and the perception
of weak and strong points depends again on the above methods. Hence
the present chapter comes immediately after the chapter on Energy."

1 . Sun Tzu said : Whoever is first in the field and awaits
the coming of the enemy, will be fresh for the fight;
whoever is second in the field and has to hasten to battle,
will arrive exhausted.

Instead of l|| , the Yu Lan has in both clauses the stronger word JjH .

'7^—. l£9>

For the antithesis between ^ and 2fi , cf. I. §23, where however %ft
is used as a verb.

2. Therefore the clever combatant imposes his will on
the enemy, but does not allow the enemy's will to be
imposed on him.

The next paragraph makes it clear that |*jj[ does not merely mean,
as Tu Mu says, ^ j|£ Jfc |^ ^ «to make the enemy approach me,"
but rather to make him go in any direction I please. It is thus practically
synonymous with fljjj . Cf. Tu Mu's own note on V. § 19. One mark
of a great soldier is that he fights on his own terms or fights not at all. *
* See Col. Henderson's biography of Stonewall Jackson, 1902 ed., vol. II, p. 490-

43

5.

3. By holding out advantages to him, he can cause the
enemy to approach of his own accord; or, by inflicting
damage, he can make it, impossible .for the e;iemy to
draw near.

In the first case^-he will entice him with a bait; in the second, he will
strike at some important point which the enemy will have to defend.

4. If the enemy is taking his ease, he can harass him ;

This passage may be cited as evidence against Mei Yao-Ch'en's inter-
pretation of I. § 23.

if well supplied with food, he can starve him out;

/||H is probably an older form than -^| , the reading of the original text.
Both are given in the gj£ ^£.

if quietly encamped, he can force him to move.

The subject to ofe is still sS jg& ^& ; but these clauses would read

J Nii 1=1 \ >\ H '

better as direct admonitions, and in the next sentence we find Sun Tzu
dropping insensibly into the imperative.

5. Appear at points which the enemy must hasten to
defend; march swiftly to places where you are not expected.

The original text, adopted by the Tlu Shu, has |jj lit $f ~jf> jfH ;

it has been altered to suit the context and the commentaries of Ts'ao
Kung and Ho Shih, who evidently read jj£\ ^ . The other reading
would mean: "Appear at points to which the enemy cannot hasten;" but
in this case there is something awkward in the use of ^^ . Capt. Calthrop
is wrong of course with "appearing where the enemy is not."

6. An army may march great distances without distress,
if it marches through country where the enemy is not.

We must beware of understanding ^ ^ £ jjjjj as "uninhabited
country." Sun Tzu habitually uses A in the sense of ||£, e.g. supra, §2.

44

Ts'ao Kung sums up very well : Jfj ^ lj£ |J[ $j| JL Jyf ->J- |jg S

^ J£ "Emerge from the void [q. d. like "a bolt from the blue"], strike
at vulnerable points, shun places that are defended, attack in unexpected
quarters." The difference of meaning between ^ and ^ is worth noting.

7. You can be sure of succeding in your attacks if you
only attack places which are undefended.

j££ ^ TJP is of course hyperbolical; Wang Hsi rightly explains it as
"weak points; that is to say, where the general is lacking in capacity, or
the soldiers in spirit; where the walls are not strong enough, or the pre-
cautions not strict enough; where relief comes too late, or provisions are
too scanty, or the defenders are variance amongst themselves."

You can ensure the safety of your defence if you only
hold positions that cannot be attacked.

I. e., where there are none of the weak points mentioned above. There
is rather a nice point involved in the interpretation of this latter clause.
Tu Mu, Ch'en Hao, and Mei Yao-ch'en assume the meaning to be: "In
order to make your defence quite safe, you must defend even those places
that are not likely to be attacked;" and Tu Mu adds: "How much more,
then, those that will be attacked." Taken thus, however, the clause balances
less well with the preceding — always a consideration in the highly anti-
thetical style which is natural to the Chinese. Chang Yii, therefore, seems
to come nearer the mark in saying: "He who is skilled in attack flashes
forth from the topmost heights of heaven [see IV. § 7], making it impos-
sible for the enemy to guard against him. This being so, the places that
I shall attack are precisely those that the enemy cannot defend . . . He
who is skilled in defence hides in the most secret recesses of the earth,
making it impossible for the enemy to estimate his whereabouts. This
being so, the places that I shall hold are precisely those that the enemy
cannot attack."

8. Hence that general is skilful in attack whose opponent
does not know what to defend ; and he is skilful in defence
whose opponent does not know what to attack.

An aphorism which puts the whole art of war into a nutshell.

45

91 $ II

10.

9. O divine art of sublety and secrecy! Through you
we learn to be invisible, through you inaudible;

Literally, "without form or sound," but it is said of course with reference
to the enemy. Chang Yii, whom I follow, draws no sharp distinction
between ^ and BJft , but Tu Mu and others think that ^ indicates the

i/o* n"r IW*

secrecy to be observed on the defensive, and j[j|jj the rapidity to be dis-
played in attack. The Yu Lan text differs considerably from ours, reading :

' IK * ft ¥ tic. m m ** » ^ I* ¥ it ¥

and hence we can hold the enemy's fate in our hands.

The Tung Tien has jj£ j|| ^J )|& >f|> fjj ^ . Capt. Calthrop's
version of this paragraph is so remarkable that I cannot refrain from
quoting it in full : "Now the secrets of the art of offence are not to be
easily apprehended, as a certain shape or noise can be understood, of
the senses; but when these secrets are once learnt, the enemy is mastered."

10. You may advance and be absolutely irresistible, if
you make for the enemy's weak points; you may retire
and be safe from pursuit if your movements are more
rapid than those of the enemy.

The second member of the sentence is weak, because ^ TJJ" ~fe is
nearly tautologous with 'jfi ~pj* ^ . The Yu Lan reads ||| for JJ .

11. If we wish to fight, the enemy can be forced to
an engagement even though he be sheltered behind a
high rampart and a deep ditch. All we need do is to
attack some other place that he will be obliged to relieve.

Tu Mu says : "If the enemy is the invading party, we can cut his line
of communications and occupy the roads by which he will have to return ;
if we are the invaders, we may direct our attack against the sovereign
himself." It is clear that Sun Tzu, unlike certain generals in the late
Boer war, was no believer in frontal attacks.

46

is. & ^ A

12. If we do not wish to fight, we can prevent the
enemy from engaging us even though the lines of our
encampment be merely traced out on the ground. All we
need do is to throw something odd and unaccountable in
his way.

In order to preserve the parallelism with § n, I should prefer to follow
the Tu Shu text, which inserts g| before jjj- Jjjjj . This extremely con-
cise expression is intelligibly paraphrased by Chia Lin : §5j| ^ ^ ^ ||| yjffi
"even though we have constructed neither wall nor ditch." The real
crux of the passage lies in 3Jfe S j^f ^ -|j^ . ^ of course = jg .

Ts'ao Kung defines 3Jg by the word j^, which is perhaps a case of
obscurum per obscurius. Li Ch'iian, however, says : g^J -jjjj* j? fjjj ^^ ^
"we puzzle him by strange and unusual dispositions;" and Tu Mu finally
clinches the meaning by three illustrative anecdotes — one of §§ ^ <^
Chu-ko Liang, who when occupying ftjl? 2p» Yang-p'ing and about to be
attacked by ffj Jj^ ^^ Ssu-ma I, suddenly struck his colours, stopped
the beating of the drums, and flung open the city gates, showing only a
few men engaged in sweeping and sprinkling the ground. This unex-
pected proceeding had the intended effect; for Ssu-ma I, suspecting an
ambush, actually drew off his army and retreated. What Sun Tzti is
advocating here, therefore, is nothing more nor less than the timely use
of "bluff." Capt. Calthrop translates: "and prevent the enemy from
attacking by keeping him in suspense," which shows that he has not fully
grasped the meaning of 3JJ? .

13. By discovering the enemy's dispositions and remaining
invisible ourselves, we can keep our forces concentrated,
while the enemy's must be divided. ^ /^^^£/*vtty.

The conclusion is perhaps not very obvious, but Chang Yii (after Mei
Yao-ch'en) rightly explains it thus : "If the enemy's dispositions are visible,
we can make for him in one body; whereas, our own dispositions being
kept secret, the enemy will be obliged to divide his forces in order to
guard against attack from every quarter." ^ is here used as an active
verb: "to make to appear." See IV, note on heading. Capt. Calthrop's
"making feints" is quite wrong.

47

14. We cap form a single united body, while the enemy
must split up into fractions. Hence there will be a whole
pitted against separate parts of a whole,

The original text has ]fy ||£ ;p£f lit — • -{f^ , which in accordance
with the T^ung Tien and Yu Lan has been altered as above. I adopt
the more plausible reading of the Tu Shu: -jj^ j£j[ -J- ;pJ£ jit — • fy ,
in spite of having to refer -j-» to ourselves and not to the enemy. Thus
Tu Yu and Mei Yao-ch'en both regard -J-1 as the undivided force, con-
sisting of so many parts, and — • as each of the isolated fractions of the
enemy. The alteration of ;gJ£ into ztt can hardly be right, though the
true text might conceivably have been ^^ \fy -[- it JpJ£ ~ffi — • -jfj^ .

which means that we shall be many to the enemy's few.

15. And if we are able thus to attack an inferior force
with a superior one, our opponents will be in dire straits.

For Jjg , the Tung Tien and Yu Lan have j|£ . Tu Yu, followed by

the other commentators, arbitrarily defines J^J as /j^ fjjj ^ )j|p "few
and easy to conquer," but only succeeds thereby in making the sentence
absolutely pointless. As for Capt. Calthrop's translation: "In superiority
of numbers there is economy of strength," its meaning is probably known
to himself alone. In justification of my own rendering of jj^J , I would
refer to Lun Yu IV. 2 and VII. 25 (3).

1 6. The spot where we intend to fight must not be
made known; for then the enemy will have to prepare
against a possible attack at several different points;

Sheridan once explained the reason of General Grant's victories by
saying that "while his opponents were kept fully employed wondering
what he was going to do, he was thinking most of what he was going to
do himself."

and his forces being thus distributed in many directions,
the numbers we shall have to face at any given point
will be proportionately few.

48

19. & *R ifc £ *fe *u ifc £ 0 f«

17. For should the enemy strengthen his van, he will
weaken his rear; should he strengthen his rear, he will
weaken his van; should he strengthen his left, he will
weaken his right; should he strengthen his right, he will
weaken his left. If he sends reinforcements everywhere,
he will everywhere be weak.

In Frederick the Great's Instructions to his Generals we read: "A
defensive war is apt to betray us into too frequent detachment. Those
generals who have had but little experience attempt to protect every point,
while those who are better acquainted with their profession, having only
the capital object in view, guard against a decisive blow, and acquiesce
in smaller misfortunes to avoid greater."

1 8. Numerical weakness comes from having to prepare
against possible attacks; numerical strength, from compelling
our adversary to make these preparations against us.

The highest generalship, in Col. Henderson's words, is "to compel the
enemy to disperse his army, and then to concentrate superior force against
each fraction in turn."

19. Knowing the place and the time of the coming
battle, we may concentrate from the greatest distances in
order to fight.

There is nothing about "defeating" anybody in this sentence, as Capt.
Calthrop translates. What Sun Tzu evidently has in mind is that nice
calculation of distances and that masterly employment of strategy which
enable a general to divide his army for the purpose of a long and rapid
march, and afterwards to effect a junction at precisely the right spot and
the right hour in order to confront the enemy in overwhelming strength.
Among many such successful junctions which military history records,
one of the most dramatic and decisive was the appearance of Bliicher
just at the critical moment on the field of Waterloo.

49

B

21.

20. But if neither time nor place be known, then the
left wing will be impotent to succour the right, the right
equally impotent to succour the left, the van unable to
relieve the rear, or the rear to support the van. How
much more so if the furthest portions of the army are anything
under a hundred li apart, and even the nearest are separated
by several li\

The Chinese of this last sentence is a little lacking in precision, but
the mental picture we are required to draw is probably that of an army
advancing towards a given rendez-vous in separate columns, each of which
has orders to be there on a fixed date. If the general allows the various
detachments to proceed at haphazard, without precise instructions as to
the time and place of meeting, the enemy will be able to annihilate the
army in detail. Chang Yii's note may be worth quoting here : "If we do
not know the place where our opponents mean to concentrate or the day
on which they will join battle, our unity will be forfeited through our
preparations for defence, and the positions we hold will be insecure.
Suddenly happening upon a powerful foe, we shall be brought to battle
in a flurried condition, and no mutual support will be possible between
wings, vanguard or rear, especially if there is any great distance between
the foremost and hindmost divisions of the army."

2 1 . Though according to my estimate the soldiers of
Yiieh exceed our own in number, that shall advantage
them nothing in the matter of victory.

Capt. Calthrop omits J^j[ 3S, teF ^ , and his translation of the remainder
is flabby and inaccurate. As Sun Tzu was in the service of the Jj£ Wu
State, it has been proposed to read J& instead of ^* — a wholly un-
necessary tampering with the text. Yiieh coincided roughly with the present
province of Chehkiang. Li Ch'iian very strangely takes ^ not as the
proper name, but in the sense of jj^ "to surpass." No other commentator
follows him. JJ|f j|£ belongs to the class of expressions like ^ jj£

"distance," - /J> "magnitude," etc., to which the Chinese have to resort

50

22. n. HI

23. ft £ ffij

in order to express abstract ideas of degree. The T'u Shu, however,

omits J|j£ .

I say then that victory can be achieved.

Alas for these brave words ! The long feud between the two states ended
in 473 B. C. with the total defeat of Wu by ^J {^ Kou Chien and its
incorporation in Yiieh. This was doubtless long after Sun Tzu's death.
With his present assertion compare IV. § 4 : ^ fjf ffl jffl ^ "pf jj^
(which is the obviously mistaken reading of the Yu Lan here). Chang Yu
is the only one to point out the seeming discrepancy, which he thus goes
on to explain: "In the chapter on Tactical Dispositions it is said, 'One
may know how to conquer without being able to do it,' whereas here we
have the statement that 'victory can be achieved.' The explanation is,
that in the former chapter, where the offensive and defensire are under
discussion, it is said that if the enemy is fully prepared, one cannot make
certain of beating him. But the present passage refers particularly to the
soldiers of Yiieh who, according to Sun Tzu's calculations, will be kept
in ignorance of the time and place of the impending struggle. That is
why he says here that victory can be achieved."

22. Though the enemy be stronger in numbers, we may
prevent him from fighting.

Capt. Calthrop quite unwarrantably translates : "If the enemy be many
in number, prevent him," etc.

Scheme so as to discover his plans and the likelihood of
their success.

This is the first of four similarly constructed sentences, all of which
present decided difficulties. Chang Yii explains 2$ fl| ^ ^ If as
J$ fi ffj- ;£ ^ -^C • This is perhaps the best way of taking the
words, though Chia Lin, referring g-j- to ourselves and not the enemy,

offers the alternative of^^^^^ff^^^-tfc "Know
beforehand all plans conducive to our success and to the enemy's failure."

y 23. Rouse him, and learn the principle of his activity
or inactivity.

Instead of ft , the T'ung Tien, Yii Lan, and also Li Ch'uan's text
have ^ , which the latter explains as "the observation of omens," and
Chia Lin simply as "watching and waiting." ft is defined by Tu Mu

24.

as Wi t ' and Chang Yu teUs us ^at by noting the joy or anger shown
by the enemy on being thus disturbed, we shall be able to conclude
whether his policy is to lie low or the reverse. He instances the action
of Chu-ko Liang, who sent the scornful present of a woman's head-dress
to Ssu-ma I, in order to goad him out of his Fabian tactics.

Force him to reveal himself, so as to find out his vulnerable
spots.

Two commentators, Li Ch'uan and Chang Yii, take ^^ ^ in the
sense of ^ ~£ "put on specious appearances." The former says: "You
may either deceive the enemy by a show of weakness — striking your
colours and silencing your drums; or by a show of strength — making a
hollow display of camp-fires and regimental banners." And the latter
quotes V. 19, where ^ ^ certainly seems to bear this sense. On the
other hand, I would point to § 13 of this chapter, where J|J must with
equal certainty be active. It is hard to choose between the two inter-
pretations, but the context here agrees better, I think, with the one that
I have adopted. Another difficulty arises over Tfa ££: ^ Wj> which

most of the commentators, thinking no doubt of the ^ J|Jj in XI. § i,
refer to the actual ground on which the enemy is encamped. The notes
of Chia Lin and Mei Yao-ch'en, however, seem to favour my view. The
same phrase has a somewhat different meaning in I. § 2.

24. Carefully compare the opposing army with your own,

Tu Yu is right, I think, in attributing this force to ^j| : Ts'ao Kung
defines it simply as ip" . Capt. Calthrop surpasses himself with the stag-
gering translation "Flap the wings" ! Can the Latin cornu (in its figurative
sense) have been at the back of his mind?

so that you may know where strength is superabundant
and where it is deficient.
Cf. IV. § 6.

25. In making tactical dispositions, the highest pitch
you can attain is to conceal them ;

The piquancy of the paradox evaporates in translation. ifljE J^ is
perhaps not so much actual invisibility (see supra, § 9) as "showing no
sign" of what you mean to do, of the plans that are formed in your brain.

52

so. 5

81 H £ l^W * » £ If

28.

conceal your dispositions, and you will be safe from the
prying of the subtlest spies, from the machinations of the
wisest brains.

ft Hj is expanded by Tu Mu into g| ^ |gj fg- '$ ^ |£ Jfc.
[For P|] ,see XIII, note on heading.] He explains J# ^jf in like fashion :

^^^it£±^^iti£<flt& "thou§h the enemy may

have clever and capable officers, they will not be able to lay any plans
against us."

26. How victory may be produced for them out of the
enemy's own tactics - - that is what the multitude cannot
comprehend.

All the commentators except Li Ch'iian make ^ refer to the enemy.
So Ts'ao Kung: @ $£ ^ ffij lfc Jjf . ^ is defined as jf . The
T*u Shu has iS, with the same meaning. ^§ee IV. §13. The Yu Lan
reads ^ , evidently a gloss. v3nxi§L

27. All men can see the tactics whereby I conquer,
but what none can see is the strategy out of which victory
is evolved. ^/>C^^fy

I. e.t everybody can see superficially how a battle is won; what they
cannot see is the long series of plans and combinations which has preceded
the battle. It seems justifiable, then, to render the first J^ by "tactics"
and the second by "strategy."

28. Do not repeat the tactics which have gained you
one victory, but let your methods be regulate_dr^y the
infinite variet of circumstances. ,

As Wang Hsi sagely remarks: "There is
underlying victory, but the tactics (Jf£) which lead up to it are infinite
in number." With this compare Col. Henderson; "The rules of strategy
are few and simple. They may be learned in a week. They may be
taught by familiar illustrations or a dozen diagrams. But such knowledge
will no more teach a man to lead an army like Napoleon than a knowledge
of grammar will teach him to write like Gibbon."

53

* X 2JBJI ff IH S 1

31. ^ m *& m m m & m n. m

32. i&

33. is

29. Military tactics are like unto water; for water in
its natural course runs away from high places and hastens
downwards.

ff is ^j| jj: ^ Liu Chou-tzu's reading for ^ in the original text.

30. So in war, the way is to avoid what is strong and
to strike at what is weak.

Like water, taking the line of least resistance.

31. Water shapes its course according to the nature of
the ground over which it flows;

The Tung Tien and Yu Lan read ^j|J J& , — the latter also fljlj Jft .
The present text is derived from Cheng Yu-hsien.

the soldier works out his victory in relation to the foe
whom he is facing.

32. Therefore, just as water retains no constant shape,
so in warfare there are no constant conditions.

33. He who can modify his tactics in relation to his
opponent and thereby succeed in winning, rqay be called
a heaven-born captain. JT

34. The five elements
Water, fire, wood, metal, earth.
are not always equally predominant;

That is, as Wang Hsi says: ffi; ;j"|J "^f -jj^ "they predominate
alternately."

54

the four seasons make ^ay for each other in turn.
Literally, "have no invariabl, seat>>>

There are short days a^ long; the moon has its periods
of waning and waxing.

Cf. V. § 6. The purport of the passage js simpiy to illustrate the want
of fixity in war by the chang«s constantiy taking place in Nature. The
comparison is not very happ.^ however, because the regularity of the
phenomena which Sun Tzu mntions is by no means paralleled in war.

VII.

VII. MANOEUVRING.

The commentators, as well as the subsequent text, make it clear that
this is the real meaning of j|f ^jj . Thus, Li Ch'iian says that ^
means ^ ^] "marching rapidly to seize an advantage"; Wang Hsisays:

^ ^^M^f M 9A W* "'Striving' means striving for an advan-
tage; this being obtained, victory will follow;" and Chang Yii : ppjj jj?

ffi ^j" f75 ^p1 ^J ifc "The two armies face to face, and each striving
to obtain a tactical advantage over the other." According to the latter
commentator, then, the situation is analogous to that of two wrestlers
manoeuvring for a "hold," before coming to actual grips. In any case,
we must beware of translating 4JJ1 by the word "fighting" or "battle," as
if it were equivalent to |g^ . Capt. Calthrop falls into this mistake.

1 . Sun Tzu said : In war, the general receives his com-
mands from the sovereign.

For jB: there is another reading ^ , which Li Ch'uan explains as
:&£ Jfj ^ -gjj "being the reverent instrument of Heaven's chastisement."

2. Having collected an army and concentrated his forces,
he must blend and harmonise the different elements thereof
before pitching his camp.

Ts'ao Kung takes ^p as referring to the ;pp p^ or main gate of the

military camp. This, Tu Mu tells us, was formed with a couple of flags

hung across. [Cf. Chou Li, ch. xxvii. fol. 3 r of the Imperial edition :

lit JS^ P^ •] ^fc ffi would then mean "setting up his Jfft ^ opposite

that of the enemy." But Chia Lin's explanation, which has been adopted

56

Jt * 4^ 1^

m

above, is on the whole simpler and better. Chang Yii, while following
Ts'ao Kung, adds that the words may also be taken to mean "the
establishment of harmony and confidence between the higher and lower
ranks before venturing into the field;" and he quotes a saying of Wu
Tzu (chap, i ad init.}: "Without harmony in the State, no military ex-
pedition can be undertaken; without harmony in the army, no battle
array can be formed." In the historical romance j|J J^|j ^|J ||j| , chap.

75, Sun Tzti himself is represented as saying to -^ 8 Wu Yiian: -fc

Jl ff & Z & ± fa ft E '& & It W ft ffi "As a

general rule, those who are waging war should get rid of all domestic
troubles before proceeding to attack the external foe." ^ is defined
as jj^ . It here conveys the notion of encamping after having taken
the field.

3. After that, comes tactical manoeuvring-, than which
there is nothing more difficult.

I have departed slightly from the traditional interpretation of Ts'ao
Kung, who says: ^^§^^^^^5^11^ "From
the time of receiving the sovereign's instructions until our encampment
over against the enemy, the tactics to be pursued are most difficult." It
seems to me that the jp[ ^- tactics or manoeuvres can hardly be said
to begin until the army has sallied forth and encamped, and Ch'en Hao's
note gives colour to this view: "For levying, concentrating, harmonising
and intrenching an army, there are plenty of old rules which will serve.
The real difficulty comes when we engage in tactical operations." Tu Yu
also observes that "the great difficulty is to be beforehand with the enemy
in seizing favourable positions."

The difficulty of tactical manoeuvring consists in turning
the devious into the direct, and misfortune into gain.

jyi x£ 'jjfa ]jf[ is one of those highly condensed and somewhat enig-
matical expressions of which Sun Tzu is so fond. This is how it is ex-
plained by Ts'ao Kung: ^jaU^S^M^itSifc

"Make it appear that you are a long way off, then cover the distance
rapidly and arrive on the scene before your opponent." Tu Mu says:
"Hoodwink the enemy, so that he may be remiss and leisurely while you
are dashing along with the utmost speed." Ho Shih gives a slightly
different turn to the sentence: "Although you may have difficult ground
to traverse and natural obstacles to encounter, this is a drawback which

57

can be turned into actual advantage by celerity of movement." Signal
examples of this saying are afforded by the two famous passages across
the Alps — that of Hannibal, which laid Italy at his mercy, and that of
Napoleon two thousand years later, which resulted in the great victory
of Marengo.

4. Thus, to take a long and circuitous route, after
enticing the enemy out of the way, and though starting
after him, to contrive to reach the goal before him, shows
knowledge of the artifice of deviation.

Chia Lin understands ^ as the enemy's line of march, thus : "If our
adversary's course is really a short one, and we can manage to divert
him from it ( ^J ^ ) either by simulating weakness or by holding out
some small advantage, we shall be able to beat him in the race for good
positions." This is quite a defensible view, though not adopted by any
other commentator. ^ of course = jjj|£ , and ^ and ^Q are to be

taken as verbs. Tu Mu cites the famous march of j|& -^ Chao She
in 270 B.C. to relieve the town of j|f| Ijjl O-yii, which was closely in-
vested by a ^ps; Ch'in army. [It should be noted that the above is the
correct pronunciation of ^ ]M , as given in the commentary on the
Cfrien Han Shu, ch. 34. Giles' dictionary gives "Yii-yii," and Chavannes,
I know not on what authority, prefers to write "Yen-yii." The name
is omitted altogether from Playfair's "Cities and Towns."] The King of
Chao first consulted j|| ^ Lien P'o on the advisability of attempting
a relief, but the latter thought the distance too great, and the intervening
country too rugged and difficult. His Majesty then turned to Chao She,
who fully admitted the hazardous nature of the march, but finally said :
"We shall be like two rats fighting in a hole — and the pluckier one
will win !" So he left the capital with his army, but had only gone a
distance of 30 // when he stopped and began throwing up intrenchments.
For 28 days he continued strengthening his fortifications, and took care
that spies should carry 'the intelligence to the enemy. The Ch'in general
was overjoyed, and attributed his adversary's tardiness to the fact that
the beleaguered city was in the Han State, and thus not actually part of
Chao territory. But the spies had no sooner departed than Chao She
began a forced march lasting for two days and one night, and arrived on
the scene of action with such astonishing rapidity that he was able to
occupy a commanding position on the ^ [Jj "North hill" before the enemy

58

5. ffiJC 5. ff 3iS ^

c. § 5 rfii ^ ^

had got wind of his movements. A crushing defeat followed for the Ch'in
forces, who were obliged to raise the siege of O-yii in all haste and retreat
across the border. [See jjj |g, chap. 81.]

5. Manoeuvring with an army is advantageous; with an
undisciplined multitude, most dangerous.

I here adopt the reading of the Tung Tien, Cheng Yu-hsien and the
T'u Shu, where ^ appears to supply the exact nuance required in order
to make sense. The standard text, on the other hand, in which j|F is
repeated, seems somewhat pointless. The commentators take it to mean
that manoeuvres may be profitable, or they may be dangerous: it all
depends on the ability of the general. Capt. Calthrop translates ^ ^
"the wrangles of a multitude" !

6. If you set a fully equipped army in march in order
to snatch an advantage, the chances are that you will be
too late.

The original text has ^jfc instead of J^; but a verb is needed to
balance 23§.

On the other hand, to detach a flying column for the
purpose involves the sacrifice of its baggage and stores.

^ j|? is evidently unintelligible to the Chinese commentators, who
paraphrase the sentence as though it began with pj| ijijg . Absolute
tautology in the apodosis can then only be avoided by drawing an im-
possibly fine distinction between iSb and ^ . I submit my own rendering
without much enthusiasm, being convinced that there is some deep-seated
corruption in the text. On the whole, it is clear that Sun Tzu does not
approve of a lengthy march being undertaken without supplies. Cf. in-
fra, § ii.

7. Thus, if you order your men to roll up their buff-coats,

^g; Ep does not mean "to discard one's armour," as Capt. Calthrop
translates, but implies on the contrary that it is to be carried with you.
Chang Yii says: Jg ^g ^ ^ "This means, in full panoply."

59

9. 3L + ffi m & m M m ± m s

10. = + m ffij ^ ft) iw = » z — M

and make forced marches without halting day or night,
covering double the usual distance at a stretch,

The ordinary day's march, according to Tu Mu, was 30 li\ but on one
occasion, when pursuing ^|J ^ Liu Pei, Ts'ao Ts'ao is said to have
covered the incredible distance of 300 li within twenty-four hours.

doing a hundred li in order to wrest an advantage, the
leaders of all your three divisions will fall into the hands
of the enemy.

8. The stronger men will be in front, the jaded ones
will fall behind, and on this plan only one-tenth of your
army will reach its destination.

For j|j£ , see II. § 14. The moral is, as Ts'ao Kung and others point
out: Don't march a hundred li to gain a tactical advantage, either with
or without impedimenta. Manoeuvres of this description should be con-
fined to short distances. Stonewall Jackson said: "The hardships of
forced marches are often more painful than the dangers of battle." He
did not often call upon his troops for extraordinary exertions. It was
only when he intended a surprise, or when a rapid retreat was impera-
tive, that he sacrificed everything to speed.*

9. If you march fifty li in order to outmanoeuvre the
enemy, you will lose the leader of your first division, and
only half your force will reach the goal.

jjjjfc is explained as similar in meaning to ^: literally, "the leader
of the first division will be torn away." Cf. Tso Chuan, 3| i9th year:
>fe IH j^ lit 2J£ "This is a case of [the falling tree] tearing up
its roots."

10. If you march thirty li with the same object, two-
thirds of your army will arrive.

In the Tung Tien is added: j $ | "From this

we may know the difficulty of manoeuvring."

* See Col. Henderson, op. cit. vol. I. p. 426.

i.i. We may take it then that an army without its
baggage-train is lost; without provisions it is lost; without
bases of supply it is lost.

5^ j^jji is explained by Tu Yu as ^^ ffi ^ Jj| "fodder and the
like;" by Tu Mu and Chang Yii as ^ ^ "goods in general;" and by
Wang Hsi as ^ |j|jj j|g j^f %, JB "fuel> salt> foodstuffs, etc." But I think
what Sun Tzu meant was "stores accumulated in depots," as distinguished
from ifem Jff and S & , the various impedimenta accompanying an
army on its march. Cf. Chou Li, ch. xvi. fol. 10: 2J£ A . . . ?£(/ l£r

•

1 2. We cannot enter into alliances until we are acquainted
with the designs of our neighbours.

j& — -^Q. Li Ch'iian understands it as 'JJH "guard against," which
is hardly so good. An original interpretation of ^j? is given by Tu Mu,
who says it stands for ^ Ji or ^ fjjrj^ "join in battle."

13. We are not fit to lead an army on the march un-
\ less we are familiar with the face of the country — its

^mountains and forests, its pitfalls

Ujjjr, defined as J^j] ^ (Ts'ao Kung) or J^ ^ (Chang Yu).
and precipices,

[$H , defined as — • "^ — » ~T^ .
its marshes

ja, defined as
and swamps.
g|, defined as

14. We shall be unable to turn natural advantages to
account unless we make use of local guides.
§§ 12—14 are repeated in chap. XI. § 52.

6i

± M m m

15. In war, practise dissimulation, and you will succeed.

According to Tu Mu, jfc stands for jfc )0. Cf. I. § 18. In the
tactics of Turenne, deception of the enemy, especially as to the numerical
strength of his troops, took a very prominent position. *

Move only if there is a real advantage to be gained.

This is the interpretation of all the commentators except Wang Hsi, ^
who has the brief note g^ ^ -fy "Entice out the enemy" (by offering
him some apparent advantage). /

1 6. Whether to concentrate or to divide your troops,^
must be decided by circumstances.

17. Let your rapidity be that of the wind,

The simile is doubly appropriate, because the wind is not only swift «*
but, as Mei Yao-*ch'en points out, 3jt j^ $fc "invisible and leaves
no tracks."

your compactness that of the forest.

It is hardly possible to take |jj£ here in its ordinary sense of "sedate,"
as Tu Yu tries to do. Meng Shih comes nearer the mark in his note
^§ "tr ^H ^f 'fT ?'J "Wnen slowly marching, order and ranks must
be preserved" - so as to guard against surprise attacks. But natural
forests do not grow in rows, whereas they do generally possess the quality
of density or compactness. I think then that Mei Yao-ch'en uses the
right adjective in saying #p ^ ^ ^ ^ .

1 8. In raiding and plundering be like fire,

Cf. Shih Ching, IV. 3. iv. 6: fa ^ ^ %\ g|J ^ ft # ^

"Fierce as a blazing fire which no man can check."

in immovability like a mountain.

That is, when holding a position from which the enemy is trying to
dislodge you, or perhaps, as Tu Yu says, when he is trying to entice you
into a trap.

* For a number of maxims on this head, see "Marshal Turenne" (Longmans,
1907), p. 29.

62

19.

19. Let your plans be dark and impenetrable as night,
and when you move, fall like a thunderbolt.

The original text has j|| instead of U . Cf. IV. § 7. Tu Yu quotes
a saying of T'ai Kung which has passed into a proverb : ^ ^ ^f\ ~fc
^ If ^ 1|) ^f» 2£ IjlC @ "You cannot shut your ears to the
thunder or your eyes to the lightning — so rapid are they." Likewise,
an attack should be made so quickly that it cannot be parried.

20. When you plunder a countryside, let the spoil be
divided amongst your men;

The reading of Tu Yu, Chia Lin, and apparently Ts'ao Kung, is ^
|S) ft $$, > wmcn is explained as referring to the subdivision of the
army, mentioned in V. §§ i, 2, by means of banners and flags, serving
to point out ( ^[ ) to each man the way he should go ( |fj] ). But this
is very forced, and the ellipsis is too great, even for Sun Tzu. Luckily,
the T'ung Tien and Yu Lan have the variant |j|j , which not only sug-
gests the true reading ^pjj, but affords some clue to the way in which
the corruption arose. Some early commentator having inserted [6] as
the sound of ^|J , the two may afterwards have been read as one character;
and this being interchangeable with |pjj, ^p|5 must finally have disap-
peared altogether. Meanwhile, ;jjt would have been altered to ^ in
order to make sense. As regards ^ ^J , I believe that Ho Shih
alone has grasped the real meaning, the other commentators understanding
it as "dividing the men into parties'' to search for plunder. Sun Tzu
wishes to lessen the abuses of indiscriminate plundering by insisting that
all booty shall be thrown into a common stock, which may afterwards
be fairly divided amongst all.

when you capture new territory, cut it up into allotments
for the benefit of the soldiery.

That this is the meaning, may be gathered from Tu Mu's note : ^i
±*5 *I KIJ # flj ja^f ^ 5£. The H §& gives the same
advice: U jfa 3gi £ • )fj5 means "to enlarge" or "extend" — at the
expense of the enemy, understood. Cf. Shih Ching, III. i. vii. i: »|^

"hating all the great States." Ch'en Hao also says lg &
"quarter your soldiers on the land, and let them sow and plant

63

23.
mm

it." It is by acting on this principle, and harvesting the lands they in-
vaded, that the Chinese have succeeded in carrying out some of their

most memorable and triumphant expeditions, such as that of Jff ^3
Pan Ch'ao who penetrated to the Caspian, and in more recent years,
those of jjig J|£ jfc Fu-k'ang-an and ^ ^ ^ Tso Tsung-t'ang.

2 1 . Ponder and deliberate

Note that both these words, like the Chinese ^ /pH , are really meta-
phors derived from the use of scales.

before you make a move.

Chang Yu quotes Jpsf j|§ -^r as saying that we must not break camp
until we have gauged the resisting power of the enemy and the clever-
ness of the opposing general. Cf. the "seven comparisons" in I. § 13.
Capt. Calthrop omits this sentence.

22. He will conquer who has learnt the artifice of
deviation.

See supra, §§ 3, 4.
Such is the art of manoeuvring.

With these words, the chapter would naturally come to an end. But
there now follows a long appendix in the shape of an extract from an
earlier book on War, now lost, but apparently extant at the time when
Sun Tzu wrote. The style of this fragment is not noticeably different
from that of Sun Tzu himself, but no commentator raises a doubt as to
its genuineness.

23. The Book of Army Management says:

It is perhaps significant that none of the earlier commentators give us
any information about this work. Mei Yao-Ch'en calls it jj? ^ ^ JpL
"an ancient military classic," and Wang Hsi, ~^£ jff U "an old book on
war." Considering the enormous amount of fighting that had gone on
for centuries before Sun Tzu's time between the various kingdoms and
principalities of China, it is not in itself improbable that a collection of
military maxims should have been made and written downraf some e^r-
lier period. V

64

26.

On the field of battle,
Implied, though not actually in the Chinese.

the spoken word does not carry far enough: hence the
institution of gongs and drums.

I have retained the words <£*• gfc of the original text, which recur in
the next paragraph, in preference to the other reading j|{? ^f K drums
and bells," which is found in the T^ung Tien, Pel Tlang Shu Cfcao and
Yu Lan. ^p is a bell with a clapper. See Lun Yu III. 24, Chou Li
XXIX. 15, 29. £>• of course would include both gongs and bells of
every kind. The T'-u Shu inserts a ^ after each ^jjj .

Nor can ordinary objects be seen clearly enough: hence
the institution of banners and flags.

24. Gongs and drums, banners and flags, are means
whereby the ears and eyes of the host

The original text, followed by the T'-u Shu, has ^ for ||J here and
in the next two paragraphs. But, as we have seen, A is generally used in Sun
Tzti for the enemy.

may be focussed on one particular point.

Note the use of — • as a verb. Chang Yu says : jjj^ jg J^j 7Jj£ |J|J

§$WH£^£it£i,#B-^^ "If siSht and hearing converge
simultaneously on the same object, the evolutions of as many as a million
soldiers will be like those of a single man" !

25. The host thus forming a single united body, it is
impossible either for the brave to advance alone, or for
the cowardly to retreat alone.

Chang Yu quotes a saying: J j & 4

| "Equally guilty are those who advance against orders
and those who retreat against orders." Tu Mu tells a story in this con-
nection of J^. ^g Wu Ch'i, when he was righting against the Ch'in State.
Before the battle had begun, one of his soldiers, a man of matchless
daring, sallied forth by himself, captured two heads from the enemy, and

65

27. j&HS PT^^&mi^'tt

returned to camp. Wu Ch'i had the man instantly executed, whereupon
an officer ventured to remonstrate, saying : "This man was a good soldier,
and ought not to have been beheaded." Wu Ch'i replied: "I fully be-
lieve he was a good soldier, but I had him beheaded because he acted
without orders."

This is the art of handling large masses of men.

26. In night-fighting, then, make much use of signal-
fires and drums, and in fighting by day, of flags and
banners, as a means of influencing the ears and eyes of
your army.

The Tung Tien has the bad variant ||j for $jj& . With regard to the
latter word, I believe I have hit off the right meaning, the whole phrase
being slightly elliptical for "influencing the movements of the army through
their senses of sight and hearing." Li Ch'iian, Tu Mu and Chia Lin
certainly seem to understand it thus. The other commentators, however,
take |jj (or J^ ) as the enemy, and ^j& as equivalent to ^|& ~^ or %jj&

Hk "to perplex" or "confound." This does not agree so well with what
has gone before, though on the other hand it renders the transition to
§ 27 less abrupt. The whole question, I think, hinges on the alternative
readings ^ and J\^. The latter would almost certainly denote the
enemy. Ch'en Hao alludes to ^ -^ JS? L* Kuang-pi's night ride to

W HI? Ho-yang at the head of 500 mounted men; they made such an
imposing display with torches, that though the rebel leader ifl JB^ M
Shih Ssu-ming had a large army, he did not dare to dispute their pas-
sage. [Ch'en Hao gives the date as ^ =j^ ^j^ A.D. 756; but according

to the ffi )!* ||£ New T'ang History, ^|J ^j| 61, it must have been
later than this, probably 760.]

27. A whole army may be robbed of its spirit;

"In war," says Chang Yu, "if a spirit of anger can be made to pervade
all ranks of an army at one and the same time, its onset will be irresistible.
Now the spirit of the enemy's soldiers will be keenest when they have
newly arrived on the scene, and it is therefore our cue not to fight at
once, but to wait until their ardour and enthusiasm have worn off, and
then strike. It is in this way that they may be robbed of their keen spirit."
Li Ch'uan and others tell an anecdote (to be found in the Tso Chuan,

5

66

28.
29.

year 10, § i) of Ifj J||j Ts'ao Kuei, & protege of Duke Chuang
of Lu. The latter State was attacked by Ch'i, and the Duke was about
to join battle at -M J\\ Ch'ang-cho, after the first roll of the enemy's
drums, when Ts'ao said: "Not just yet." Only after their drums had
beaten for the third time, did he give the word for attack. Then they
fought, and the men of Ch'i were utterly defeated. Questioned after-
wards by the Duke as to the meaning of his delay, Ts'ao Kuei replied:
"In battle, a courageous spirit is everything. Now the first roll of the
drum tends to create this spirit, but with the second it is already on the
wane, and after the third it is gone altogether. I attacked when their
spirit was gone and ours was at its height. Hence our victory." J^. -^
(chap. 4) puts "spirit" first among the "four important influences" in war,
and continues: =

— ' .A. x£ §11 HH t^Sl "The value of a whole army — a mighty host
of a million men — is dependent on one man alone: such is the influence
of spirit!"

a commander-in-chief may be robbed of his presence of mind.
Capt. Calthrop goes woefully astray with "defeat his general's ambition."
Chang Yu says: tf $• ft £ ft ± -& -£ ^ £ * '!* % ±
J^ Ao* "Presence of mind is the general's most important asset. It is
the quality which enables him to discipline disorder and to inspire cour-
age into the panic-stricken." The great general d^5 ij{| Li Ching (A.D.

571-649) has a saying: ^^^^lt^S^$S|$ff3

B *)k ^ ?& S ^ £ $3 Oil "Attacking does not merely consist in
assaulting walled cities or striking at an army in battle array; it must in-
clude the art of assailing the enemy's mental equilibrium." [ ^jjj ^f , pt. 3.]

28. Now a soldier's spirit is keenest in the morning;

Always provided, I suppose, that he has had breakfast. At the battle
of the Trebia, the Romans were foolishly allowed to fight fasting, whereas
Hannibal's men had breakfasted at their leisure. See Livy, XXI, liv. 8,
Iv. i and 8.

by noonday it has begun to flag; and in the evening,
his mind is bent only on returning to camp.

29. A clever general, therefore,

67

30.

82. M g IE IE z m to * £ ^ 2 it ft 7c? n ^ *

The jjgjjf , which certainly seems to be wanted here, is omitted in the
Tu Shu.

avoids an army when its spirit is keen, but attacks it
when it is sluggish and inclined to return. This is the
art of studying moods.

The Tlung Tien, for reasons of ^ gj|[ "avoidance of personal names

of the reigning dynasty," reads jfjt for £p in this and the two next
paragraphs.

30. Disciplined and calm, to await the appearance of
disorder and hubbub amongst the enemy: - - this is the
art of retaining self-possession.

31. To be near the goal while the enemy is still far
from it, to wait at ease

The Tlung Tien has ^ for /^ . The two characters are practically
synonymous, but according to the commentary, the latter is the form
always used in Sun Tzu.

while the enemy is toiling and struggling, to be well-fed
while the enemy is famished: - - this is the art of hus-
banding one's strength.

32. To refrain from intercepting

*|£ is the reading of the original text. But the J£ 1jj> |g |j£

quotes the passage with 4§£ yao1 (also meaning "to intercept"), and this
is supported by the Pei T'ang Shu Cfrao, the Yu Lan, and Wang Hsi's text.

an enemy whose banners are in perfect order, to refrain
from attacking an army drawn up in calm and confident array:

For this translation of ^ 'jg* , I can appeal to the authority of Tu
Mu, who defines the phrase as 3&E ||^ . The other commentators
mostly follow Ts'ao Kung, who says -^ , probably meaning "grand and

imposing". Li Ch'iian, however, has ^ Jfr "in subdivisions," which is
somewhat strange.

68

33.
34.

— this is the art of studying circumstances.

I have not attempted a uniform rendering of the four phrases yj^ ^ ,
'/p Aj) i */p J] and yjpf ^ » though y|^ really bears the same meaning
in each case. It is to be taken, I think, not in the sense of "to govern"
or "control," but rather, as K'ang Hsi defines it, = fj|j ^ "to examine
and practise," hence "look after," "keep a watchful eye upon." We may
find an example of this use in the Chou Li, XVIII. fol. 46 : yj=f fi -fc fljH .
Sun Tzti has not told us to control or restrain the quality which he calls
^pj?, but only to observe the time at which it is strongest. As for j(^»,
it is important to remember that in the present context it can only mean
"presence of mind." To speak of "controlling presence of mind" is ab-
surd, and Capt. Calthrop's "to have the heart under control" is hardly
less so. The whole process recommended here is that of VI. § 2 :

33. It is a military axiom not to advance uphill against
the enemy, nor to oppose him when he comes downhill.

" " The Yii Lan reads ^fe for -£T .

lr"» 14

34. Do not pursue an enemy who simulates flight; do
not attack soldiers whose temper is keen.

35. Do not swallow a bait offered by the enemy.

Li Ch'iian and Tu Mu, with extraordinary inability to see a metaphor,
take these words quite literally of food and drink that have been poisoned
by the enemy. Ch'en Hao and Chang Yii carefully point out that the
saying has a wider application. The T'ung Tien reads ^ "to covet"
instead of ^ . The similarity of the two characters sufficiently accounts
for the mistake.

Do not interfere with an army that is returning home.

The commentators explain this rather singular piece of advice by saying
that a man whose heart is set on returning home will fight to the death
against any attempt to bar his way, and is therefore too dangerous an
opponent to be tackled. Chang Yii quotes the words of Han Hsin:

3& 'S» 3|C §li ^& i 'fcf )9f ^P >nL "Invincikle is the soldier who
hath his desire and returneth homewards." A marvellous tale is told of

69

Ts'ao Ts'ao's courage and resource in ch. i of the San Kuo Chih, j|f*
*$* $E : *n *9^ A.D., he was besieging EM ||| Chang Hsiu in ;js|| Jang,
when :§||J =^j? Liu Piao sent reinforcements with a view to cutting off
Ts'ao's retreat. The latter was obliged to draw off his troops, only to
find himself hemmed in between two enemies, who were guarding each
outlet of a narrow pass in which he had engaged himself. In this des-
perate plight Ts'ao waited until nightfall, when he bored a tunnel into
the mountain side and laid an ambush in it. Then he marched on with
his baggage-train, and when it grew light, Chang Hsiu, finding that the
bird had flown, pressed after him in hot pursuit. As soon as the whole
army had passed by, the hidden troops fell on its rear, while Ts'ao him-
self turned and met his pursuers in front, so that they were thrown into
confusion and annihilated. Ts'ao Ts'ao said afterwards: Jjjj- j^ 3f- ^

to check my army in its retreat and brought me to battle in a desperate
position: hence I knew how to overcome them."

36. When you surround an army, leave an outlet free.

This does not mean that the enemy is to be allowed to escape. The
object, as Tu Mu puts it, is ^ J^j[ J^ ffifr -A> ifllE jj£\ ^ ^ j(^ "to

make him believe that there is a road to safety, and thus prevent his
fighting with the courage of despair." Tu Mu adds pleasantly : |Jj fjjj
||< ^ "After that, you may crush him."

Do not press a desperate foe too hard.

For *Q, the T'u Shu reads j[|| "pursue." Ch'en Hao quotes the

saying: ^ |p| j||J ^jj( 1& |p| |J|J [^g "Birds and beasts when brought
to bay will use their claws and teeth." Chang Yii says: ||£ ^jjf ^£ ^£j-

^ "if? T^t — ' Hfe fW >F* "Pf *§ IS ?$> "^ y°ur adversary has
burned his boats and destroyed his cooking-pots, and is ready to stake
all on the issue of a battle, he must not be pushed to extremities." The
phrase jj| ^g doubtless originated with Sun Tzti. The /*« Wen Yun Fu
gives four examples of its use, the earliest being from the Ch'ien Han Shu^
and I have found another in chap. 34 of the same work. Ho Shih il-
lustrates the meaning by a story taken from the life of ^J j|* ^|J Fu
Yen-ch'ing in ch. 251 of the -^ jjj . That general, together with his
colleague ^jrj^ |J Jg£ Tu Chung-wei, was surrounded by a vastly superior
army of Khitans in the year 945 A.D. The country was bare and desert-
like, and the little Chinese force was soon in dire straits for want of

;o

37. ft flj :H 2 ft fc

water. The wells they bored ran dry, and the men were reduced to
squeezing lumps of mud and sucking out the moisture. Their ranks
thinned rapidly, until at last Fu Yen-ch'ing exclained : "We are desperate
men. Far better to die for our country than to go with fettered hands
into captivity!" A strong gale happened to be blowing from the north-
east and darkening the air with dense clouds of sandy dust. Tu Chung-
wei was for waiting until this had abated before deciding on a final at-
tack; but luckily another officer, ^* ^J* jl Li Shou-cheng by name,
was quicker to see an opportunity, and said: "They are many and we are
few, but in the midst of this sandstorm our numbers will not be discernible;
victory will go to the strenuous fighter, and the wind will be our best
ally." Accordingly, Fu Yen-ch'ing made a sudden and wholly unexpected
onslaught with his cavalry, routed the barbarians and succeeded in breaking
through to safety. [Certain details in the above account have been added
from the g ^ 4 , ch. 78.]

37. Such is the art of warfare.

Cheng Yu-hsien in his jjj^ g^ inserts jfp after ^, I take it that
these words conclude the extract from the S jffr which began at § 23.

VIII. VARIATION OF TACTICS.

The heading means literally "The Nine Variations," but as Sun Tzu
does not appear to enumerate these, and as, indeed, he has already told
us (V. §§ 6 — n) that such deflections from the ordinary course are prac-
tically innumerable, we have little option but to follow Wang Hsi, who
says that "Nine" stands for an indefinitely large number. "All it means
is that in warfare ^ jjjfe it $jj& we ought to vary our tactics to the
utmost degree ... I do not know what Ts'ao Kung makes these Nine
Variations out to be [the latter's note is^^Jg^fij^j1^^
-Jjj^ ], but it has been suggested that they are connected with the Nine
Situations" — of chap. XI. This is the view adopted by Chang Yii:
see note on ^ ijjj, § 2. The only other alternative is to suppose that
something has been lost — a supposition to which the unusual shortness
of the chapter lends some weight.

1. Sun Tzu said: In war, the general receives his com-
mands from the sovereign, collects his army and concentrates
his forces.

Repeated from VII. § i, where it is certainly more in place. It may
have been interpolated here merely in order to supply a beginning to
the chapter.

2. When in difficult country, do not encamp.
For explanation of J^J ]fy , see XI. § 8.

In country where high roads intersect, join hands with
your allies.

See XI, §§ 6, 12. Capt. Calthrop omits

72

Do not linger in dangerously isolated positions.

£& Jjjj is not one of the Nine Situations as given in the beginning of
chap. XI, but occurs later on (ibid. § 43, q. v.). We may compare it with
jg $fa (XI. § 7). Chang Yii calls it a ^ $g £ ijjj, situated across
the frontier, in hostile territory. Li Ch'iian says it is "country in which
there are no springs or wells, flocks or herds, vegetables or firewood;"
Chia Lin, "one of gorges, chasms and precipices, without a road by which
to advance."
In hemmed-in situations, you must resort to stratagem.

See XI. §§ 9, 14. Capt. Calthrop has "mountainous and wooded
country," which is a quite inadequate translation of [j] .

In a desperate position, you must fight.

See XI. §§ 10, 14. Chang Ytt has an important note here, which
must be given in full. "From Jg, ijjj fiffi ^ ," he says, "down to this
point, the Nine Variations are presented to us. The reason why only five
are given is that the subject is treated en precis ( Jjjf; Jt -fc $fa fy ).
So in chap. XI, where he discusses the variations of tactics corresponding
to the Nine Grounds, Sun Tzu mentions only six variations; there again
we have an abridgment. [I cannot understand what Chang Yii means
by this statement. He can only be referring to §§ 11—14 or §§ 46 — 50
of chap. XI; but in both places all the nine grounds are discussed. Per-
haps he is confusing these with the Six ^Jj J^ of chap. X.] All kinds
of ground have corresponding military positions, and also a variation of
tactics suitable to each ( j^ jfy ^ <jj£ 7^ $j& ). In chap. XI, what
we find enumerated first [§§ 2 — 10] are the situations; afterwards [§§ 1 1 — 14]
the corresponding tactics. Now, how can we tell that the "^ J||j& "Nine
Variations" are simply the ^ jfy ^ %jj& "variations of tactics corres-
ponding to the Nine Grounds"? It is said further on [§ 5] that 'the
general who does not understand the nine variations of tactics may be
well acquainted with the features of the country, yet he will not be able
to turn his knowledge to practical account.' Again, in chap. XI [§ 41]
we read : 'The different measures adapted to the nine varieties of ground
( ^L Mfe £ 'HI ) an(^ ^e exPediency of aggressive or defensive tactics
must be carefully examined.' From a consideration of these passages the
meaning is made clear. When later on the nine grounds are enumerated,
Sun Tzu recurs to these nine variations. He wishes here to speak of the
Five Advantages [see infra, § 6], so he begins by setting forth the Nine
Variations. These are inseparably connected in practice, and therefore
they are dealt with together." The weak point of this argument is the
suggestion that 3£ IJJ "five things" can stand as a - , that is, an

73

abstract or abridgment, of nine, when those that are omitted are not less
important than those that appear, and when one of the latter is not in-
cluded amongst the nine at all.

3. There are roads which must not be followed,

"Especially those leading through narrow defiles," says Li Ch'iian,
"where an ambush is to be feared."

armies which must not be attacked,

More correctly, perhaps, "there are times when an army must not be
attacked." Ch'en Hao says: "When you see your way to obtain a trivial
advantage, but are powerless to inflict a real defeat, refrain from attacking,
for fear of overtaxing your men's strength."

towns

Capt. Calthrop says "castles" — an unfortunate attempt to introduce
local colour.

which must not be besieged,

Cf. III. § 4. Ts'ao Kung gives an interesting illustration from his own
experience. When invading the territory of ^ yft Hsu-chou, he ignored
the city of jSE Jjjj? Hua-pi, which lay directly in his path, and pressed
on into the heart of the country. This excellent strategy was rewarded
by the subsequent capture of no fewer than fourteen important district
cities. Chang Yu says: "No town should be attacked which, if taken,
cannot be held, or if left alone, will not cause any trouble " ^j jj£
Hsiin Ying, when urged to attack >fg Kjl? Pi-yang, replied: "The city is
small and well-fortified; even if I succeed in taking it, 't will be no great
feat of arms ; whereas if I fail, I shall make myself a laughing-stock."
In the seventeenth century, sieges still formed a large proportion of war.
It was Turenne who directed attention to the importance of marches,
countermarches and manoeuvres. He said: "It is a great mistake to
waste men in taking a town when the same expenditure of soldiers will
gain a province." *

positions which must not be contested, commands of the
sovereign which must not be obeyed.

This is a hard saying for the Chinese, with their reverence for au-
thority, and Wei Liao Tzu (quoted by Tu Mu) is moved to exclaim:

* "Marshal Turenne," p. 50.

74

5. # ^ m t$ % -I £ m % m & MU ye ^ mn
ZM^

6- '/£ ^ ^ 531 #,•£& £ * SI 2fl 3E. fU ^ .H ft A

. "Weapons

are baleful instruments, strife is antagonistic to virtue, a military com-
mander is the negation of civil order !" The unpalatable fact remains,
however, that even Imperial wishes must be subordinated to military
necessity. Cf. III. § 17. (5), X. § 23. The Tung Tien has $f ^£ 1|[
before ^& ^ , etc. This is a gloss on the, words by Chu-ko Liang, which
being repeated by Tu Yu became incorporated with the text. Chang Yii
thinks that these five precepts are the 3JL ?PJ referred to in §6. Another
theory is that the mysterious ~j\^ %jj& are here enumerated, starting with

and endin§ at *tb W j^r ^ ^ ' while the final clause

embraces and as it were sums up all the nine. Thus
Ho Shih says : "Even if it be your sovereign's command to encamp in diffi-
cult country, linger in isolated positions, etc., you must not do so." The
theory is perhaps a little too ingenious to be accepted with confidence.

4. The general Ivho thoroughly understands the advan-
tages that accompany variation of tactics knows how to
handle his troops.

Before 7J;|J in the original text there is a ^|j which is obviously not
required.

5. The general who does not understand these, may be
well acquainted with the configuration of the country, yet he
will not be able to turn his knowledge to practical account.

Literally, "get the advantage of the ground," which means not only
securing good positions, but availing oneself of natural advantages in
every possible way. Chang Yii says : "Every kind of ground is characterised
by certain natural features, and also gives scope for a certain variability
of plan. How is it possible to turn these natural features to account
unless topographical knowledge is supplemented by versatility of mind?"

6. So, the student of war who is unversed in the art
of varying his plans, even though he be acquainted with
the Five Advantages, will fail to make the best use of
his men.

75

M J-ftflfr

Ts<ao Kung says that the 3£ ^|J are ~^C 3£ |Jj ^ "the five things
that follow;" but this cannot be right. We must rather look back to the
five "variations" contained in § 3. Chia Lin (who reads jfc ^|j& here to
balance the 5t %\\ ) te^s us tnat these imply five obvious and generally
advantageous lines of action, namely : "if a certain road is short, it must
be followed; if an army is isolated, it must be attacked; if a town is in
a parlous condition, it must be besieged; if a position can be stormed, it
must be attempted ; and if consistent with military operations, the ruler's
commands must be obeyed." But there are circumstances which some-
times forbid a general to use these advantages. For instance, "a certain
road may be the shortest way for him, but if he knows that it abounds
in natural obstacles, or that the enemy has laid an ambush on it, he
will not follow that road. A hostile force may be open to attack, but if
he knows that it is hard-pressed and likely to fight with desperation, he
will refrain from striking," and so on. Here the *|& comes in to modify
the ^|J , and hence we see the uselessness of knowing the one without
the other — of having an eye for weaknesses in the enemy's armour
without being clever enough to recast one's plans on the spur of the mo-
ment. Capt. Calthrop offers this slovenly translation : "In the manage-
ment of armies, if the art of the Nine Changes be understood [stf\, a
knowledge of the Five Advantages is of no avail."

7. Hence in the wise leader's plans, considerations of
advantage and of disadvantage will be blended together.

"Whether in an advantageous position or a disadvantageous one," says
Ts'ao Kung, "the opposite state should be always present to your mind."

8. If our expectation of advantage be tempered in this
way, we may succeed in accomplishing the essential part
of our schemes.

>j=| , according to Tu Mu, is equivalent to ^ , and %jfc Tfj" ^ -j^

is paraphrased by Chang Yii as "jjj* J£j[ ^jp £ ^£ lf£ • Tu Mu Soes
on to say: "If we wish to wrest an advantage from the enemy, we must
not fix our minds on that alone, but allow for the possibility of the enemy
also doing some harm to us, and let this enter as a factor into our cal-
culations."

9. If, on the other hand, in the midst of difficulties we

76

are always ready to seize an advantage, we may extricate
ourselves from misfortune.

A translator cannot emulate the conciseness of J^ "to blend
[thoughts of advantage] with disadvantage," but the meaning is as given.
Tu Mu says : "If I wish to extricate myself from a dangerous position, I
must consider not only the enemy's ability to injure me, but also my
own ability to gain an advantage over the enemy. If in my counsels
these two considerations are properly blended, I shall succeed in liberating
myself. . . For instance, if I am surrounded by the enemy and only think
of effecting an escape, the nervelessness of my policy will incite my ad-
versary to pursue and crush me; it would be far better to encourage my
men to deliver a bold counter-attack, and use the advantage thus gained
to free myself from the enemy's toils." See the story of Ts'ao Ts'ao, VII.
§ 35, note. In his first edition, Capt. Calthrop translated §§ 7 — 9 as
follows: "The wise man perceives clearly wherein lies advantage and
disadvantage. While recognising an opportunity, he does not overlook
the risks, and saves future anxiety." This has now been altered into:
"The wise man considers well both advantage and disadvantage. He
sees a way out of adversity, and on the day of victory to danger is not blind"
Owing to a needless inversion of the Chinese, the words which I have
italicised are evidently intended to represent § 8 !

10. Reduce the hostile chiefs by inflicting damage on
them;

Chia Lin enumerates several ways of inflicting this injury, some of
which would only occur to the Oriental mind: — "Entice away the
enemy's best and wisest men, so that he may be left without counsellors.
Introduce traitors into his country, that the government policy may be
rendered futile. Foment intrigue and deceit, and thus sow dissension
between the ruler and his ministers. By means of every artful contri-
vance, cause deterioration amongst his men and waste of his treasure.
Corrupt his morals by insidious gifts leading him into excess. Disturb
and unsettle his mind by presenting him with lovely women." Chang Yu
(after Wang Hsi) considers the ^ to be military chastisement: "Get the
enemy," he says, "into a position where he must suffer injury, and he
will submit of his own accord." Capt. Calthrop twists Sun Tzu's words
into an absurdly barbarous precept: "In reducing an enemy to submis-
sion, inflict all possible damage upon him."

make trouble for them,

UH is defined by Ts'ao Kung as it}. , and his definition is generally

77

adopted by the commentators. Tu Mu, however, seems to take it in the
sense of "possessions," or, as we might say, "assets," which he considers

to be ^ JK H W A 3® ^ ff "a larSe army' a rich exchequer,
harmony amongst the soldiers, punctual fulfilment of commands." These
give us a whip-hand over the enemy.

and keep them constantly engaged;

^, literally, "make servants of them." Tu Yu says ^ ^ ^ ^ ^
"prevent them from having any rest."

hold out specious allurements, and make them rush to
any given point.

Meng Shih's note contains an excellent example of the idiomatic use
of *|& : "^ T^J %jj& pjj JJ g|? "cause them to forget pien (the reasons
for acting otherwise than on their first impulse), and hasten in our
direction."

1 1 . The art of war teaches us to rely not on the like-
lihood of the enemy's not coming, but on our own readi-
ness to receive him;

The Tung Tien and Yu Lan read ^ || 0 ^ ^ ifc » but the

conciser form is more likely to be right.

not on the chance of his not attacking, but rather on the
fact that we have made our position unassailable.

The Tung Tien and Yu Lan insert 3£ -^ after the first ]^£ , and
omit # Jft ,

1 2 . There are five dangerous faults which may affect
a general: (i) Recklessness, which leads to destruction;

_p| fjfjj ffiE j|T% "Bravery without forethought," as Ts'ao Kung analyses
it, which causes a man to fight blindly and desperately like a mad bull.
Such an opponent, says Chang Yii, "must not be encountered with brute
force, but may be lured into an ambush and slain." Cf. Wu Tzti, chap. IV

<^ Mt, ji A

78

"In estimating the character of a general, men are wont to pay exclusive
attention to his courage, forgetting that courage is only one out of many
qualities which a general should possess. The merely brave man is prone
to fight recklessly; and he who fights recklessly, without any perception
of what is expedient, must be condemned." Ssu-ma Fa, too, makes the
incisive remark _t ^ >5 ^ "Simply going to one's death does not
bring about victory."

(2) cowardice, which leads to capture-

' Jj£> 0^ is explained by Ts'ao Kung of the man "whom timidity pre-
vents from advancing to seize an advantage," and Wang Hsi adds, "who
is quick to flee at the sight of danger." Meng Shih gives the closer
paraphrase ^ jjfc £|r ^ "he who is bent on returning alive," that is,
the man who will never take a risk. But, as Sun Tzti knew, nothing is
to be achieved in war unless you are willing to take risks. T'ai Kung
said: -fc %\] ^ fl^f ^ §g S $& "He who lets an advantage slip
will subsequently bring upon himself real disaster." In 404 A.D., Jjjj\ ^t
Liu Yii pursued the rebel ^g "& Huan Hsiian up the Yangtsze and
fought a naval battle with him at |Jj|J. |]||| ty\\ the island of Ch'eng-
hung. The loyal troops numbered only a few thousands, while their op-
ponents were in great force. But Huan Hsuan, fearing the fate which
was in store for him should he be overcome, had a light boat made fast
to the side of his war-junk, so that he might escape, if necessary, at a
moment's notice. The natural result was that the fighting spirit of his
soldiers was utterly quenched, and when the loyalists made an attack
from windward with fireships, all striving with the utmost ardour to be
first in the fray, Huan Hsuan's forces were routed, had to burn all their
baggage and fled for two days and nights without stopping. [See ^|p jfe

chap. 99, fol. 13.] Chang Yii tells a somewhat similar story of ^ ffl 7Jjf>
Chao Ying-ch'i, a general of the Chin State who during a battle with the
army of Ch'u in 597 B.C. had a boat kept in readiness for him on the
river, wishing in case of defeat to be the first to get across.

(3) a hasty temper, which can be provoked by insults ;

I fail to see the meaning of Capt. Calthrop's "which brings insult."
Tu Mu tells us that $|c j| Yao Hsiang, when opposed in 357 A.D. by
^ Jg Huang Mei, ^ =fe Teng Ch'iang and others, shut himself up
behind his walls and refused to fight. Teng Ch'iang said: "Our adver-
sary is of a choleric temper and easily provoked; let us make constant
sallies and break down his walls, then he will grow angry and come out.

79

Once we can bring his force to battle, it is doomed to be our prey."
This plan was acted upon, Yao Hsiang came out to fight, was lured on
as far as ^ j§* San-yuan by the enemy's pretended flight, and finally
attacked and slain.

(4) a delicacy of honour which is sensitive to shame ;

This need not be taken to mean that a sense of honour is really a
defect in a general. What Sun Tzti condemns is rather an exaggerated
sensitiveness to slanderous reports, the thin-skinned man who is stung by
opprobrium, however undeserved. Mei Yao-ch'en truly observes, though
somewhat paradoxically: ^j|J ^^ ~jf\ |p| "The seeker after glory should
be careless of public opinion."

(5) over-solicitude for his men, which exposes him to
Worry and trouble.

Here again, Sun Tzu does not mean that the general is to be careless
of the welfare of his troops. All he wishes to emphasise is the danger
of sacrificing any important military advantage to the immediate comfort
of his men. This is a shortsighted policy, because in the long run the
troops will suffer more from the defeat, or, at best, the prolongation of
the war, which will be the consequence. A mistaken feeling of pity will
often induce a general to relieve a beleaguered city, or to reinforce a
hard-pressed detachment, contrary to his military instincts. It is now
generally admitted that our repeated efforts to relieve Ladysmith in the
South African War were so many strategical blunders which defeated
their own purpose. And in the end, relief came through 'the very man
who started out with the distinct resolve no longer to subordinate the
interests of the whole to sentiment in favour of a part. An old soldier
of one of our generals who failed most conspicuously in this war, tried
once, I remember, to defend him to me on the ground that he was
always "so good to his men." By this plea, had he but known it, he
was only condemning him out of Sun Tzti's mouth.

13. These are the five besetting sins of a general,
ruinous to the conduct of war.

14. When an army is overthrown and its leader slain,
the cause will surely be found among these five dangerous
faults. Let them be a subject of meditation.

IX. THE ARMY ON THE MARCH.

The contents of this interesting chapter are better indicated in § i than
by this heading.

i . Sun Tzu said : We come now to the question of
encamping the army, and observing signs of the enemy.

The discussion of j|| jl? , as Chang Yii points out, extends from here
down to ^ ^ £ #f IK & ifc <SS i-'7), and ^| $j£ from that
point down to jj£\ ^jjjjl &j£ ^ (§§ 18 — 39). The rest of the chapter
consists of a few desultory remarks, chiefly on the subject of discipline.

Pass quickly over mountains,

For this use of jjfa, cf. infra, § 3. See also ^fjj* -^ , ch. i. fol. 2
(standard edition of 1876): $jjfc fa JjjJ*; Shih Chi, ch. 27 ad init.:

and keep in the neighbourhood of valleys.

Tu Mu says that ^ here = jj£. The idea is, not to linger among
barren uplands, but to keep close to supplies of water and grass. Capt.
Calthrop translates "camp in valleys," heedless of the very next sentence.
Cf. Wu Tzu, ch. 3 : ^ |£ ^ |g "Abide not in natural ovens," /. e.
^ ^ ^ IH "the openings of large valleys." Chang Yii tells the fol-
lowing anecdote : " j£ |j|$ ^g Wu-tu Ch'iang was a robber captain in
the time of the Later Han, and Jj| ^ Ma Yuan was sent to exterminate
his gang. Ch'iang having found a refuge in the hills, Ma Yuan made no
attempt to force a battle, but seized all the favourable positions com-
manding supplies of water and forage. Ch'iang was soon in such a
desperate plight for want of provisions that he was forced to make a total
surrender. He did not know the advantage of keeping in the neighbour-
hood of valleys." •

8i

2

2. Camp in high places,

Not on high hills, but on knolls or hillocks elevated above the sur-
rounding country.

facing the sun.

jjjj^ £[::=: |fj [j|^ . Tu Mu takes this to mean "facing south," and
Ch'en Hao "facing east." Cf. infra, §§ n, 13.

Do not climb heights in order to fight.

^jg is here simply equivalent to "jf|f . The T'ung Tien and Yu Lan
read |J£ .
So much for mountain warfare.

After [Jj , the Tung Tien and Yu Lan insert ^ .

3. After crossing a river, you should get far away from it.

"In order to tempt the enemy to cross after you," according to Ts'ao
Kung, and also, says Chang Yu, "in order not to be impeded in your
evolutions." The Tung Tien reads j|£ ^ %jb -fa "lf the enemy crosses
a river," etc. But in view of the next sentence, this is almost certainly
an interpolation.

4. When an invading force crosses a river in its on-
ward march, do not advance to meet it in mid-stream.
It will be best to let half the army get across, and then
deliver your attack.

The T'ung Tien and Yu Lan read Jg for ^ , without change of
meaning. Wu Tzu plagiarises this passage twice over: — ch. II ad fin.,

• Li

Ch'iian alludes to the great victory won by Han Hsin over ^|[ fl Lung
Chu at the yjj^ Wei River. Turning to the Ch'ien Han Shu, ch. 34, fol. 6
verso, we find the battle described as follows: "The two armies were
drawn up on opposite sides of the river. In the night, Han Hsin ordered
his men to take some ten thousand sacks filled with sand and construct
a dam a little higher up. Then, leading half his army across, he at-

6

82

. ft fcJMR ftJl it M ft ft

tacked Lung CM; but after a time,, pretending to have failed in his
attempt, he hastily withdrew to the other bank. Lung Chu was much
elated by this unlooked-for success, and exclaiming : "I felt sure that Han
Hsin was really a coward!" he pursued him and began crossing the river
in his turn. Han Hsin now sent a party to cut open the sandbags, thus
releasing a great volume of water, which swept down and prevented the
greater portion of Lung Chii's army from getting across. He then turned
upon the force which had been cut off, and annihilated it, Lung Chu
himself being amongst the slain. The rest of the army, on the further
bank, also scattered and fled in all directions."

5. If you are anxious to fight, you should not go to
meet the invader near a river which he has to cross.

For fear of preventing his crossing. Capt. Calthrop makes the injunction
ridiculous by omitting

6. Moor your craft higher up than the enemy, and
facing the sun.

See supra, § 2. The repetition of these words in connection with water
is very awkward. Chang Yii has the note : al/ S ;J| "1SJ (fifi p£ -^C

* ^^ /i xyy_ X*"ft tsSj\. *^?^4 /+

-t i0 f} if ^1 M i| fffi Jt ft "Said either of tro°Ps marshalled
on the river-bank, or of boats anchored in the stream itself; in either
case it is essential to be higher than the enemy and facing the sun."
The other commentators are not at all explicit. One is much tempted
to reject their explanation of jjjj^ /Jl altogether, and understand it simply

as "seeking safety.'' [Cf. Jjfc B£ in VIII. § 12, and infra, §9.] It is true

that this involves taking jjjj^ in an unusual, though not, I think, an im-
possible sense. Of course the earlier passage would then have to be
translated in like manner.

Do not move up-stream to meet the enemy.

Tu Mu says: "As water flows downwards, we must not pitch our camp
on the lower reaches of a river, for fear the enemy should open the
sluices and sweep us away in a flood. This is implied above in the words
J|jj^ ^ ||J jfyj . Chu-ko Wu-hou has remarked that 'in river warfare
we must not advance against the stream,' which is as much as to say
that our fleet must not be anchored below that of the enemy, for then
they would be able to take advantage of the current and make short
work of us." There is also the danger, noted by other commentators,

83

that the enemy may throw poison on the water to be carried down
to us. Capt. Calthrop's first version was: "Do not cross rivers in the
face of the stream" — a sapient piece of advice, which made one curious
to know what the correct way of crossing rivers might be. He has now
improved this into: "Do not fight when the enemy is between the army
and the source of the river."

So much for river warfare.

7. In crossing salt-marshes, your sole concern should
be to get over them quickly, without any delay.

Because of the lack of fresh water, the poor quality of the herbage,
and last but not least, because they are low, flat, and exposed to attack.

8. If forced to fight in a salt-marsh, you should have
water and grass near you, and get your back to a clump
of trees.

Li Ch'uan remarks that the ground is less likely to be treacherous
where there are trees, while Tu Yu says that they will serve to protect
the rear. Capt. Calthrop, with a perfect genius for going wrong, says "in
the neighbourhood of a marsh." For ^k the Tlung Tien and Ytt Lan
wrongly read ^|J , and the latter also has ^g instead of ^* .

So much for operations in salt-marshes. .1

9. In dry, level country, take up an easily accessible
position

This is doubtless the force of Jjj^j , its opposite being |^ . Thus, Tu

Mu explains it as -JJ3 ^ ^f i$8 ^ |fl "ground that is smooth and
firm," and therefore adapted for cavalry; Chang Ytt as ;JfJ ^ fit J^£
Rl ^ ilk "level ground, free from depressions and hollows." He adds
later on that although Sun Tzu is discussing flat country, there will never-
theless be slight elevations and hillocks.

with rising ground to your right and on your rear,

84

io. Jl ift P9 W £ 5

11. ii it sx9 •3E4Ht 9 • it

12. # £ ffi £ » m n w ^ *n # 0

The Yii Lan again reads ^ for ^ . Tu Mu quotes T'ai Kung as
saying : "An army should have a stream or a marsh on its left, and a hill
or tumulus on its right."

so that the danger may be in front, and safety lie behind.
Wang Hsi thinks that ^ ^ contradicts the saying jjj^ £j: in § 2,
and therefore suspects a mistake in the text.

So much for campaigning in flat country.

10. These are the four useful branches of military
knowledge

Those, namely, concerned with (i) mountains, (2) rivers, (3) marshes,
and (4) plains. Compare Napoleon's "Military Maxims," no. i.

which enabled the Yellow Emperor to vanquish four several
sovereigns.

Mei Yao-ch'en asks, with some plausibility, whether »jjj» is not a mistake
for jpT "armies," as nothing is known of Huang Ti having conquered
four other Emperors. The Shih Chi (ch. I ad init.) speaks only of his
victories over jj£ *jjj* Yen Ti and j^ -fa Ch'ih Yu. In the ^ |?g
it is mentioned that he "fought seventy battles and pacified the Empire."
Ts'ao Kung's explanation is, that the Yellow Emperor was the first to
institute the feudal system of vassal princes, each of whom (to the number
of four) originally bore the title of Emperor. Li Chfcian tells us that the
art of war originated under Huang Ti, who received it from his Minister
M, J5f Feng Hou.

1 1 . All armies prefer high ground to low,

"High ground," says Mei Yao-ch'en, "is not only more agreeable and
salubrious, but more convenient from a military point of view; low
ground is not only damp and unhealthy, but also disadvantageous for
fighting." The original text and the Tlu Shu have ^jp instead of Jal .

and sunny places to dark.

12. If you are careful of your men,

Ts'ao Kung says: [fi] fc ^ ~pf $ >$ ^ ^ "Make for fresh
water and pasture, where you can turn out your animals to graze." And

85

the other commentators follow him, apparently taking ^^ as = ffi .
Cf. Mencius, V. i. ix. i, where ^jji ffi ^- means a cattle-keeper. But
here ^ £jr surely has reference to the health of the troops. It is the
title of Chuang Tzii's third chapter, where it denotes moral rather than
physical well-being.

and camp on hard ground,

jj must mean dry and solid, as opposed to damp and marshy, ground.
This is to be found as a rule in high places, so the commentators explain
jj as practically equivalent to "Jj|j .

the army will be free from disease of every kind,

Chang Yii says: "The dryness of the climate will prevent the outbreak
of illness."

and this will spell victory.

13. When you come to a hill or a bank, occupy the
sunny side, with the slope on your right rear. Thus you
will at once act for the benefit of your soldiers and utilise
the natural advantages of the ground.

14. When, in consequence of heavy rains up-country,
a river which you wish to ford is swollen and flecked
with foam, you must wait until it subsides.

The T'ung Tien and Ya Lan have a superfluous ~~J\ before fc .

15. Country in which there are precipitous cliffs with
torrents running between,

% ffi , explained by Mei Yao-ch'en as^^l^l^^C^^^I.
deep natural hollows,

^ # , explained as |3J @J ^ ^ ffl l£ #f Hf V^ces enclosed
on every side by steep banks, with pools of water at the bottom."

confined places,

86

^ 5}5 "natural pens or prisons," explained as ^£ jgj J|| ^g ^

^A HE HJ "Places surrounded by precipices on three sides — easy to
get into, but hard to get out of."
tangled thickets,

^ |f, explained as ^ ^ ^ ^ |f |g ^ |g "places covered
with such dense undergrowth that spears cannot be used."

quagmires

^ jig, explained as ^ "pfflffig $. ^ ^ M "low-lying places,
so heavy with mud as to be impassible for chariots and horsemen."

and crevasses,

^ |$$ is explained by MeiYao-ch^n as ^ tH ffi [6) ^ ^ jfc ^

"a narrow difficult way between beetling cliffs," but Ts'ao Kung says

UJ $1 it *H[ ilb ^ ft E K ^ ii: 3t ^. which seems to

denote something on a much smaller scale. Tu Mu's note is j^ ^ j(S
^HL ^t R§ ^k 5 "Sroun(^ covered with trees and rocks, and inter-
sected by numerous ravines and pitfalls." This is very vague, but Chia
Lin explains it clearly enough as a defile or narrow pass : ppjj ^ [J^ ^
~f& $5 "M ff5 St S' anc^ Chang Yii takes much the same view.
On the whole, the weight of the commentators certainly inclines to the
rendering "defile". But the ordinary meaning of [J§ (a crack or fissure)
and the fact that <^U Jfljj above must be something in the nature of a
defile, make me think that Sun Tzu is here speaking of crevasses. The
Tung Tien and Yil Lan read J|$ for |Jj^, with the same meaning; the
latter also has -^ ^ after ^ J|J — a palpable gloss.
should be left with all possible speed and not approached
1 6. While we keep away from such places, we should
get the enemy to approach them; while we face them,
we should let the enemy have them on his rear.

17. If in ,the neighbourhood of your camp

The original text has jg Jfj , but ^ has been generally adopted as
yielding much better sense.

87

is. at a B5 » # it s wrto

there should be any hilly country,

|J& Iffi is £|$ -^ 2, *&» according to Chang Yu,
ponds surrounded by aquatic grass, hollow basins filled
with reeds,

The original text omits 3JJL and £fc, so that ^ and ^ join to make
a pair: "ponds and basins." This is plausible enough at first sight, but
there are several objections to the reading: (r) 3JL is unlikely to have
got into the text as a gloss on ^; (2) it is easy to suppose, on the other

hand, that 3j£. and afterwards tk (to restore the balance of the sentence)

" VM* i I

were omitted by a copyist who jumped to the conclusion that gi| and ^p
must go together; (3) the sense, when one comes to consider it, actually
requires ^J, for it is absurd to talk of pools and ponds as in themselres
suitable places for an ambush; (4) Li Ching (571 — 649 A. D.) in his
-E j£ "Art of War" has the words: |f $| !g % glj # ^ g -ft .
This is evidently a rerniniscence of Sun Tzti, so there can be little doubt
that ^j§ stood in the text at this early date. It may be added that the
T'-ung Tien and Yu Lan both have $&, and the latter also reads :yj±
for #..

or woods with thick undergrowth,

I read /\\ ^ with tne Yii Lan in preference to [Jj ^JC, given in the
original text, which is accepted by the commentators without question.
The text of the T(u Shu up to this point runs as follows: fr

they must be carefully routed out and searched; for these
are places where men in ambush or insidious spies are likely
to be lurking.

The original text omits |j^, which has been restorecj from the T~ung
Tien and Yii Lan. The T'u Shu omits ||£ as well, making " a sub-

stantive. On Chang Yu has the note:

on our guard against traitors who may lie in close covert, secretly spying
out our weaknesses and overhearing our instructions. Fu and chien are
to be taken separately."

1 8. When the enemy is close at hand and remains
quiet, he is relying on the natural strength of his position.

88

19. a us & a * # A 2 at tfe

». £ ft £ * 4 * ft

Here begin Sun Tzu's remarks on the reading of signs, much of which
is so good that it could almost be included in a modern manual like
Gen. Baden-Powell's "Aids to Scouting."

19. When he keeps aloof and tries to provoke a battle,
he is anxious for the other side to advance.

Probably because we are in a strong position from which he wishes to
dislodge us. "If he came close up to us," says Tu Mu, "and tried to
force a battle, he would seem to despise us, and there would be less
probability of our responding to the challenge."

20. If his place of encampment is easy of access, he
is tendering a bait.

Sj is here the opposite of |Jj|r in § 18. The reading of the T^ung
Tien and Yil Lan, 3t ffi $j. % fg $ %\] ifc , is pretty obviously
corrupt. The original text, which transposes ^ and 5§", niay very pos-
sibly be right. Tu Mu tells us that there is yet another reading :

2 1 . Movement amongst the trees of a forest shows that
the enemy is advancing.

Ts'ao Kung explains this as "felling trees to clear a passage," and
Chang Yii says: "Every army sends out scouts to climb high places and
observe the enemy. If a scout sees that the trees of a forest are moving
and shaking, he may know that they are being cut down to clear a pas-
sage for the enemy's march."

The appearance of a number of screens in the midst of
thick grass means that the enemy wants to make us
suspicious.

Whenever the meaning of a passage happens to be somewhat elusive,
Capt. Calthrop seems to consider himself justified in giving free rein to
the imagination. Thus, though his text is here identical with ours, he
renders the above : "Broken branches and trodden grass, as of the passing
of a large host, must be regarded with suspicion." Tu Yu's explanation,
borrowed from Ts'ao Kung, is as follows : "The presence of a number of
screens or sheds in the midst of thick vegetation is a sure sign that the
enemy has fled and, fearing pursuit, has constructed these hiding-places

89

22-

23.

in order to make u's suspect an ambush." It appears that these "screens"
were hastily knotted together out of any long grass which the retreating
enemy happened to come across.

22. The rising of birds in their flight is the sign of an
ambuscade.

Chang Yii's explanation is doubtless right: "When birds that are flying
along in a straight line suddenly shoot upwards, it means that soldiers
are in ambush at the spot beneath."

Startled beasts indicate that a sudden attack is coming.

An example of JJ fou* in the meaning of "ambuscade" may be found
in the Tso Chuan, |g 9th year: 3jg* ^ =£ g[ J£j[ ffi ^ . In the

present passage, however, it is to be distinguished from -^ just above, in
that it implies onward motion on the part of the attacking force. Thus,
Li Ch'iian defines it as ^ jj; ffp jg , and Tu Mu as ^ t|j ^ ^ .

23. When there is dust rising in a high column, it is
the sign of chariots advancing; when the dust is low, but
spread over a wide area, it betokens the approach of
infantry.

ft f?5 IPt "high and sharp," or rising to a peak, is of course some-
what exaggerated as applied to dust. The commentators explain the
phenomenon by saying that horses and chariots, being heavier than men,
raise more dust, and also follow one another in the same wheel-track,
whereas foot-soldiers would be marching in ranks, many abreast. According
to Chang Yii, "every army on the march must have scouts ( $fc ^ffc ^ ^ )
some way in advance, who on sighting dust raised by the enemy, will
gallop back and report it to the commander-in-chief." Cf. Gen. Baden-
Powell: "As you move along, say, in a hostile country, your eyes should
be looking afar for the enemy or any signs of him : figures, dust rising,
birds getting up, glitter of arms, etc." *

When it branches out in different directions, it shows that
parties have been sent to collect firewood.

There is some doubt about the reading jffij. J^jJ . The T'ung Tien and
Yil Lan have , and Li Ch'iian proposes

* "Aids to Scouting," p. 26.

go

A few clouds of dust moving to and fro signify that the
army is encamping.

Chang Yii says: "In apportioning the defences for a cantonment, light
horse will be sent out to survey the position and ascertain the weak and
strong points all along its circumference. Hence the small quantity of
dust and its motion*"

24. Humble words and increased preparations are signs
that the enemy is about to advance.

"As though they stood in great fear of us," says Tu Mu. "Their ob-
ject is- to make us contemptuous and careless, after which they will attack
us." Chang Yu alludes to the story of gj j|[ T'ien Tan of the Ch'i
State, who in 279 B.C. was hard-pressed in his defence of [|p ||§ Chi-
mo against the Yen forces, led by jjjj^ 5J^f Ch'i Chieh. In ch. 82 of the
Shih Chi we read: "T'ien Tan openly said: 'My only fear is that the
Yen army may cut off the noses of their Ch'i prisoners and place them
in the "front rank to fight against us; that would be the undoing of our
city.' The other side being informed of this speech, at once acted on
the suggestion; but those within the city were enraged at seeing their
fellow-countrymen thus mutilated, and fearing only lest they should fall
into the enemy's hands, were nerved to defend themselves more obstinately
than ever. Once again T'ien Tan sent back converted spies who reported.
these words to the enemy: 'What I dread most is that the men of Yen
may dig up the ancestral tombs outside the town, and by inflicting this
indignity on our forefathers cause us to become faint-hearted.' Forthwith
the besiegers dug up all the graves and burned the corpses lying in them.
And the inhabitants of Chi-mo, witnessing the outrage from the city-walls,
wept passionately and were all impatient to go out and fight, their fury
being increased tenfold. T'ien Tan knew then that his soldiers were
ready for any enterprise. But instead of a sword, he himself took a mat-
tock in his hands, and ordered others to be distributed amongst his best
warriors, while the ranks were filled up with their wives and concubines.
He then served out all the remaining rations and bade his men eat their
fill. The regular soldiers were told to keep out of sight, and the walls
were manned with the old and weaker men and with women. This
done, envoys were despatched to the enemy's camp to arrange terms of
surrender, whereupon the Yen army began shouting for joy. T'ien Tan
also collected 20,000 ounces of silver from the people, and got the wealthy
citizens of Chi-mo to send it to the Yen general with the prayer that,
when the town capitulated, he would not allow their homes to be plundered
or their women to be maltreated. Ch'i Chieh, in high good humour,
granted their prayer; but his army now became increasingly slack and

9'

26. Jfi5

careless. Meanwhile, T'ien Tan got together a thousand oxen, decked
them with pieces of red silk, painted their bodies, dragon-like, with coloured
stripes, and fastened sharp blades on their horns and well-greased rushes
on their tails. When night came on, he lighted the ends of the rushes,
and drove the oxen through a number of holes which he had pierced in
the walls, backing them up with a force of 5000 picked warriors. The
animals, maddened with pain, dashed furiously into the enemy's camp
where they caused the utmost confusion and dismay; for their tails acted
as torches, showing up the hideous pattern on their bodies, and the weapons
on their horns killed or wounded any with whom they came into contact.
In the meantime, the band of 5000 had crept up with gags in their
mouths, and now threw themselves on the enemy. At the same moment
a frightful din arose in the city itself, all those that remained behind
making as much noise as possible by banging drums and hammering on
bronze vessels, until heaven and earth were convulsed by the uproar.
Terror-stricken, the Yen army fled in disorder, hotly pursued by the men
of Ch'i, who succeeded in slaying their general Ch'i Chieh . . . The result
of the battle was the ultimate recovery of some seventy cities which had
belonged to the Ch'i State."

Violent language and driving forward as if to the attack
are signs that he will retreat.

I follow the original text here, also adopted by the Tu Shu. The
standard text reads ||£ =jfa ffjj ij|j J|t lg| ^g- ^ fy on the strength

of Ts'ao Kung's commentary Hfjjf g^ -j^ , which shows that his text in-
cluded the word |^. Strong as this ground is, I do not think it can
counterbalance the obvious superiority of the other reading in point of
sense, g^ not only provides no antithesis to j|f , but makes the whole
passage absurd; for if the language of the enemy is calculated to deceive,
it cannot be known as deceitful at the time, and can therefore afford no
"sign." Moreover, the extra word in itjj j[£ |g (an awkward locu-

tion, by the way) spoils the parallelism with

25. When the light chariots

The same, according to Tu Yu, as the B^ £ of II. $ I.
come out first and take up a position on the wings, it
is a sign that the enemy is forming for battle.

The Tung Tien omits |fj .

26. Peace proposals unaccompanied by a sworn covenant
indicate a plot.

92

27.

28.

29.

30. » fffi ft tfc

Tu Yu defines jjft as Jg $J , and Li Ch'uan as J| jg[ ;> $J ";

treaty confirmed by oaths and hostages." Wang Hsi and Chang Yii, 01
the other hand, simply say fit jjg£ "without reason," "on a frivolou
pretext," as though ^J bore the rather unusual sense of "important.'
Capt. Calthrop has "without consultation," which is too loose.

27. When there is much running about

Every man hastening to his proper place under his own regimental banner
and the soldiers fall into rank,

I follow the Tl u Shu in omitting jjj after Jiri . Tu Mu quotes th<
Chou Li, ch. xxix. fol. 31: ^ Qg ^ 38 # ^ TJr jfc .
it means that the critical moment has come.

What Chia Lin calls >g. J|J ^ flft , as opposed to ||

28. When some are seen advancing and some retreating
it is a lure.

Capt. Calthrop is hardly right in translating: "An advance, followed b)
sudden retirement." It is rather a case of feigned confusion. As Tu Mi

29. WThen the soldiers stand leaning on their spears
they are faint from want of food.

^ is here probably not a synonym for ^ , but = & "a weapon.'
The original text has ^ fflj JJL ^* » which has been corrected fron
the Tlung Tien and Yu Lan.

30. If those who are sent to draw water begin b)
drinking themselves, the army is suffering from thirst.

As Tu Mu remarks: |JJ — '^^^^r^ifa "One may knov
the condition of a whole army from the behaviour of a single man." Th<
•^ may mean either that they drink before drawing water for the army
or before they return to camp. Chang Yu takes the latter view. Th<
Tung Tien has the faulty reading ^ - = , and the Yu Lan

worse still,

93

32- & $k % £ & # P* * & til

33.

34. *

31. If the enemy sees an advantage to be gained

Not necessarily "booty," as Capt. Calthrop translates it. The Tlung
Tien and Yu Lan read fS] ^ Jjj, % |J , etc.

and makes no effort to secure it, the soldiers are exhausted.

32. If birds gather on any spot, it is unoccupied.

A useful fact to bear in mind when, for instance, as Ch'en Hao says,
the enemy has secretly abandoned his camp.

Clamour by night betokens nervousness.

Owing to false alarms; or, as Tu Mu explains it: Jgf |H >P ^ jjjfc
^L ^ J^l S ifi ifc "Fear makes men restless; so they fall to shouting
at night in order to keep up their courage." The T'ung Tien inserts
Pj[ before |T^ .

33. If there is disturbance in the camp, the general's
authority is weak. If the banners and flags are shifted
about, sedition is afoot.

The Tung Tien and Yu Lan omit J^ .
If the officers are angry, it means that the men are weary.

And therefore, as Capt. Calthrop says, slow to obey. Tu Yu under-
stands the sentence differently : "If all the officers of an army are angry
with their general, it means that they are broken with fatigue" [owing
to the exertions which he has demanded from them].

34. When an army feeds its horses with grain and
kills its cattle for food,

!§L ,fj| |^j] ^ is expanded by Mei Yao-ch'en (following Tu Mu) into

|pilJaf*^.i^^^Ss^±' which is the sense J

have given above. In the ordinary course of things, the men would be
fed on grain and the horses chiefly on grass.

i and when the men do not hang their cooking-pots

94

35. || ff H ^ f& w A A

The 7^£- TzV;* reads ^ , which is much the same as feft , and th
Yu Lan jjj , which is manifestly wrong.

over the camp-fires, showing that they will not return t<
their tents,

For }g , the Tung Tien and Yil Lan both read ^ .

you may know that they are determined to fight to the death
For 1jj| ^ , see VII. § 36. I may quote here the illustrative passag
from the Hou Han Shu, ch. 71, given in abbreviated form by the /"<
Wen Yun Fu: "The rebel ^ jg] Wang Kuo of i|£ Liang was besiegin
the town of |Jjj[ ^ Ch'en-ts'ang, and j|| "jjj ^f Huang-fu Sung, who wa
in supreme command, and U j|t Tung Cho were sent out against hin
The latter pressed for hasty measures, but Sung turned a deaf ear to h
counsel. At last the rebels were utterly worn out, and began to thro1
down their weapons of their own accord. Sung was now for advancin
to. ,the attack, but Cho said : 'It is a principle of war not to pursue dei
perate-men and not to press a retreating host.' Sung answered: 'The
does not apply here. What I am about to attack is a jaded army, not
retreating host; with disciplined troops I am falling on a disorganise
multitude, not a band of desperate men.' Thereupon he advanced t
the attack unsupported by his colleague, and routed the enemy, Wan
Kuo being slain." The inferior reading of the T'u Shu for § 34 is z

follows: it' Jf :fl|- A «-9:|Kii-'{k V flg'^'JIf X' V4I
1PI 7§ "tfc • ^e ^rst c^ause strikes me as rather shallow for Sun Tzi
and it is hard to make anything of jjjjj: ^ in the second without th
negative. Capt. Calthrop, nothing daunted, set down in his first edition
"When they cast away their cooking-pots." He now has: "When th
cooking-pots are hung up on the wall."

35. The sight of men whispering together

fi|[ |f|L is well explained by Tu Mu as ^ vg ^ ^jjl "speaking wit
bated breath."
in small knots

The Shuo Wen rather strangely defines ^ by the word ^E, but th
£rh Ya says -A. «to join" or "contract," which is undoubtedly its pr
mary meaning. Chang Yu is right, then, in explaining it here by th
word Jpf . The other commentators are very much at sea: Ts'ao Kun

l, Tu Yu ^ j^ , Tu Mu ®li®\^^$l, Chia Li
Mei Yao-ch<en Bjf ^ ^ , Wang Hsi Eg ift J^ .

95
36. M

37. ;fc|

33. #

or speaking in subdued tones

~/{ ^ is said to be the same as
points to disaffection amongst the rank and file.

-^ ^ is equivalent to -^ J[t ^ j(£, the subject of course being
"the general," understood. In the original text, which seems to be fol-
lowed by several commentators, the whole passage stands thus: =j& |f|[

^^f^HAW^^c^ifc- Here h would be the seneral

who is talking to his men, not the men amongst themselves. For ^^ ,
which is the chief stumbling-block in the way of this reading, the T'u S/iu
gives the very plausible emendation g^ (also read /isi, and defined by
K'ang Hsi as ^ S "to speak fast"). But this is unnecessary if we
keep to the standard text.

36. Too frequent rewards signify that the enemy is
at the end of his resources;

Because, when an army is hard pressed, as Tu Mu says, theie is al-
ways a fear of mutiny, and lavish rewards are given to keep the men in
good temper.

too many punishments betray a condition of dire distress.

Because in such case discipline becomes relaxed, and unwonted severity
is necessary to keep the men to their duty.

37. To begin by bluster, but afterwards to take fright
at the enemy's numbers, shows a supreme lack of in-
telligence.

I follow the interpretation of Ts'ao Kung: ^Q jgjt $j£ ^ ^ ^ ^
Ml] ^ HJ* £ fy ' also ad°Pted by Li Ch'iian, Tu Mu and Cha*ng Yii.
Another possible meaning, set forth by Tu Yu, Chia Lin, Mei Yao-ch'en
and Wang Hsi, is: "The general who is first tyrannical towards his men,
and then in terror lest they should mutiny, etc." This would connect
the sentence with what went before about rewards and punishments. The
T'ung Tien and Yu Lan read '|*j§ "affection" instead of ;^| .

38. When envoys are sent with compliments in their
mouths, it is a sign that the enemy wishes for a truce.

96

40. ^ it * * * «Ji « * IH t * A

Tu Mu says: #f 0 £ R # * ft * » Q »

ifc ^ $fc ^ A tit "If tlie enemv °Pen friendly relations by sending
hostages, it is a sign that they are anxious for an armistice, either because
their strength is exhausted or for some other reason." But it hardly
needs a Sun Tzu to draw such an obvious inference; and although Tu
Mu is supported by Mei Yao-ch'en and Chang Yii, I cannot think that
hostages are indicated by the word ^ .

39. If the enemy's troops march up angrily and remain
facing ours for a long time without either joining battle
or taking themselves off again, the situation is one that
demands great vigilance and circumspection.

Capt. Calthrop falls into a trap which often lurks in the word ^ .
He translates: "When both sides, eager for a fight, face each other for a
considerable time, neither advancing nor retiring," etc. Had he reflected
a little, he would have seen that this is meaningless as addressed to a
commander who has control over the movements of his own troops.
;j|J |jj , then, does not mean that the two armies go to meet each other,
but simply that the other side comes up to us. Likewise with ;jig ^» .
If this were not perfectly clear of itself, Mei Yao-ch'en 's paraphrase would
make it so : ^g jfjj ^Jj ^ ^ , etc. As Ts'ao Kung points out, a
manoeuvre of this sort may be only a ruse to gain time for an unexpected
flank attack or the laying of an ambush.

40. If our troops are no more in number than the
enemy, that is amply sufficient;

Wang Hsi's paraphrase, partly borrowed from Ts'ao Kung, is jg| ~f\

k 1_* •—» ^ • t*^ S J

Jg JjL ^ . Another reading, adopted by Chia Lin and the T*u S/iu,

is Ji ^ji j||- ^jHj? ^ , which Capt. Calthrop renders, much too loosely :
"Numbers are no certain mark of strength."

it only means that no direct attack can be made.

Literally, "no martial advance." That is to say, j£ "chtng" tactics
and frontal attacks must be eschewed, and stratagem resorted to instead.
What we can do is simply to concentrate all our available
strength, keep a close watch on the enemy, and obtain
reinforcements.

97

# H ^ A
42. $ 3t % pt iffi 18 2 MiJ 7 JR ^ «

B Ifllt A fi 7 f? 'M 7 W M A

This is an obscure sentence, and none of the commentators succeed in
squeezing very good sense out of it. The difficulty lies chiefly in the
words Jffi Jl , which have been taken in every possible way. I follow
Li Ch'iian, who appears to offer the simplest explanation: ^ ^ ^

^t" %& ifc "Only the side that gets more men will win." Ts'ao Kung's
note, concise as usual to the verge of incomprehensibility, is |^ :j|

jFjL 4-ft . Fortunately we have Chang Yii to expound its meaning to us
in language which is lucidity itself:

1IV&&& B "When the numbers

are even, and no favourable opening presents itself, although we may not
be strong enough to deliver a sustained attack, we can find additional
recruits amongst our sutlers and camp-followers, and then, concentrating
our forces and keeping a close watch on the enemy, contrive to snatch
the victory. But we must avoid borrowing foreign soldiers to help us."
He then quotes from Wei Liao Tzti, ch. 3: g^^^g^|J-]-^S
Jf -7* i® S& j-jj ^Ef "The nominal strength of mercenary troops may
be 100,000, but their real value will be not more than half that figure."
According to this interpretation, Jjj( J^ means "to get recruits," not
from outside, but from the tag-rag and bobtail which follows in the wake
of a large army. This does not sound a very soldierly suggestion, and I
feel convinced that it is not what Sun Tzu meant. Chia Lin, on the other
hand, takes the words in a different sense altogether, namely "to conquer
the enemy" [cf. I. § 20]. But in that case they could hardly be followed
by jj]j Qi • Better than this would be the rendering "to make isolated
captures," as opposed to ;g£ $£ "a general attack."

41. He who exercises no forethought but makes light
of his opponents is sure to be captured by them.

The force of -^ is not easy to appreciate. Ch'en Hao says ^t

' thus

continues, quoting from the Tso Chuan: jj^ Jj /^ ^ ^jj ^ HU ^

fW /l^ II& ^(P -7 "W ^^ "^ bees and scorpi°ns carry poison, how
much more will a hostile state I [ f|t ^ , XXII. 3.] Even a puny opponent,
then, should not be treated with contempt."

42. If soldiers are punished before they have grown

7

98

*e & ii # w

R * 4 * * ff

* JR

attached to you, they will not prove submissive; and,
unless submissive, they will be practically useless. If, when
the soldiers have become attached to you, punishments
are not enforced, they will still be useless.

This is wrongly translated by Capt. Calthrop: elf the troops know the
general, but are not affected by his punishments, they are useless."

43. Therefore soldiers must be treated in the first in-
stance with humanity, but kept under control by means
of iron discipline.

jj^ and jj£ , according to Ts'ao Kung, are here equivalent to £^ and
fg" respectively. Compare our two uses of the word "civil." ^P* — ]p
Yen Tzu [f B. C. 493] said of ^| || f J| ^ Ssu-ma Jang-chii : ^ gg
IW ^ fl(J H! M j|)C ifc "His civil virtues endeared him to the people;
his martial prowess kept his enemies in awe." Cf. Wu Tzu, ch. 4 init.\

^m^^^mzm^MmmM^^m^

"The ideal commander unites culture with a warlike temper; the profes-
sion of arms requires a combination of hardness and tenderness." Again
I must find fault with Capt. Calthrop's translation : "By humane treatment
we obtain obedience; authority brings uniformity."

This is a certain road to victory.

44. If in training soldiers commands are habitually en-
forced, the army will be well-disciplined; if not, its discipline
will be bad.

The Tung Tien and Yii Lan read: ^^^Tji^^^A^

m ^ * ff w A « 4 * 7 n.ty A x »^

45- If a general shows confidence in his men but always
insists on his orders being obeyed,

The original text has ^ ^ ft ^ . ^ ^ is certainly awkward
without fa, but on the other hand it is clear that Tu Mu accepted the
Tung Tien text, which is identical with ours. He says : "A general ought

99

in time of peace to show kindly confidence in his men and also make
his authority respected, so that when they come to face the enemy, orders
may be executed and discipline maintained, because they all trust and
look up to him." What Sun Tzu has said in § 44, however, would lead
one rather to expect something like this : "If a general is always confident
that his orders will be carried out," etc. Hence I am tempted to think
that he may have written ^ ^ j=| Jf=f =£ . But this is perhaps too
conjectural.

the gain will be mutual.

Chang Yu says: ± 0 B $ 15 & K* 1g J$ ± ft ± T

;j»g ^ -jj^ "The general has confidence in the men under his command,
and the men are docile, having confidence in him. Thus the gain is
mutual." He quotes a pregnant sentence from Wei Liao Tzu, ch. 4:

4 Z Z & * M $& ~$i >Mi; M 4« "The art of givi"g

orders is not to try to rectify minor blunders and not to be swayed by
petty doubts." Vacillation and fussiness are the surest means of sapping
the confidence of an army. Capt. Calthrop winds up the chapter with a
final mistranslation of a more than usually heinous description: "Orders
are always obeyed, if general and soldiers are in sympathy." Besides
inventing the latter half of the sentence, he has managed to invert pro-
tasis and apodosis.

X.

X. TERRAIN.

Only about a third of the chapter, comprising §§ i — 13, deals with
^ J|5 , the subject being more fully treated in ch. XI. The "six cala-
mities" are discussed in §§ 14 — 20, and the rest of the chapter is again
a mere string of desultory remarks, though not less interesting, perhaps,
on that account.

i. Sun Tzu said: We may distinguish six kinds of ter-
rain, to wit: (i) Accessible ground;

Mei Yao-ch'en says: ^H* $fa ^ U "plentifully provided with roads
and means of communication."

(2) entangling ground;

The same commentator says: $pj |g ^ ^ Q jfa jjfr $$ "Net-like
country, venturing into which you become entangled."

(3) temporising ground;

Tu Yu explains ^JT as -^ . This meaning is still retained in modern
phrases such as j|r ^, ^ ^ "stave off," "delay." I do not know

why Capt. Calthrop calls ^JT Jjjj "suspended ground," unless he is con-
fusing it with ^ ^ .

(4) narrow passes; ($} precipitous heights;
The root idea in |$g£ is narrowness; in |Jjpt, steepness.

(6) positions at a great distance from the enemy.

It is hardly necessary to point out the faultiness of this classification.
A strange lack of logical perception is shown in the Chinaman's unques-
tioning acceptance of glaring cross-divisions such as the above.

101

3. m y

2. Ground which can be freely traversed by both sides
is called accessible.

Generally speaking, 2p ||j| "level country" is meant. Cf. IX. § 9:

3. With regard to ground of this nature,

The Tung Tien reads Jg *j± J^ .
be before the enemy in occupying the raised and sunny spots,

See IX. § 2. The Tung Tien reads
and carefully guard your line of supplies.

A curious use of 7Jc|J as a verb, if our text is right. The general
meaning is doubtless, as Tu Yu says, fit >ffi& H£ jjjjb ^ ^H ^tf' "not
to allow the enemy to cut your communications." Tu Mu, who was not
a soldier and can hardly have had any practical experience of fighting,
goes more into detail and speaks of protecting the line of communications
by a wall ( trjg| ), or enclosing it by embankments on each side ( jfc ^
§§))! In view of Napoleon's dictum, "the secret of war lies in the com-
munications," * we could wish that Sun Tzti had done more than skirt the
edge of this important subject here and in I. § 10, VII. § u. Col. Hen-
derson says : "The line of supply may be said to be as vital to the existence
of an army as the heart to the life of a human being. Just as the duel-
list who finds his adversary's point menacing him with certain death, and
his own guard astray, is compelled to conform to his adversary's move-
ments, and to content himself with warding off his thrusts, so the com-
mander whose communications are suddenly threatened finds himself in a
false position, and he will be fortunate if he has not to change all his
plans, to split up his force into more or less isolated detachments, and
to fight with inferior numbers on ground which he has not had time to
prepare, and where defeat will not be an ordinary failure, but will entail
the ruin or the surrender of his whole army." **

Then you will be able to fight with advantage.

Omitted by Capt. Calthrop.

* See KPens<§es de Napoleon !«," no. 47.
** "The Science of War," chap. 2.

102

B5

ttj ffn

4. Ground which can be abandoned but is hard to
re-occupy is called entangling.

Capt. Calthrop is wrong in translating :j|< "retreat from it."

5. From a position of this sort, if the enemy is unprepared,
you may sally forth and defeat him. But if the enemy
is prepared for your coming, and you fail to defeat him,
then, return being impossible, disaster will ensue.

^f\ 7J?|J (an example of litotes) is paraphrased by Mei Yao-ch'en as
jj£\ ^ ^j|J "you will receive a check."

6. When the position is such that neither side will gain
by making the first move, it is called temporising ground.

'S^ -^ IP! ^l ffi 'Hf "tit "Each side finds it inconvenient to move,
and the situation remains at a deadlock" (Tu Yu).

7. In a position of this sort, even though the enemy
should offer us an attractive bait,

Tu Yu says ^=j£ ^T* ^^ -^ "turning their backs on us and pretending
to flee." But this is only one of the lures which might induce us to
quit our position. Here again ^pl] is used as a verb, but this time in a
different sense: "to hold out an advantage to."

it will be advisable not to stir forth, but rather to retreat,
thus enticing the enemy in his turn; then, when part of
his army has come out, we may deliver our attack with
advantage.

Mei Yao-ch'en paraphrases the passage in a curious jingle, the scheme
of rhymes being aMdd: %. % ffi $fe ^ ft ft fa % ^ f |J fflj

io3

8. With regard to narrow passes, if you can occupy
them first,

Capt. Calthrop says: "Defiles, make haste to occupy." But this is a
conditional clause, answering to ^^ j^ -^Q ^ ~£ in the next paragraph.

let them be strongly garrisoned and await the advent of
the enemy.

Because then, as Tu Yu observes, f ft\\

$HJ iilfc "^ie initiative Wl^ ^e with lls> and by making sudden and unex-
pected attacks we shall have the enemy at our mercy." The commen-
tators make a great pother about the precise meaning of ^9£, which to
the foreign reader seems to present no difficulty whatever.

9. Should the enemy forestall you in occupying a pass,
do not go after him if the pass is fully garrisoned, but
only if it is weakly garrisoned.

10. With regard to precipitous heights, if you are be-
forehand with your adversary, you should occupy the raised
and sunny spots, and there wait for him to come up.

Ts'ao Kung says: ^J ^ |^ H ^ ^ Pf ^ ^ A "The Par~
ticular advantage of securing heights and defiles is that your actions can-
not then be dictated by the enemy." [For the enunciation of the grand
principle alluded to, see VI. § 2]. Chang Yu tells the following anec-
dote of ^ ^j |jtt]r P'ei Hsing-chien (A.D. 619 — 682), who was sent on
a punitive expedition against the Turkic tribes. "At nightfall he pitched
his camp as usual, and it had already been completely fortified by wall
and ditch, when suddenly he gave orders that the army should shift its
quarters to a hill near by. This was highly displeasing to his officers,
who protested loudly against the extra fatigue which it would entail on
the men. P'ei Hsing-chien, however, paid no heed to their remonstrances
and had the camp moved as quickly as possible. The same night, a
terrific storm came on, which flooded their former place of encampment
to the depth of over twelve feet. The recalcitrant officers were amazed
at the sight, and owned that they had been in the wrong. 'How did
you know what was going to happen?' they asked. P'ei Hsing-chien
replied: 'From this time forward be content to obey orders without asking

104

13. jiiftA

unnecessary questions.' [See Cte T^aw^ S>4«, ch. 84, fol. 12 r°., and
-fltt« :T'0/*£- 67^ ch. 1 08, fol. 5 v°.} From this it may be seen," Chang
Yii continues, "that high and sunny places are advantageous not only
for fighting, but also because they are immune from disastrous floods."

11. If the enemy has occupied them before you, do
not follow him, but retreat and try to entice him away.

The turning-point of ^* |f£ ££ Li Shih-min's campaign in 621 A.D.
against the two rebels, Ijjf ||| |j|i Tou Chien-te, King of W Hsia, and
lE Ht ^j Wang Shih-ch'ung, Prince of J||J Cheng, was his seizure o
the heights of jj£ 3p Wu-lao, in spite of which Tou Chien-te persisted
in his attempt to relieve his ally in Lo-yang, was defeated and taken
prisoner. [See Chiu Tang Shu, ch. 2, fol. 5 z>°., and also ch. 54.]

12. If you are situated at a great distance from the
enemy, and the strength of the two armies is equal,

The Tung Tien reads
it is not easy to provoke a battle,

Ts'ao Kung says that ^ Ifffe means $[£ jj|£ "challenging the enemy."
But the enemy being far away, that plainly involves, as Tu Yu says,

$$, Hfc "&°ing to meet him." The point of course is, that we must not
think of undertaking a long and wearisome march, at the end of which

xfe $5 fci I§£ IPt "we should. be exhausted and our adversary fresh
and keen."

and righting will be to your disadvantage.

13. These six are the principles connected with Earth.
Or perhaps, "the principles relating to ground." See, however, I. § 8.

The general who has attained a responsible post must
be careful to study them.

Capt. Calthrop omits Eg <g£ . Out of the foregoing six ^|j} ^ , it
will be noticed that nos. 3 and 6 have really no reference to the config-
uration of the country, and that only 4 and 5 can be said to convey
any definite geographical idea.

105

15. ^c^J^JlJJl— I* + 0

14. Now an army is exposed to six several calamities,
not arising from natural causes,

The T*u Shu reads

but from faults for which the general is responsible. These
are: (i) Flight; (2) insubordination; (3) collapse; (4) ruin;
(5) disorganisation; (6) rout.

I take exception to Capt. Calthrop's rendering of |Sjg and jjfo as

"distress" and "disorganisation," respectively.

15. Other conditions being equal, if one force is hurled
against another ten times its size, the result will be the
flight of the former.

Cf. III. § 10. The general's fault here is that of ^ ^ J] "not
calculating the enemy's strength." It is obvious that life cannot have
the same force as in § 12, where it was equivalent to Ji ^J . I should

not be inclined, however, to limit it, with Chang Yu, to t|^ ^ ^ Jj|
-& ~£ ^|J 3p£ "the wisdom and valour of the general and the sharpness
of the weapons." As Li Ch'iian very justly remarks, -^ ^ ^ >gj

2. *tfe ffl ^ ft Z It R'J "ST ^ "Given a decided advantage in
position, or the help of some stratagem such as a flank attack or an am-
buscade, it would be quite possible [to fight in the ratio of one to ten]."

1 6. When the common soldiers are too strong and their
officers too weak, the result is insubordination.

iffll "laxity" — the metaphor being taken from an unstrung bow. Capt.
Calthrop's "relaxation" is not good, on account of its ambiguity. Tu Mu
cites the unhappy case of J|J ^ffj T'ien Pu \Hsin T'ang Shu, ch. 148],
who was sent to ^| Wei in 821 A.D. with orders to lead an army against
I /Ji ip; Wang T'ing-ts'ou. But the whole time he was in command,
his soldiers treated him with the utmost contempt, and openly flouted
his authority by riding about the camp on donkeys, several thousands at
a time. T'ien Pu was powerless to put a stop to this conduct, and when,

io6

n. H5

after some months had passed, he made an attempt to engage the enemy,
his troops turned tail and dispersed in every direction. After that, the
unfortunate man committed suicide by cutting his throat.

When the officers are too strong and the common soldiers
too weak, the result is collapse.

Ts'ao Kung says: g* f}% ^ *g T£ || $Bl Pi "The officers are
energetic and want to press on, the common soldiers are feeble and sud-
denly collapse." Note that j$j is to be taken literalb of physical weak-
ness, whereas in the former clause it is figurative. Li Ch'iian makes [^
equivalent to j£ , and Tu Mu explains it as |lg ^ ^ Tft ^jj "stumb-
ling into a death-trap."

17. When the higher officers

~fc |tl ' according to Ts'ao Kung, are the >J> jj^ "generals of in-
ferior rank." But Li Ch'iian, Ch'en Hao and Wang Hsi take the term
as simply convertible with j|^ or -^ 4^.

are angry and insubordinate, and on meeting the enemy
give battle on their own account from a feeling of resent-
ment, before the commander-in-chief can tell whether or
no he is in a position • to fight, the result is ruin.

Ts'ao Kung makes -fc i^, understood, the subject of ^R , which
seems rather far-fetched. Wang Hsi's note is:

"This means, the general is angry without just cause, and at the same
time does not appreciate the ability of his subordinate officers; thus he
arouses fierce resentment and brings an avalanche of ruin upon his head."
He takes |^ , therefore, in the sense of ^ • but I think that Ch'en Hao

is right in his paraphrase ^ jjjj| j||;! ^ "they don't care if it be pos-
sible or no." My interpretation of the whole passage is that of Mei Yao-
ch'en and Chang Yu. Tu Mu gives a long extract from the Tso Chuan,
Hf <$£, XII. 3, showing how the great battle of j{£\|$ Pi [597 B.C.] was
lost for the ^ Chin State through the contumacy of -^Q |^ Hsien Hu
and the resentful spite of |J| |^- Wei I and ^g ^ Chao Chan. Chang

Yu also alludes to the mutinous conduct of |f| B Luan Yen [ibid.

1 8. When the general is weak and without authority;
when his orders are not clear and distinct;

Wei Liao Tzu (ch. 4) says: ±^^4,|lJ^^Zl|i,
jfjf fiffi H ^ ^ H(J ^ Jfi 31 ^ "If the commander gives his orders
with decision, the soldiers will not wait to hear them twice ; if his moves
are made without vacillation, the soldiers will not be in two minds about
doing their duty." General Baden-Powell says, italicising the words:
"The secret of getting successful work out of your trained men lies in
one nutshell — in the clearness of the instructions they receive." * As-
suming that clear instructions beget confidence, this is very much what
Wei Liao Tztt (loc. cit.) goes on to say: ^ ^ ^ >g 3t J$ jjft g|

#*;&*&• Cf. alsoWuTzuch.3: ffl J« £ W » *
H ~k — ® ^ <£ fii ty M ® "the most fatal defect in a mili-

••"i^ _/ > — — r— ^^*f sf > — 1_ V ~\ «w»» /y*»

tary leader is diffidence; the worst calamities that befall an army arise
from hesitation."

when there are no fixed duties assigned to officers and men,

|J* ^X ^ ^ ~ffij ^ ^ "Neither officers nor men have any regular
routine" [Tu Mu].

and the ranks are formed in a slovenly haphazard manner,
the result is utter disorganisation.

19. When a general, unable to estimate the enemy's
strength, allows an inferior force to engage a larger one,
or hurls a weak detachment against a powerful one, and
neglects to place picked soldiers in the front rank, the
result must be a rout.

Chang Yii paraphrases the latter part of the sentence ^ j|3| ||j| Jj|

£ ± H! H» 3t & & & & * til > and c°ntinu<*: Jl Sfc $
ffl » » ft to H ^ - RIJ }|t ^- ^ - RIJ « ^ ^ -&

"Whenever there is fighting to be done, the keenest spirits should be
* "Aids to Scouting," p. xii.

io8

20.

appointed to serve in the front ranks, both in order to strengthen the
resolution of our own men and to demoralise the enemy." Cf. the primi
ordines of Caesar ("De Bello Gallico," V. 28, 44 et a/.). There seems
little to distinguish ^ from j^jr in § 15, except that ^ is a more
forcible word.

20. These are six ways of courting defeat,

Ch'en Hao makes them out to be: (i) 'jfc -fa jjf J&J "neglect to

» / I -T^. >5^- >T>

estimate the enemy's strength;" (2) 2J£ ^ JflJ ^ "want of authority;"
(3) £ J* gfl| |& "defective training;" (4) # 3g jft & "unjustifiable
anger;" (5) £|i ^v ^ ^ "non-observance of discipline ;" (6) ^ ^
HH J|| "failure to use picked men."

which must be carefully noted by the general who has
attained a responsible post.
See supra, § 13.

21. The natural formation of the country is the soldier's
best ally;

Chia Lin's text has the reading ^ for JJjff . Ch'en Hao says: ^ ^
>P $fj i^ ^c|J "The advantages of weather and season are not equal to
those connected with ground."

but a power of estimating the adversary,

The insertion of a "but" is necessary to show the connection of thought
here. A general should always utilise, but never rely wholly on natural
advantages of terrain.

of controlling the forces of victory,

wl )$af ^s one °f those condensed expressions which mean so much in
Chinese, and so little in an English translation. What it seems to imply
is complete mastery of the situation from the beginning.

and of shrewdly calculating difficulties, dangers and distances,
The Tung Tien and Yu Lan read ff @ fa £ %\] <g ^ fe .

I am decidedly puzzled by Capt. Calthrop's translation : "an eye for steep-
ness, command and distances." Where did he find the word which I have
put in italics?

109

22. #» it m ffl a ^ $ 0 * #« lit

23.

constitutes the test of a great general.

A somewhat free translation of ^ . As Chang Yu remarks, these are
^ £ $ "the essentials of soldiering," ground being only a helpful
accessory.

22. He who knows these things, and in fighting puts
his knowledge into practice, will win his battles. He
who knows them not, nor practises them, will surely be
defeated.

23. If fighting is sure to result in victory, then you
must fight, even though the ruler forbid it; if fighting
will not result in victory, then you must not fight even
at the ruler's bidding.

Cf. VIII. § 3 fin. Huang Shih-kung of the Ch'in dynasty, who is said
to have been the patron of EM ^ Chang Liang and to have written the
^ |5§, has these words attributed to him: |jj jj? ^j gj|

JJUJ "The responsibility of setting an army in motion must devolve on
the general alone ; if advance and retreat are controlled from the Palace,
brilliant results will hardly be achieved. Hence the god-like ruler and
the enlightened monarch are content to play a humble part in furthering
their country's cause [///., kneel down to push the chariot wheel]." This

means that |gj #\* £ ^ $£ j|F gjj ^ "in matters lying outside the
zenana, the decision of the military commander must be absolute." Chang
Yu also quotes the saying: ^^^P^^'T'^sS "Decrees of
the Son of Heaven do not penetrate the walls of a camp." Napoleon,
who has been accused of allowing his generals too little independence
of action, speaks in the same sense: "Un general en chef n'est pas a
convert de ses fautes a la guerre par un ordre de son souverain ou du
ministre, quand celui qui le donne est eloigne du champ d'operation, et
qu'il connait mal, ou ne connait pas du tout le dernier etat des choses." *

* "Maximes de Guerre," no. 72.

I 10

24. J

24. The general who advances without coveting fame
and retreats without fearing disgrace,

It was Wellington, I think, who said that the hardest thing of all for
a soldier is to retreat.

whose only thought is to protect his country and do good
service for his sovereign,

^, which is omitted by the Tu Shu, is said by Ch'en Hao to be
equivalent to ^ . If it had to be separately translated, it would be
something like our word "accrue."

is the jewel of the kingdom.

A noble presentment, in few words, of the Chinese "happy warrior."
Such a man, says Ho Shih, fj= ~fc S -Iff ^ »$| ^ "even if he
had to suffer punishment, would not regret his conduct."

25. Regard your soldiers as your children, and they
will follow you into the deepest valleys; look on them as
your own beloved sons, and they will stand by you even
unto death.

Cf. I. § 6. In this connection, Tu Mu draws for us an engaging pic-
ture of the famous general Wu Ch'i, from whose treatise on war I have
frequently had occasion to quote: "He wore the same clothes and ate
the same food as the meanest of his soldiers, refused to have either a
horse to ride or a mat to sleep on, carried his own surplus rations
wrapped in a parcel, and shared every hardship with his men. One of his
soldiers was suffering from an abscess, and Wu Ch'i himself sucked out
the virus. The soldier's mother, hearing this, began wailing and lamenting.
Somebody asked her, saying: 'Why do you cry? Your son is only a com-
mon soldier, and yet the commander-in-chief himself has sucked the poison
from his sore.' The woman replied : 'Many years ago, Lord Wu performed a
similar service for my husband, who never left him afterwards, and finally
met his death at the hands of the enemy. And now that he has done the
same for my son, he too will fall fighting I know not where'." Li Ch'iian
mentions ^ -^ the Viscount of Ch'u, who invaded the small state of |||
Hsiao during the winter. ^ ^ The Duke of Shen said to him : "Many of

1 1 1

1 . j? BO ^ HI $ s ffi 7 si 4 ii ro

27.

the soldiers are suffering severely from the cold." So he made a round
of the whole army, comforting and encouraging the men; and straight-
way they felt as if they were clothed in garments lined with floss silk.
\Tso CJntan, j|£ ^. , XII. 5]. Chang Yii alludes to the same passage,

26. If, however, you are indulgent, but unable to make
your authority felt; kind-hearted, but unable to enforce
your commands ; and incapable, moreover, of quelling
disorder :

Capt. Calthrop has got these three clauses quite wrong. The last he
translates: "overindulgence may produce disorder."

then your soldiers must be likened to spoilt children; they
are useless for any practical purpose.

Cf. IX. § 42. We read in the \&- ffi $g , pt. 2 : =j| ^ =f ^

"Injury comes out of kindness." Li Ching once said that if you could
make your soldiers afraid of you, they would not be afraid of the enemy.
Tu Mu recalls an instance of stern military discipline which occurred in
219 A.D., when Q ^^ Lii Meng was occupying the town of yT [|fe
Chiang-ling. He had given stringent orders to his army not to molest
the inhabitants nor take anything from them by force. Nevertheless, a
certain officer serving under his banner, who happened to be a fellow-
townsman, ventured to appropriate a bamboo hat ( ^ ) belonging to one
of the people, in order to wear it over his regulation helmet as a pro-
tection against the rain. Lii Meng considered that the fact of his being
also a native of VrT tvj Tu-nan should not be allowed to palliate a clear

Y?* rrJ J

breach of discipline, and accordingly he ordered his summary execution,
the tears rolling down his face, however, as he did so. This act of
severity filled the army with wholesome awe, and from that time forth
even articles dropped in the highway were not picked up. \SanKuo Chih,
ch. 54, f. i3r°.&*°.].

27. If we know that our own men are in a condition
to attack, but are unaware that the enemy is not open to
attack, we have gone only halfway towards victory.

That is, as Ts'ao Kung says, "the issue in this case is uncertain."

I 12

29.

2 * ^ ifc 0 £ ^ -tit

so.

28. If we know that the enemy is open to attack, but
are unaware that our own men are not in a condition to
attack, we have gone only halfway towards victory.

Cf. III. § 13 (i).

29. If we know that the enemy is open to attack, and
also know that our men are in a condition to attack, but
are unaware that the nature of the ground makes fighting
impracticable, we have still gone only halfway towards
victory.

I may take this opportunity of pointing out the rather nice distinction
in meaning between jpj? and Jpjr. The latter is simply "to attack"
without any further implication, whereas tjpc is a stronger word which in
nine cases out of ten means "to attack with expectation of victory," "to
fall upon," as we should say, or even "to crush." On the other hand,
jpc is not quite synonymous with >0£, which is mostly used of operations
on a larger scale, as of one State making war on another, often with the
added idea of invasion. ^j£ , finally, has special reference to the subjugation
of rebels. See Mencius, VII. 2. ii. 2.

30. Hence the experienced soldier, once in motion, is
never bewildered; once he has broken camp, he is never
at a loss.

The reason being, according to Tu Mu, that he has taken his measures
so thoroughly as to ensure victory beforehand. "He does not move
recklessly," says Chang Yu, "so that when he does move, he makes no
mistakes." Another reading substitutes [g for $$£ and jp| for ^| .
The latter variant only is adopted by the T'ung Tien and Yu Lan. Note
that jjj| here means "at the end of his mental resources."

3 1 . Hence the saying : If you know the enemy and know
yourself, your victory will not stand in doubt;

Capt. Calthrop makes the saying end here, which cannot be justified,
if you know Heaven and know Earth,

^ and jfy are transposed for the sake of the jingle between ^

and ^ . The original text, however, has ^W ^C ^»W ijfe > and tne cor-
rection has been made from the T'ung Tien.

you may make your victory complete.

As opposed to |j^ £ ^"> above. The original text has B^L 7JT

^f\ |p| , the corruption being perhaps due to the occurrence of jf\ *JK* in
the preceding sentence. Here, however ~jf\ j|S| would not be synonymous

with jf\ ^ , but equivalent to ^f\ ^ ]Q *jjj* "inexhaustible," "beyond
computation." Cf. V. § n. The T'ung Tien has again supplied the true
reading. Li Ch'uan sums up as follows: ^ ^ ^ ^jp jfy ^}J ^

^ 1^ 9$ K'J W ifc W ^ "Given a knowledge of three things -
the affairs of man, the seasons of heaven and the natural advantages of
earth — , victory will invariably crown your battles."

* 0

XI. THE NINE SITUATIONS.

Li Ch'iian is not quite right in calling these ^ j|^ ^ %• As we
shall see, some of them are highly disadvantageous from the military
point of view. Wang Hsi more correctly says : ^ J£ ~£ jfy ^|J ^
^ ^L ifc "There are nine military situations, good and bad." One
would like to distinguish the -j\^ ij|j from the six ^ ^ of chap. X by
saying that the latter refer to the natural formation or geographical features
of the country, while the ^ Jjjj have more to do with the condition of
the army, being jfy ^i "situations" as opposed to "grounds." But it is
soon found impossible to carry out the distinction. Both are cross-divisions,
for among the J{|j -^ we have "temporising ground" side by side with
"narrow passes," while in the present chapter there is even greater confusion.

i . Sun Tzii said : The art of war recognises nine varieties
of ground: (i) Dispersive ground; (2) facile ground; (3)
contentious ground; (4) open ground; (5) ground of inter-
secting highways; (6) serious ground; (7) difficult ground;
(8) hemmed-in ground; (9) desperate ground.

2. When a chieftain is righting in his own territory, it
is dispersive ground.

So called because the soldiers, being near to their homes and anxious
to see their wives and children, are likely to seize the opportunity afforded
by a battle and scatter in every direction. "In their advance," observes
Tu Mu, "they will lack the valour of desperation, and when they retreat,
they will find harbours of refuge." The ^ , which appears in the T'u
Shu, seems to have been accidentally omitted in my edition of the
standard text.

3.

to

3. When he has penetrated into hostile territory, but
no great distance, it is facile ground.

Li Ch'iian and Ho Shih say |g J£ ^ ^ "because of the facility
for retreating," and the other commentators give similar explanations.

Tu Mu remarks: §115^^^^^^-^^^^^®

^ )Q "When your army has crossed the border, you should burn your
boats and bridges, in order to make it clear to everybody that you have
no hankering after home." I do not think that "disturbing ground,"
Capt. Calthrop's rendering of j|(fr ijjj, has anything to justify it. If an
idiomatic translation is out of the question, one should at least attempt
to be literal.

4. Ground the possession of which imports great ad-
vantage to either side, is contentious ground.

I must apologise for using this word in a sense not known to the dic-
tionary, i.e. "to be contended for" — Tu Mu's Jj£\ tjf- £ Jjjjj . Ts'ao
Kung says : "Pfj^l^^^^^^S "grouncl on which the few
and the weak can defeat the many and the strong," such as [^ Pj^
"the neck of a pass," instanced by Li Ch'iian. Thus, Thermopylae was
a ^j£ jfy , because the- possession of it, even for a few days only, meant
holding the entire invading army in check and thus gaining invaluable
time. Cf. Wu -Tztt, ch. V. ad init.i $ — !jc -f^ J| || ;j$ $&
"For those who have to fight in the ratio of one to ten, there is nothing
better than a narrow pass." When {zj -^ Lii Kuang was returning
from his triumphant expedition to Turkestan in 385 A.D., and had got
as far as *SJf -^ I-ho, laden with spoils, J|^ WEt Liang Hsi, administrator of
VJrf >UJ Liang-chou, taking advantage of the death of Fu Chien, King of
Ch'in, plotted against him and was for barring his way into the province.
^1 j^ Yang Han, governor of ^|j M Kao-ch'ang, counselled him,
saying: "Lii Kuang is fresh from his victories in the west, and his soldiers
are vigorous and mettlesome. If we oppose him in the shifting sands of
the desert, we shall be no match for him, and we must therefore try a
different plan. Let us hasten to occupy the defile at the mouth of the
"JEJJJ Oj^ Kao-wu pass, thus cutting him off from supplies of water, and
when his troops are prostrated with thirst, we can dictate our own terms
without moving. Or if you think that the pass I mention is too far off,
we could make a stand against him at the ^ I-wu pass, which is

n6

nearer. The cunning and resource of -^ j^ Tzu-fang himself [i.e. jj|
would be expended in vain against the enormous strength of these two
positions." Liang Hsi, refusing to act on this advice, was overwhelmed
and swept away by the invader. [See ^jj- |J , ch. 122, fol. 3 r°, and
> ch-43, fol. 26.]

5. Ground on which each side has liberty of movement
is open ground.

This is only a makeshift translation of ^|F , which according to Ts ao
Kung stands for ^ &j& "ground covered with a network of roads," like
a chess-board. Another interpretation, suggested by Ho Shih,'is ^ a§|
"ground on which intercommunication is easy." In either case, it must
evidently be ^p J|f "flat country," and therefore ^» "Sf ^4 ^6 "can~
not be blocked." Cf. £j| ^ , X. § 2.

6. Ground which forms the key to three contiguous states,

rrfnfi&IHi "Our

the enemy's and a third country conterminous with both." [Ts'ao Kung.]
Meng Shih instances the small principality of J||$ Cheng, which was
bounded on the north-east by ^ Ch'i, on the west by ^ Chin, and on
the south by ^ Ch'u.

so that he who occupies it first has most of the Empire
at his command,

^ ~J\ of course stands for the loose confederacy of states into which
China was divided under the Chou dynasty. The belligerent who holds
this dominating position can constrain most of them to become his allies.
See infra, § 48. ^ appears at first sight to be "the masses" or "population"
of the Empire, but it is more probably, as Tu Yu says, ^| & £ *& .

is ground of intersecting highways.

Capt. Calthrop's "path-ridden ground" might stand well enough for
2£ ijjj above, but it does not bring out the force of ^ J|jj , which
clearly denotes the central position where important highways meet.

7. A A

B tft ttttrtt&VJt

9-

10. iW!

7. When an army has penetrated into the heart of a
hostile country, leaving a number of fortified cities in
its rear,

After ^ , the Tlung Tien intercalates the gloss J|j| J^ jg .
it is serious ground.

Wang Hsi explains the name by saying that -fi rJj? jf£ ^ l|j. ^

2 ifc "when an army has reached such a point, its situation is serious."
Li Ch'iian instances (i) the victorious march of |$| ^^ Yo I into the
capital of Ch'i in 284 B.C., and (2) the attack on Ch'u, six years later,
by the Ch'in general Q jfg Po Ch'i.

8. Mountain forests,

Or simply, "forests." I follow the Tlu Shu in omitting the Jfj before
||[ ^ , given in the standard text, which is not only otiose but spoils
the rhythm of the sentence.

rugged steeps, marshes and fens - all country that is
hard to traverse : this is difficult ground.

J^ p*i 3 (to be distinguished from J|J i 4) is defined by K'ang Hsi
(after the Shuo Wtri] as ^f "to destroy." Hence Chia Lin explains

tE Mb as ground $2 ^K )9f Wi "that has been ruined by water Pas~

sing over it," and Tu Yu simply as ^ yJ0 ^ Jj^ "swampy ground."
But Ch'en Hao says that the word is specially applied to deep hollows —
what Chu-ko Liang, he tells us, used to designate by the expressive term
^tb ^ "earth-hells." Compare the ^ ^ of IX. § 15.

9. Ground which is reached through narrow gorges,
and from which we can only retire by tortuous paths, so
that a small number of the enemy would suffice to crush
a large body of our men : this is hemmed-in ground.

10. Ground on which we can only be saved from destruc-
tion by fighting without delay, is desperate ground.

11. ft & ic *fe IW « « a H *4 H'J ft It f Ufa IN ft

.

The situation, as pictured by Ts'ao Kung, is very similar to the H|| ijjj ,
except that here escape is no longer possible: ^jjj ^ 1^1 Uj ^ ^ff
^ 7K it RlJ ^ ^ Ji. HlJ ^ $E "A lofty mountain in front, a
large river behind, advance impossible, retreat blocked." Ch'en Haosays:
A^^E^^^'it^^'JiM "to be on 'desperate ground'
is like sitting in a leaking boat or crouching in a burning house." Tu
Mu quotes from Li Ching a vivid description of the plight of an army
thus entrapped: "Suppose an army invading hostile territory without the
aid of local guides: — it falls into a fatal snare and is at the enemy's
mercy. A ravine on the left, a mountain on the right, a pathway so
perilous that the horses have to be roped together and the chariots car-
ried in slings, no passage open in front, retreat cut off behind, no choice
but to proceed in single file (fjj* ^J J3| jf' £ J^). Then, before
there is time to range our soldiers in order of battle, the enemy in over-
whelming strength suddenly appears on the scene. Advancing, we can
nowhere take a breathing-space; retreating, we have no haven of refuge.
We seek a pitched battle, but in vain; yet standing on the defen-
sive, none of us has a moment's respite. If we simply maintain our
ground, whole days and months will crawl by; the moment we make a
move, we have to sustain the enemy's attacks on front and rear. The
country is wild, destitute of water and plants; the army is lacking in the
necessaries of life, the horses are jaded and the men worn-out, all the
resources of strength and skill unavailing, the pass so narrow that a single
man defending it can check the onset of ten thousand; all means of
offence in the hands of the enemy, all points of vantage already forfeited
by ourselves: — in this terrible plight, even though we had the most
valiant soldiers and the keenest of weapons, how could they be employed
with the slightest effect?" Students of Greek history may be reminded
of the awful close to the Sicilian expedition, and the agony of the Athenians
under Nicias and Demosthenes. [See Thucydides, VII. 78 sqq.].

ii. On dispersive ground, therefore, fight not. On facile
ground, halt not. On contentious ground, attack not.

But rather let all your energies be bent on occupying the advantageous
position first. So Ts'ao Kung. Li Ch'iian and others, however, suppose
the meaning to be that the enemy has already forestalled us, so that it
would be sheer madness to attack. In the ^ -^ ^ ^, when the
King of Wu inquires what should be done in this case, Sun Tzu replies :
"The rule with regard to contentious ground is that those in possession
have the advantage over the other side. If a position of this kind is

119

secured first by the enemy, beware of attacking him. Lure him away
by pretending to flee - - show your banners and sound your drums —
make a dash for other places that he cannot afford to lose — trail brush-
wood and raise a dust — confound his ears and eyes — detach a body
of your best troops, and place it secretly in ambuscade. Then your op-
ponent will sally forth to the rescue."

1 2. On open ground, do not try to block the enemy's way.

Because the attempt would be futile, and would expose the blocking
force itself to serious risks. There are two interpretations of ^SE ^ .
1 follow that of Chang Yii ( jfi gj" \% J£ |Sj[ $& lit JjJg ). The other

is indicated in Ts'ao Kung's brief note : ^g ^ J||| -jj^ "Draw closer
together" — i.e., see that a portion of your own army is not cut off.
Wang Hsi points out that ^g ijjj is only another name for the 5^ jfy
"accessible ground" of X. § 2, and says that the advice here given is
simply a variation of 5flJ ^H :jjj[ "keep a sharp eye on the line of sup-
plies," be careful that your communications are not cut. The T'ung Tien

On ground of intersecting highways, join hands with your
allies.

Or perhaps, "form alliances with neighbouring states." Thus Ts'ao
Kung has : ^ ^ ^ ifc • Capt. Calthrop's "cultivate intercourse" is
much too timid and vague. The original text reads ^ -^ .

13. On serious ground, gather in plunder.
On this, Li Ch'iian has the following delicious note : '^j

^ S 11 ft A >tf & ft ^

an army penetrates far into the enemy's country, care must be taken not
to alienate the people by unjust treatment. Follow the example of the
Han Emperor Kao Tsu, whose march into Ch'in territory was marked
by no violation of women or looting of valuables. \Nota bene: this was
in 207 B.C., and may well cause us to blush for the Christian armies
that entered Peking in 1900 A.D.] Thus he won the hearts of all. In
the present passage, then, I think that the true reading must be, not
;jjt 'plunder,' but ^&E ^ 'do not plunder'." Alas, I fear that in this
instance the worthy commentator's feelings outran his judgment. Tu Mu,

120

*ij m m % Mb w a

at least, has no such illusions. He says: "When encamped on 'serious
ground,' there being no inducement as yet to advance further, and no
possibility of retreat, one ought to take measures for a protracted resis-
tance by bringing in provisions from all sides, and keep a close watch
on the enemy." Cf. also II. §9: |g| || $$ fjfc .

In difficult ground, keep steadily on the march.
Or, in the words of VIII. § 2, fi| ^ "do not encamp."

14. On hemmed-in ground, resort to stratagem.

Ts'ao Kung says: ^jjjf :jjfr |]j| "Try the effect of some unusual artifice;"
and Tu Yu amplifies this by saying: Jg jj£ g|J || |g g| §£ |g ^f

J£j[ ^ H|| "In such a position, some scheme must be devised which
will suit the circumstances, and if we can succeed in deluding the enemy,
the peril may be escaped." This is exactly what happened on the famous
occasion when Hannibal was hemmed in among the mountains on. the
road to Casilinum, and to all appearances entrapped by the Dictator
Fabius. The stratagem which Hannibal devised to baffle his foes was
remarkably like that which T'ien Tan had also employed with success
exactly 62 years before. [See IX. § 24, note.] When night came on,
bundles of twigs were fastened to the horns of some 2000 oxen and set
on fire, the terrified animals being then quickly driven along the mountain
side towards the passes which were beset by the enemy. The strange
spectacle of these rapidly moving lights so alarmed and discomfited the
Romans that they withdrew from their position, and Hannibal's army
passed safely through the defile. [See Polybius, III. 93, 94; Livy, XXII.

16, 17.]

On desperate ground, fight.

For, as Chia Lin remarks: Jj egfe |jj£ /H ^4* |M |||| ^ "if you

fight with all your might, there is a chance of life ; whereas death is cer-
tain if you cling to your corner."

15. Those who were called skilful leaders of old
j^j- f H is omitted in the T'u Shu text.

knew how to drive a wedge between the enemy's front
and rear;

More literally, "cause the front and rear to lose touch with each other."

121

to prevent co-operation between his large and small divi-
sions; to hinder the good troops from rescuing the bad,

I doubt if ^ ^ can mean "officers and men," as Capt. Calthrop
translates. This is wanted for J^ ~|\ .

the officers from rallying their men.

The reading ^^, derived from the Yu Lan, must be considered very
doubtful. The original text has >^, and the T'u Shu )|£.

1 6. When the enemy's men were scattered, they prevented
them from concentrating;

Capt. Calthrop translates ffi fjffi> "they scattered the enemy," which
cannot be right.

even when their forces were united, they managed to keep
them in disorder.

Mei Yao-ch'en's note makes the sense plain : nt/ R Sft rSi ^f\ gte

^^ i— t rvFc HM * rtt-i

& 1$. S^ ^ fln 7 H^ 5? • ^^ these clauses, of course, down to
^f\ ij|js are dependent on 'fi|l in § 15.

17. When it was to their advantage, they made a for-
ward move; when otherwise, they stopped still.

Mei Yao-ch'en connects this with the foregoing: ^ j||| -jj|j ^jj£ ^g1

tt W fl WM M IIIIE 5« RIJ Ih "Having succeeded in thus
dislocating the enemy, they would push forward in order to secure any
advantage to be gained; if there was no advantage to be gained, they
would remain where they were."

1 8. If asked how to cope with a great host of the
enemy in orderly array and on the point of marching to
the attack,

j|£ ffl is like fjg PJj , introducing a supposed question.

I should say: "Begin by seizing something which your op-
ponent holds dear; then he will be amenable to your will."

122

Opinions differ as to what Sun Tzti had in mind. Ts'ao Kung thinks
it is jt Jt)r *Hp ^ 5f?lJ "some strategical advantage on which the enemy
is depending." Tu Mu says: fl |$ f|j % 4 H B3 Sf f 'J £

i.lt#3-#ikA-^/Bir»!fft^»*.l "Thethree

things which an enemy is anxious to do, and on the accomplishment of
which his success depends, are: (i) to capture our favourable positions;
(2) to ravage our cultivated land; (3) to guard his own communications."
Our object then must be to thwart his plans in these three directions
and thus render him helpless. [Cf. III. § 3.] But this exegesis unduly
strains the meaning of iS* and ffife , and 1 agree with Ch'en Hao, who
says that ffi ^ does not refer only to strategical advantages, but is
any person or thing that may happen to be of importance to the enemy.
By boldly seizing the initiative in this way, you at once throw the other
side on the defensive.

19. Rapidity is the essence of war:

means "the conditions of war," not, as Capt. Calthrop
says, "the spirit of the troops." According to Tu Mu, [[£ j^ ^ -f£
•£ tpf ftJc "this is a summary of leading principles in warfare," and

he adds: ft **'££' til 1ft ft £ IS. $ $ "These are the
profoundest truths of military science, and the chief business of the general."
The following anecdotes, told by Ho Shih, show the importance attached
to speed by two of China's greatest generals. In 227 A.D., ^ j||
Meng Ta, governor of ^jft tyfa Hsin-ch'eng under the Wei Emperor Wen
Ti, was meditating defection to the House of Shu, and had entered into
correspondence with Chu-ko Liang, Prime Minister of that State. The
Wei general Ssti-ma I was then military governor of ^ Wan, and get-
ting wind of Meng Ta's treachery, he at once set off with an army to
anticipate his revolt, having previously cajoled him by a specious message
of friendly import. Ssu-ma's officers came to him and said: "If Meng
Ta has leagued himself with Wu and Shu, the matter should be thor-
oughly investigated before we make a move." Ssti-ma I replied: "Meng
Ta is an unprincipled man, and we ought to go and punish him at once,
while he is still wavering and before he has thrown off the mask." Then, by
a series of forced marches, he brought his army under the walls of Hsin-
ch'eng within the space of eight days. Now Meng Ta had previously said in
a letter to Chu-ko Liang: "Wan is 1200 li from here. When the news
of my revolt reaches Ssti-ma I, he will at once inform his Imperial Master,
but it will be a whole month before any steps can be taken, and by that

I23

so. Jl £ I? 2 £* A JW ¥ ± A

time my city will be well fortified. Besides, Ssu-ma I is sure not to
come himself, and the generals that will be sent against us are not
worth troubling about." The next letter, however, was filled with con-
sternation : "Though only eight days have passed since I threw off my
allegiance, an army is already at the city-gates. What miraculous rapidity
is this!" A fortnight later, Hsin-ch'eng had fallen and Meng Ta had
lost his -head. [See Chin Shu, ch. i, f. 3.] In 621 A.D., Li Ching was
sent from j®. »M4 K'uei-chou in Ssti-ch'uan to reduce the successful

rebel jljlj1 $fa Hsiao Hsien, who had set up as Emperor at the modern

ffil ^N Ching-chou FU in Hupeh. It was autumn, and the Yangtsze
being then in flood, Hsiao Hsien never dreamt that his adversary would
venture to come down through the gorges, and consequently made no
preparations. But Li Ching embarked his army without loss of time, and
was just about to start when the other generals implored him to postpone
his departure until the river was in a less dangerous state for navigation.
Li Ching replied: "To the soldier, overwhelming speed is of paramount
importance, and he must never miss opportunities. Now is the time to
strike, before Hsiao Hsien even knows that we have got an army together.
If we seize the present moment when the river is in flood, we shall ap-
pear before his capital with startling suddenness, like the thunder which
is heard before you have time to stop your ears against it. [See VII,
§ 19, note.] This is the great principle in war. Even if he gets to know
of our approach, he will have to levy his soldiers in such a hurry that
they will not be fit to oppose us. Thus the full fruits of victory will be
ours." All came about as he predicted, and Hsiao Hsien was obliged to
surrender, nobly stipulating that his people should be spared and he alone
suffer the penalty of death. [See Hsin T^ang Shu, ch. 93, f. i v°.~\

take advantage of the enemy's unreadiness, make your
way by unexpected routes, and attack unguarded spots.

20. The following are the principles to be observed by
an invading force : The further you penetrate into a country,
the greater will be the solidarity of your troops, and thus
the defenders will not prevail against you.

21. Make forays in fertile country in order to supply
your army with food.

Cf. supra, § 13. Li Ch'iian does not venture on a note here.

22. Carefully study the well-being of your men,

124

HI ^, according to Wang Hsi, means: ft ^ ffc j£ J^ fl £

"Pet them, humour them, give them plenty of food and drink, and look
after them generally."

and do not overtax them. Concentrate your energy and
hoard your strength.

Tu Mu explains these words in a rhyming couplet: ||| -j^ ^J ^
— ' §1 flX Jffi> and Ch^n recalls the line of action adopted in 2 24 B.C.
by the famous general ^£ l|jj Wang Chien, whose military genius largely
contributed to the success of the First Emperor. He had invaded the
Ch'u State, where a universal levy was made to oppose him. But, being
doubtful of the temper of his troops, he declined all invitations to fight
and remained strictly on the defensive. In vain did the Ch'u general try
to force a battle: day after day Wang Chien kept inside his walls and
would not come out, but devoted his whole time and energy to winning
the affection and confidence of his men. He took care that they should
be well fed, sharing his own meals with them, provided facilities for
bathing, and employed every method of judicious indulgence to weld
them into a loyal and homogeneous body. After some time had elapsed,
he told off certain persons to find out how the men were amusing them-
selves. The answer was, that they were contending with one another in
putting the weight and long-jumping (^ ^ jjg Jiff?). When Wang
Chien heard that they were engaged in these athletic pursuits, he knew
that their spirits had been strung up to the required pitch and that they
were now ready for fighting. By this time the Ch'u army, after repeating
their challenge again and again, had marched away eastwards in disgust.
The Ch'in general immediately broke up his camp and followed them,
and in the battle that ensued they were routed with great slaughter.
Shortly afterwards, the whole of Ch'u was conquered by Ch'in, and the
king j| ^ Fu-ch'u led into captivity. [See Shih Chi, ch. 73, f. 5 r°.
It should be noted that, ^ being a taboo character under the Ch'in
dynasty, the name figures as ^jj|j throughout.]

Keep your army continually on the move,

In order that the enemy may never know exactly where you are. It has
struck me, however, that the true reading might be, not yjj[ & , but

5J| _j£ "link your army together" [cf. supra § 46, |f g$. $J £ JQ ],
which would be more in keeping with ffi sjfr |j| Jj . Capt. Calthrop
cuts the Gordian knot by omitting the words altogether.

and devise unfathomable plans.

Ch'ang YQ's paraphrase is:

125

23. « Z m ffi a 5B Jl # * 5E 1 ^ ft ± A H

24. j* ± & fig jin ifimm jjfr tt jw m * A M>J w

23. Throw your soldiers into positions whence there is A
no escape, and they will prefer death to flight. $

Cf. Nicias' speech to the Athenians: To rs J-VPTTUV yvurs, 5 av^pes") H
(TTpUTturM, u,vu,yxa,\QV re ov (//wTv avSfxeiv cLyuAoic, yiyvccrbcci, a$ py ovro$
%up!ov syyvs OTTCI &v (tahstxtffbsvTSS (rubetre, etc. [Thuc. VII. 77. vii.] /u.

If they will face death, there is nothing they may not achieve. ^

^£ by itself constitutes the protasis, and ^ is the interrogative = 7J^ .
Capt. Calthrop makes the protasis end with ^ : "If there be no alter-
native but death." But I do not see how this is to be got out of the
Chinese. Chang Yii gives a clear paraphrase : J^ Zj£ 5E

, and quotes his favourite Wei Liao Tzu (ch. 3): — •

m H H A g

-{^ "If one man were to run amok with a sword in the market-place,
and everybody else tried to get out of his way, I should not allow that
this man alone had courage and that all the rest were contemptible
cowards. The truth is, that a desperado and a man who sets some value
on his life do not meet on even terms."

Officers and men alike will put forth their uttermost strength.
J^ A appears to stand for the more usual -f- 7X . Chang Yii says :

i^^mitb^r^^^^S^ "lf they are in an awkward

place together, they will surely exert their united strength to get out of it."

24. Soldiers when in desperate straits lose the sense
nf fear. If there is no place of refuge, they will stand
firm If they are in the heart of a hostile country, they
will show a stubborn front.

Capt. Calthrop weakly says: "there is unity," as though the text were
^|J S, as in § 20. But ^pj introduces quite a new idea — that of
tenacity -- which Ts'ao Kung tries to explain by the word ^JJJ "to
bind fast."

If there is no help for it, they will fight hard.

126

25. Thus, without waiting to be marshalled, the soldiers
will be constantly on the qui vive;

Tu Mu says: ^ ^ \$ ^ jfjj § #J f|| • Capt. Calthrop wrongly
translates ^ ^ "without warnings."

without waiting to be asked, they will do your will;

Literally, "without asking, you will get." Chang Yii's paraphrase is:

without restrictions, they will be faithful ;

Chang Ytt says: ^ jjft ^ ffij
without giving orders, they can be trusted.

This last clause is very similar in sense to the one preceding, except
that jjp^ indicates the soldiers' attachment to their leader, and 'fpf the
leader's attitude towards them. I rather doubt if ^ can mean "they
will have confidence in their leader," as the commentary seems to indi-
cate. That way, the sense is not nearly so good. On the other hand, it
is just possible that here, as in VIII. § 8 and infra, § 55, >fp| may = ^ :
"without orders, they will carry out [their leader's plans]." The whole
of this paragraph, of course, has reference to "desperate ground."

26. Prohibit the taking of omens, and do away with
superstitious doubts.

jjfp is amplified by Ts'ao Kung into Iffi jffi ~£ =^ , and ^p^into
I! 1^ £ ft' Cf< the Ss"-ma Fa, ch- 3:
Then, until death itself comes, no calamity need be feared.

The superstitious, "bound in to saucy doubts and fears," degenerate
into cowards and "die many times before their deaths." Tu Mu quotes
Huang Shih-kung: tt /[A jjjj? ^

1^1 ?S 91 5 i ^2 ^ "'Spells and incantations should be strictly
forbidden, and no officer allowed to inquire by divination into the fortunes
of an army, for fear the soldier's minds should be seriously perturbed.'
The meaning is," he continues, "that if all doubts and scruples are dis-

127

irffft ft* « ft ft ***#£**

28.

carded, your men will never falter in their resolution until they die."
The reading of the standard text is fi| Jfjff- ^ "there will be no refuge,"
which does not fit in well here. I therefore prefer to adopt the variant
5^ , which evidently stood in Li Ch'iian's text.

27. If our soldiers are not overburdened with money,
it is not because they have a distaste for riches; if their
lives are not unduly long, it is not because they are dis-
inclined to longevity.

Chang Yu has the best note on this passage : jj

ti ill "Wealth and long life are things for which all men have
a natural inclination. Hence, if they burn or fling away valuables, and
sacrifice their own lives, it is not that they dislike them, but simply that
they have no choice." Sun Tzu is slyly insinuating that, as soldiers are
but human, it is for the general to see that temptations to shirk fighting
and grow rich are not thrown in their way. Capt. Calthrop, mistaking
jj& for the adjective, has: "not because money is a bad thing ... not
because long life is evil."

28. On the day they are ordered out to battle, your
soldiers may weep,

The word in the Chinese is ^ "snivel." This is taken to indicate
more genuine grief than tears alone.

those sitting up bedewing their garments, and those lying
down letting the tears run down their cheeks.

Not because they are afraid, but because, as Ts'ao Kung says, Jjj£ ^p jjfi\
ffi £tj[\ "all have embraced the firm resolution to do or die." We
may remember that the heroes of the Iliad were equally childlike in
showing their emotion. Chang Yu alludes to the mournful parting at the
^ I River between ^jj ijjpj" Ching K'o and his friends, when the former
was sent to attempt the life of the King of Ch'in (afterwards First Emperor)
in 227 B.C. The tears of all flowed down like rain as he bade them

farewell and uttered the following lines: Jjj^ jHf JJJJJ tfj> ^ ^ 2J£ ^ %

128

^ttsS "The shrill blast is blowing, Chilly the
burn; Your champion is going — Not to return."*
But let them once be brought to bay, and they will display
the courage of a Chu or a Kuei.

H& was the personal name of Jll ^ Chuan Chu, a native of the Wu
State and contemporary with Sun Tzu himself, who was employed by
^ jy. -^ Kung-tzu Kuang, better known as Ho Lii Wang, to assas-
sinate his sovereign ^ ^j? Wang Liao with a dagger which he secreted
in the belly of a fish served up at a banquet. He succeeded in his at-
tempt, but was immediately hacked to pieces by the king's bodyguard.
This was in 515 B.C. The other hero referred to, ||f J|r|J Ts'ao Kuei
(or Ts'ao ^k Mo), performed the exploit which has made his name
famous 166 years earlier, in 681 B.C. Lu had been thrice defeated by
Ch'i, and was just about to conclude a treaty surrendering a large slice
of territory, when Ts'ao Kuei suddenly seized ^Q ^ Huan Kung, the
Duke of Ch'i, as he stood on the altar steps and held a dagger against
his chest. None of the Duke's retainers dared to move a muscle, and
Ts'ao Kuei proceeded to demand full restitution, declaring that Lu was
being unjustly treated because she was a smaller and weaker state. Huan
Kung, in peril of his life, was obliged to consent, whereupon Ts'ao Kuei
flung away his dagger and quietly resumed his place amid the terrified
assemblage without having so much as changed colour. As was to be
expected, the Duke wanted afterwards to lepudiate the bargain, but his
wise old counsellor ^ -ffjl Kuan Chung pointed out to him the impolicy
of breaking his word, and the upshot was that this bold stroke regained
for Lu the whole of what she had lost in three pitched battles. [For
another anecdote of Ts'ao Kuei see VII. § 27, note; and for the biogra-
phies of these three bravos, Ts'ao, Chuan and Ching, see Shih Chi, ch. 86.]

29. The skilful tactician may be likened to the shuai-jan.
Now the shiiai-jan is a snake that is found in the Ch'ang
mountains. ufeSA?/7

2p jffi means "suddenly" or "rapidly," and the snake in question was
doubtless so called owing to the rapidity of its movements. Through
this passage, the term has now come to be used in the sense of "military
manoeuvres." The ^ jj[| have apparently not been identified.

* Giles' Biographical Dictionary, no. 399.

129

Strike at its head, and you will be attacked by its tail;
strike at its tail, and you will be attacked by its head;
strike at its middle,

Another reading in the Yu Lan for pb is Hff "belly."
and you will be attacked by head and tail both.

30. Asked if an army can be made to imitate the
shuai-jan,

That is, as Mei Yao-ch'en says, ^^^^J^^^^^
]jffl — • HH -3p> "Is it possible to make the front and rear of an army
each swiftly responsive to attack on the other, just as though they were
parts of a single living body ?"

I should answer, Yes. For the men of Wu and the men
of Ylieh are enemies;

Cf. VI. § 21.

yet if they are crossing a river in the same boat and
are caught by a storm, they will come to each other's
assistance just as the left hand helps the right.

The meaning is : If two enemies will help each other in a time of com-
mon peril, how much more should two parts of the same army, bound
together as they are by every tie of interest and fellow-feeling. Yet it is
notorious that many a campaign has been ruined through lack of co-
operation, especially in the case of allied armies.

31. Hence it is not enough to put one's trust in the
tethering of horses,

~^J is said here to be equivalent to ^| .
and the burying of chariot wheels in the ground.

These quaint devices to prevent one's army from running away recall
the Athenian hero Sophanes, who carried an anchor with him at the
battle of Plataea, by means of which he fastened himself firmly to one
spot. [See Herodotus, IX. 74.] It is not enough, says Sun Tzu, to render
flight impossible by such mechanical means. You will not succeed unless

9

1 3o

32.

33.

84.

your men have tenacity and unity of purpose, and, above all, a spirit of
sympathetic co-operation. This is the lesson which can be learned from
the shnai-jan.

32. The principle on which to manage an army is to
set up one standard of courage which all must reach.

Literally, "level the courage [of all] as though [it were that of] one."
If the ideal army is to form a single organic whole, then it follows that
the resolution and spirit of its component parts must be of the same
quality, or at any rate must not fall below a certain standard. Wellington's
seemingly ungrateful description of his army at Waterloo as "the worst
he had ever commanded" meant no more than that it was deficient in
this important particular -- unity of spirit and courage. Had he not
foreseen the Belgian defections and carefully kept those troops in the
background, he would almost certainly have lost the day.

33. How to make the best of both strong and weak
- that is a question involving the proper use of ground.

This is rather a hard sentence on the first reading, but the key to it
will be found, firstly, in the pause after ^;, and next, in the meaning
of ^ itself. The best equivalent for this that I can think of is the
German "zur Geltung kommen." Mei Yao-ch'en's paraphrase is: J£ fi£

$($}%inJft%&ffi*&Z1&& "The way to elimin""e

the differences of strong and weak and to make both serviceable is to
utilise accidental features of the ground." Less reliable troops, if posted
in strong positions, will hold out as long as better troops on more exposed
terrain. The advantage of position neutralises the inferiority in stamina
and courage. Col. Henderson says: "With all respect to the text books,
and to ordinary tactical teaching, I am inclined to think that the study
of ground is often overlooked, and that by no means sufficient importance
is attached to the selection of positions . . . and to the immense advantages
that are to be derived, whether you are defending or attacking, from the
proper utilisation of natural features." *

34. Thus the skilful general conducts his army just as
though he were leading a single man, willy-nilly, by
the hand.

p. 333.

35.

Tu Mu says : $jfa ^ "The simile has reference to the ease with

which he does it." jf\ ^ Q means that he makes it impossible for
his troops to do otherwise than obey. Chang Yii quotes a jingle, to be
found in Wu Tzti, ch. 4: ^f Z ffi # , ^

35. It is the business of a general to be quiet and thus
ensure secrecy; upright and just, and thus maintain order.

pjp seems to combine the meanings "noiseless" and "imperturbable,"
both of which attributes would of course conduce to secrecy. Tu Mu
explains |^| as |^| $jg || ffjlj "deep and inscrutable," and J£ as ^

"|F IJHE y(j|j "fair and unbiassed." Mei Yao-ch'en alone among the com-
mentators takes */Snr in the sense of 1=3 i& "self-controlled." |£|£| and

I •—• I— I T9—9 K-^-l

{^ are causally connected with j|j|J and "|p respectively. This is not
brought out at all in Capt. Calthrop's rendering: "The general should be
calm, inscrutable, just and prudent." The last adjective, moreover, can
in no sense be said to represent jjj^j .

36. He must be able to mystify his officers and men
by false reports and appearances,

Literally, "to deceive their eyes and ears" — j^ being here used as
a verb in the sense of j|JJ£.

and thus keep them in total ignorance.

Ts'ao Kung gives us one of his excellent apophthegms: ^^ ~jjj* ffi

^ J& ^ W ^ JS> #& "The tro°ps must not be allowed to share

your schemes in the beginning; they may only rejoice with you over
their happy outcome." "To mystify, mislead, and surprise the enemy,"
is one of the first principles in war, as has been frequently pointed out.
But how about the other process — the mystification of one's own men?
Those who may think that Sun Tzti is over-emphatic on this point would
do well to read Col. Henderson's remarks on Stonewall Jackson's Valley
campaign: "The infinite pains," he says, "with which Jackson sought to
conceal, even from his most trusted staff officers, his movements, his in-
tentions, and his thoughts, a commander less thorough would have pro-
nounced useless" — etc. etc. * In the year 88 A.D., as we read in ch. 47

* "Stonewall Jackson," vol. I, p. 421.

132

37.

of the ffou Han Shu, "Pan Ch'ao took the field with 25,000 men from
Khotan and other Central Asian states wi th the object of crushing Yarkand.
The King of Kutcha replied by dispatching his chief commander to suc-
cour the place with an army drawn from the kingdoms of Wen-su, Ku-
mo and Wei-t'ou, totalling 50,000 men. Pan Ch'ao summoned his officers
and also the King of Khotan to a council of war, and said: 'Our forces
are now outnumbered and unable to make head against the enemy. The
best plan, then, is for us to separate and disperse, each in a different
direction. The King of Khotan will march away by the easterly route,
and I will then return myself towards the west. Let us wait until the
evening drum has sounded and then start.' Pan Ch'ao now secretly
released the prisoners whom he had taken alive, and the King of Kutcha
was thus informed of his plans. Much elated by the news, the latter set
off at once at the head of 10,000 horsemen to bar Pan Ch'ao's retreat
in the west, while the King of Wen-su rode eastwards with 8000 horse
in order to intercept the King of Khotan. As soon as Pan Ch'ao knew
that the two chieftains had gone, he called his divisions together, got
them well in hand, and at cock-crow hurled them against the army of
Yarkand, as it lay encamped. The barbarians, panic-stricken, fled in
confusion, and were closely pursued by Pan Ch'ao. Over 5000 heads were
brought back as trophies, besides immense spoils in the shape of horses
and cattle and valuables of every description. Yarkand then capitulating,
Kutcha and the other kingdoms drew off their respective forces. From
that time forward, Pan Ch'ao's prestige completely overawed the countries
of the west." In this case, we see that the Chinese general not only
kept his own officers in ignorance of his real plans, but actually took the
bold step of dividing his army in order to deceive the enemy.

37. By altering his arrangements and changing his plans,

Wang Hsi thinks that this means, not using the same stratagem twice. He

he keeps the enemy without definite knowledge.

Note that ^ denotes the enemy, as opposed to the -^ ~tt of § 36.
Capt. Calthrop, not perceiving this, joins the two paragraphs into one.
Chang Ytt quotes ;fc ^ Ul A as S^S'- & f| ft *£ $ ft jt

it n & nm 3%±&n&m^&&z& -^

axiom, that war is based on deception, does not apply only to deception
of the enemy. You must deceive even your own soldiers. Make them
follow you, but without letting them know why."

133

38.

z m m

By shifting his camp and taking circuitous routes, he
prevents the enemy from anticipating his purpose.

Wang Hsi paraphrases ^ jit J§ as j|| ^ ^g- "camp on easy
ground," and Chang Yti follows him, saying: ijt Jg j||J •=£ |^ fj^

jgft Jj; . But this is an utterly untenable view. For j££ ^ ^ ,
cf. VII. 4. Chia Lin, retaining his old interpretation of those words, is
now obliged to explain ^ ijt JJE~ as "cause the enemy to shift his camp,"
which is awkward in the extreme.

38. At the critical moment, the leader of an army acts
like one who has climbed up a height and then kicks
away the ladder behind him. '

I must candidly confess that I do not understand the syntax of ^[[j] IM
^^ JIB , though the meaning is fairly plain. The difficulty has evidently
been felt, for Tu Mu tells us that one text omits SH §fl . It is more
likely, however, that a couple of characters have dropped out.

He carries his men deep into hostile territory before he
shows his hand.

j||, literally, "releases the spring" (see V. § 15), that is, takes
some decisive step which makes it impossible for the army to return —
like ;j|| ^JJ Hsiang Yii, who sunk his ships after crossing a river. Ch'en
Hao, followed by Chia Lin, understands the words less well as ^ IS
AH* fjjl "puts forth every artifice at his command." But |^ in this derived
sense occurs nowhere else in Sun Tzu.

39. Jie burns his boats and breaks his cooking-pots;
Omitted in the Tu Shu.

like a shepherd driving a flock of sheep, he drives his
men this way and that, and none knows whither he is going.

The Tu Shu inserts another |g after i£ . Tu Mu says: —

ft&&2ft^ft&jytZ1$i& "The army is

cognisant of orders to advance or retreat; it is ignorant of the ulterior
ends of attacking and conquering."

134

40.
41.

43.

40. To muster his host and bring it into danger: —
this may be termed the business of the general.

Sun Tzu means that after mobilisation there should be no delay in
aiming a blow at the enemy's heart. With ^ ^ J^ fflfe cf. supra,
§ 23 : ^ ^ 4ft^ l^r ;££ . Note how he returns again and again to this
point. Among the warring states of ancient China, desertion was no
doubt a much more present fear and serious evil than it is in the armies
of to-day.

41. The different measures suited to the nine varieties
of ground;

Chang Yii says: Jl *& £ & ^ Pf ^J $6 "One must not be
hide-bound in interpreting the rules for the nine varieties of ground.

the expediency of aggressive or defensive tactics;

The use of IS -frfj "contraction and expansion" may be illustrated by

/r^ I I

the saying JjjJ J^j[ 3^ -j^ , which almost exactly corresponds to the French
"il faut reculer pour mieux sauter." * Capt. Calthrop, more suo, avoids
a real translation and has: "the suiting of the means to the occasion."

and the fundamental laws of human nature : these are
things that must most certainly be studied.

42. When invading hostile territory, the general prin-
ciple is, that penetrating deeply brings cohesion ; penetrating
but a short way means dispersion.

Cf. supra, § 20.

43. When you leave your own country behind, and
take your army across neighbouring territory,

Chang Ytt's paraphrase is jffl ^ gj|} ^ .
you find yourself on critical ground.

* See Giles' Dictionary, no. 9817.

135

44.

This "ground" is cursorily mentioned in VIII. § 2, but it does not
figure among the Nine J^Jj of this chapter or the Six Jjjj ^ in chap. X.
One's first impulse would be to translate it "distant ground" ( jjjjjtj jxjfa
is commonly used in the sense of "distant lands"), but this, if we can
trust the commentators, is precisely what is not meant here. Mei Yao-

ch'en says it is j§ ^ » S £ # » & £ ^ *ft 2 BB *

"a position not far enough advanced to be called 'facile,' and not near
enough to home to be called 'dispersive,' but something between the
two." That, of course, does not explain the name ^ , which seems to
imply that the general has severed his communications and temporarily
cut himself off from his base. Thus, Wang Hsi says : "It is ground sepa-
rated from home by an interjacent state, whose territory we have had to
cross in order to reach it. Hence it is incumbent on us to settle our
business there quickly." He adds that this position is of rare occurrence,
which is the reason why it is not included among the ~j\^ ]fy. Ca.pt.
Calthrop gives but a poor rendering of this sentence: "To leave home
and cross the borders is to be free from interference."

When there are means of communication

The T^u Shu reads jj^ for ^| .
on all four sides, the ground is one of intersecting highways.

From IJtj ^| down to the end of § 45, we have some of the definitions
of the early part of the chapter repeated in slightly different language.
Capt. Calthrop omits these altogether.

44. When you penetrate deeply into a country, it is
serious ground. When you penetrate but a little way, it
is facile ground.

45. When you have the enemy's strongholds on your rear,

and narrow passes in front, it is hemmed-in ground. When
there is no place of refuge at all, it is desperate ground.

46. Therefore, on dispersive ground, I would inspire
my men with unity of purpose.

136

47.

This end, according to Tu Mu, is best attained by remaining on the
defensive, and avoiding battle. Cf. supra, § n.

On facile ground, I would see that there is close con-
nection between all parts of my army.

The T'ung Tien has "fr instead of ^ . The present reading is sup-
ported by the ^H gj£ of Cheng Yu-hsien. As Tu Mu says, the object
is to guard against two possible contingencies: — • ^ /|jj| j£ j^ $&
••Hi ^ ?S» S jijfc fP. "(*) ^e desertion of our own troops; (2) a
sudden attack on the part of the enemy." Cf. VII. § 17 :

Mei Yao-ch'en says: ft fl« 1^ # ffi « it 18

"On the march, the regiments should be in close touch; in an encamp-
ment, there should be continuity between the fortifications." He seems
to have forgotten, by the way, what Sun Tzu says above: iijff Jjjj j||J

47. On contentious ground, I would hurry up my rear.

This is Ts'ao Kung's interpretation. Chang Yu adopts its, saying:
|£j£J^S^'j|j'ffJI§^5g "We must quickly bring up our
rear, so that head and tail may both reach the goal." That is, they must
not be allowed to straggle up a long way apart. Mei Yao-ch'en offers
another equally plausible explanation: jj|£ ^ jg lit ijjj ^ ^ ^
^ K'J Hf ^ ^ J£l ^ ^ "Supposing the enemy has not yet reached
the coveted position, and we are behind him, we should advance with
all speed in order to dispute its possession." "ffi would thus denote the
enemy, ^ being the preposition, and ^^ would retain its usual intrans-

itive sense. Cf. VII. §4: ^AI^^tA^' Ch<<§n Hao' on
the other hand, assuming that the enemy has had time select his own
ground, quotes VI. § i, where Sun Tzu warns us against coming exhausted
to the attack. His own idea of the situation is rather vaguely expressed:

JaA^ill^^m^M^ "If there is a ^curable
position lying in front of you, detach a picked body of troops to occupy
it; then if the enemy, relying on their numbers, come up to make a fight
for it, you may fall quickly on their rear with your main body, and
victory will be assured." It was thus, he adds, that Chao She beat
the army of Ch'in. [See p. 57.] Li Ch'iian would read ^ for g , it
is not easy to see why.

48. On open ground, I would keep a vigilant eye on
my defences.

As Wang Hsi says, ||| j|j ^ fy "fearing a surprise attack." The
Tung Tien reads here |gj lj£ jj^t (see next sentence).

On ground of intersecting highways, I would consolidate
my alliances.

The Tung Tien reads ^| S fjj , which Tu Yu explains as "watching

the market towns," $i& ||L ~5? jS "the hotbeds of revolution." Capt.
-5c ^r *~ *Tin

Calthrop translates [jj] ^ -fejj by the same words as -^ ^ in § 12:

"cultivate intercourse."

49. On serious ground, I would try to ensure a con-
tinuous stream of supplies.

The commentators take this as referring to forage and plunder, not, as
one might expect, to an unbroken communication with a home base.
One text, indeed, gives the reading ijjaf "ffi ^ . Cf. §13. Capt. Calthrop's
"be careful of supplies" fails to render the force of ||! .

On difficult ground, I would keep pushing on along the road.

Capt. Calthrop's "do not linger" cannot be called a translation, but
only a paraphrase of the paraphrase offered by Ts'ao Kung : Jj^ jj£J ^ -{^
"Pass away from it in all haste."

50. On hemmed-in ground, I would block any way
of retreat.

^^^|||^J£j[£j*|jS| "To make it seem that I mean to
defend the position, whereas my real intention is to burst suddenly through
the enemy's lines" [Meng Shih]; 'gl j^ 2J£ ^ ^B 1$ ifc "in order
to make my soldiers fight with desperation" [Mei Yao-ch'en]; |j|| ^
^f ^ ^ "fearing lest my men be tempted to run away" [Wang Hsi].
Tu Mu points out that this is the converse of VII. § 36, where it is the
enemy who is surrounded. In 532 A.D., ~fjjj ||jj Kao Huan, afterwards
Emperor and canonised as j|fl jj Shen-wu, was surrounded by a great

army under ^ ^ % Erh-chu Chao and others. His own force was
comparatively small, consisting only of 2000 horse and something under
30,000 foot. The lines of investment had not been drawn very closely
together, gaps being left at certain points. But Kao Huan, instead of
trying to escape, actually made a shift to block all the remaining outlets
himself by driving into them a number of oxen and donkeys roped to-
gether. As soon as his officers and men saw that there was nothing for
it but to conquer or die, their spirits rose to an extraordinary pitch of
exaltation, and they charged with such desperate ferocity that the opposing
ranks broke and crumbled under their onslaught. [See Tu Mu's com-
mentary, and ^ ch. i, fol. 6.]

On desperate ground, I would proclaim to my soldiers
the hopelessness of saving their lives.

Tu Yu says: f

$fa 5^ ^E Hfe "tit "Burn your baggage and impedimenta, throw away
your stores and provisions, choke up the wells, destroy your cooking-
stoves, and make it plain to your men that they cannot survive, but
must fight to the death." Mei Yao-ch'en says epigrammatically : jj£\ ^
~pT ^ "The only chance of life lies in giving up all hope of it." This
concludes what Sun Tzu has to say about "grounds" and the "variations"
corresponding to them. Reviewing the passages which bear on this im-
portant subject, we cannot fail to be struck by the desultory and unme-
thodical fashion in which it is treated. Sun Tzu begins abruptly in VIII.
§ 2 to enumerate "variations" before touching on "grounds" at all, but
only mentions five, namely nos. 7, 5, 8 and 9 of the subsequent list, and
one that is not included in it. A few varieties of ground are dealt with
in the earlier portion of chap. IX, and then chap. X sets forth six new
grounds, with six variations of plan to match. None of these is mentioned
again, though the first is hardly to be distinguished from ground no. 4
in the next chapter. At last, in chap. XI, we come to the Nine Grounds
par excellence, immediately followed by the variations. This takes us
down to § 14. In §§ 43 — 45, fresh definitions are provided for nos. 5,6,
2, 8 and 9 (in the order given), as well as for the tenth ground noticed
in chap VIII; and finally, the nine variations are enumerated once more
from beginning to end, all, with the exception of 5, 6 and 7, being dif-
ferent from those previously given. Though it is impossible to account
for the present state of Sun Tzu's text, a few suggestive facts may be
brought into prominence: (i) Chap. VIII, according to the title, should
deal with nine variations, whereas only five appear. (2) It is an abnorm-
ally short chapter. (3) Chap. XI is entitled The Nine Grounds. Several
of these are defined twice over, besides which there are two distinct lists
of the corresponding variations. (4) The length of the chapter is dispro-
portionate, being double that of any other except IX. I do not propose

'39

n m m

to draw any inferences from these facts, beyond the general conclusion
that Sun Tzti's work cannot have come down to us in the shape in which
it left his hands: chap. VIII is obviously defective and probably out of
place, while XI seems to contain matter that has either been added by a
later hand or ought to appear elsewhere.

51. For it is the soldier's disposition to offer an ob-
stinate resistance when surrounded, to fight hard when
he cannot help himself, and to obey promptly when he
has fallen into danger.

jfi till 3& *s rendered by Capt. Calthrop : "to pursue the enemy if he
retreat." But j^ cannot mean "to retreat." Its primary sense is to
pass over, hence to go too far, to exceed or to err. Here, however, the
word has lost all implication of censure, and appears to mean "to pass
the boundary line dividing safety from danger," or, as Chang Yii puts it,
$? R§ ^ iol H £ Wj "to be deeply involved in a perilous position."
The latter commentator alludes to the conduct of Pan Ch'ao's devoted
followers in 73 A.D. The story runs thus in the Hou Han Shu, ch. 47,
fol. iv°: "When Pan Ch'ao arrived at |||J || Shan-shan, J| Kuang,
the King of the country, received him at first with great politeness and
respect; but shortly afterwards his behaviour underwent a sudden change,
and he became remiss and negligent. Pan Ch'ao spoke about this to
the officers of his suite: 'Have you not noticed,' he said, 'that Kuang's
polite intentions are on the wane? This must signify that envoys have
come from the Northern barbarians, and that consequently he is in a
state of indecision, not knowing with which side to throw in his lot.
That surely is the reason. The truly wise man, we are told, can perceive
things before they have come to pass; how much more, then, those that
are already manifest!' Thereupon he called one of the natives who had
been assigned to his service, and set a trap for him, saying: 'Where are
those envoys from the Hsiung-nu who arrived some days ago?' The man
was so taken aback that between surprise and fear he presently blurted
out the whole truth. Pan Ch'ao, keeping his informant carefully under
lock and key, then summoned a general gathering of his officers, thirty-
six in all, and began drinking with them. When the wine had mounted
into their heads a little, he tried to rouse their spirit still further by ad-
dressing them thus : 'Gentlemen, here we are in the heart of an isolated
region, anxious to achieve riches and honour by some great exploit. Now
it happens that an ambassador from the Hsiung-nu arrived in this kingdom
only a few days ago, and the result is that the respectful courtesy ex-
tended towards us by our royal host has disappeared. Should this envoy
prevail upon him to seize our party and hand us over to the Hsiung-nu,

140

52.

53. 3

our bones will become food for the wolves of the desert. What are we
to do ?' With one accord, the officers replied : '•Standing as we do in peril
of our lives, we will follow (our commander through life and death*

(4#)atr£*tb5E£$t^.i )•" For the seiuel of this

adventure, see chap. XII. § i, note.

52. We cannot enter into alliance with neighbouring
princes until we are acquainted with their designs. We
are not fit to lead an army on the march unless we are
familiar with the face of the country — its mountains and
forests, its pitfalls and precipices, its marshes and swamps.
We shall be unable to turn natural advantages to account
unless we make use of local guides.

These three sentences are repeated from VII. §§ 12 — 14 — in order to
emphasise their importance, the commentators seem to think. I prefer
to regard them as interpolated here in order to form an antecedent to
the following words. With regard to local guides, Sun Tzu might have
added that there is always the risk of going wrong, either through their
treachery or some misunderstanding such as Livy records (XXII. 13):
Hannibal, we are told, ordered a guide to lead him into the neighbourhood
of Casinum, where there was an important pass to be occupied; but his
Carthaginian accent, unsuited to the pronunciation of Latin names, caused
the guide to understand Casilinum instead of Casinum, and turning from
his proper route, he took the army in that direction, the mistake not
being discovered until they had almost arrived.

53. To be ignorant of any one of the following four
or five principles

Referring, I think, to what is contained in §§ 54, 55. Ts'ao Kung,
thinking perhaps of the 3£ ^|J in VIII. § 6, takes them to be fa jfy
^ ^|J ^|£ "the advantages and disadvantages attendant on the nine
varieties of ground." The Tu Shu reads jf£ =£ ^ .

does not befit a warlike prince.

"one who rules by force," was a term specially used for those
princes who established their hegemony over other feudal states. The

famous 3L HI of the ;th century B.C. were (i) ^ ^g ^. Duke Huan
of Ch'i (2) ^ ^ -^ Duke Wen of Chin, (3) 7J^ j| -^ Duke Hsiang
of Sung, (4) ^ Ijj: :£ Prince Chuang of Ch'u, (5) ^ ^ ^ Duke
Mu of Ch'in. Their reigns covered the period 685 — 591 B.C.

54. When a warlike prince attacks a powerful state,
his generalship shows itself in preventing the concentration
of the enemy's forces. He overawes his opponents,

Here and in the next sentence, the Yu Lan inserts n£ after .

and their allies are prevented from joining against him.

Mei Yao-ch'en constructs one of the chains of reasoning that are so
much affected by the Chinese : "In attacking a powerful state, if you can
divide her forces, you will have a superiority in strength ; if you have a
superiority in strength, you will overawe the enemy ; if you overawe the
enemy, the neighbouring states will be frightened; and if the neighbouring
states are frightened, the enemy's allies will be prevented from joining
her." The following gives a stronger meaning to Jg^ JljJJ : ^k -fc HU

— ' $L JW /l^ H §^ fi5 >P Jpl r^C "^ ^e &reat state has once been
defeated (before she has had time to summon her allies), then the lesser
states will hold aloof and refrain from massing their forces." Ch'en Hao
and Chang Yii take the sentence in quite another way. The former
says: "Powerful though a prince may be, if he attacks a large state, he
will be unable to raise enough troops, and must rfely to some extent on
external aid; if he dispenses with this, and with overweening confidence
in his own strength, simply tries to intimidate the enemy, he will surely
be defeated." Chang Yii puts his view thus: "If we recklessly attack a
large state, our own people will be discontented and hang back. But if
(as will then be the case) our display of military force is inferior by half
to that of the enemy, the other chieftains will take fright and refuse to
join us." According to this interpretation, it would refer, not to the
~Ac H » but to t^e SB I himself.

55. Hence he does not strive
For 3£ the Yu Lan reads A .

142

so.

-A

to ally himself with all and sundry,

^ ~K , as in § 6, stands for ^ ^ "the feudal princes," or the
states ruled by them.

nor does he foster the power of other states. He carries
out his own secret designs,

For t=* (read sh£n !) in the meaning of ^b , cf. VIII. § 8. The com-
mentators are unanimous on this point, and we must therefore beware
of translating >jpf ^ £ fy by "secretly self-confident" or the like.

Capt. Calthrop (omitting ^ ^ ) has : "he has confidence in himself."
keeping his antagonists in awe.

The train of thought appears to be this : Secure against a combination
of his enemies, & « ^ T £ £ It # # B £ # jfe jS
Pfl fit %h ^J? 5j||* "he can afford to reject entangling alliances and
simply pursue his own secret designs, his prestige enabling him to dispense
with external friendships." (Li Ch'iian.)

Thus he is able to capture their cities and overthrow
their kingdoms.

This paragraph, though written many years before the Ch'in State be-
came a serious menace, is not a bad summary of the policy by which
the famous Six Chancellors gradually paved the way for her final triumph
under Shih Huang Ti. Chang Yii, following up his previous note, thinks
that Sun Tzti is condemning this attitude of cold-blooded selfishness and
haughty isolation. He again refers Jit to the warlike prince, thus making
it appear that in the end he is bound to succumb.

56. Bestow rewards without regard to rule,

Wu Tzu (ch. 3) less wisely says: ^^Slt^&^JtWJ
"Let advance be richly rewarded and retreat be heavily punished."

issue orders

^, literally, "hang" or "post up."
without regard to previous arrangements;

^t if£ %ty\ "In order to prevent treachery," says Wang Hsi. The
general meaning is made clear by Ts'ao Kung's quotation from the

Ssii-ma Fa: & ^ ft 3jf fjjj ?ft ft *jj[ "Give instructions only on
sighting the enemy; give rewards only when you see deserving deeds."
$ff )$£, however, presents some difficulty. Ts'ao Kung's paraphrase,

S&^^JiSftSfl-tft'1 take to mean: "The final inst™c-
tions you give to your army should not correspond with those that have
been previously posted up." Chang Yu simplifies this into Jfc ^ J§ "tf
"your arrangements should not be divulged beforehand." And Chia Lin
says: ^ TJ* ^ ££ ^ tffc "there should be no fixity in your rules
and arrangements." Not only is there danger in letting your plans be
known, but war often necessitates the entire reversal of them at the last
moment.

and you will be able to handle a whole army

:J[f , according to Ts'ao Kung, is here equal to J^j . The exact meaning
is brought out more clearly in the next paragraph.

as though you had to do with but a single man.
Cf. supra, § 34.

57. Confront your soldiers with the deed itself; never
let them know your design.

Literally, "do not tell them words;" i.e. do not give your reasons for any
order. Lord Mansfield once told a junior colleague to "give no reasons"
for his decisions, and the maxim is even more applicable to a general
than to a judge. Capt. Calthrop translates this sentence with beautiful
simplicity: "Orders should direct the soldiers." That is all.

When the outlook is bright, bring it before their eyes;
but tell them nothing when the situation is gloomy.

58. Place your army in deadly peril, and it will survive;
plunge it into desperate straits, and it will come off in safety .

Compare the paradoxical saying "f^^^
2J£ . These words of Sun Tzu were once quoted by Han Hsin in ex-
planation of the tactics he employed in one of his most brilliant battles,
already alluded to on p. 28. In 204 B.C., he was sent against the army
of Chao, and halted ten miles from the mouth of the ^ [Iffi Ching-
hsing pass, where the enemy had mustered in full force. Here, at midnight,
he detached a body of 2000 light cavalry, every man of which was furnished

144

with a red flag. Their instructions were to make their way through nar-
row defiles and keep a secret watch on the enemy. "When the men of
Chao see me in full flight," Han Hsin said, "they will abandon their forti-
fications and give chase. This must be the sign for you to rush in, pluck
down the Chao standards and set up the red banners of j^| Han in their
stead." Turning then to his other officers, he remarked: "Our adversary
holds a strong position, and is not likely to come out and attack us until
he sees the standard and drums of the commander-in-chief, for fear I
should turn back and escape through the mountains." So saying, he first
of all sent out a division consisting of 10,000 men, and ordered them to
form in line of battle with their backs to the River yj£ Ti. Seeing this
manoeuvre, the whole army of Chao broke into loud laughter. By this
time it was broad daylight, and Han Hsin, displaying the generalissimo's
flag, marched out of the pass with drums beating, and was immediately
engaged by the enemy. A great battle followed, lasting for some time;
until at length Han Hsin and his colleague EM iEC Chang Ni, leaving
drums and banner on the field, fled to the division on the river bank,
where another fierce battle was raging. The enemy rushed out to pursue
them and to secure the trophies, thus denuding their ramparts of men;
but the two generals succeeded in joining the other army, which was
fighting with the utmost desperation. The time had now come for the
2000 horsemen to play their part. As soon as they saw the men of
Chao following up their advantage, they galloped behind the deserted
walls, tore up the enemy's flags and replaced them by those of Han.
When the Chao army turned back from the pursuit, the sight of these
red flags struck them with terror. Convinced that the Hans had got in
and overpowered their king, they broke up in wild disorder, every effort
of their leader to stay the panic being in vain. Then the Han army fell
on them from both sides and completed the rout, killing a great number
and capturing the rest, amongst whom was King jjfc Ya himself ....
After the battle, some of Han Hsin's officers came to him and said: "In
the Art of War we are told to have a hill or tumulus on the right rear,
and a river or marsh on the left front. [This appears to be a blend of
Sun Tzu and T'ai Kung. See IX. § 9, and note.] You, on the con-
trary, ordered us to draw up our troops with the river at our back. Under
these conditions, how did you manage to gain the victory?" The general
replied : "I fear you gentlemen have not studied the Art of War with
sufficient care. Is it not written there : ' 'Plunge your army into desperate
straits and it will come off in safety; place it in deadly peril and it will
survive '? Had I taken the usual course, I should never have been able
to bring my colleagues round. What says the Military Classic ($g)?
'Swoop down on the market-place and drive the men off to fight'
( H* r|j A ffij *$$ ^ )• [This passage does not occur in the present
text of Sun Tzu.] If I had not placed my troops in a position where

145

•**'

02. Jtflp

they were obliged to fight for their lives, but had allowed each man to
follow his own discretion, there would have been a general debandade,
and it would have been impossible to do anything with them." The
officers admitted the force, of his argument, and said : "These are higher
tactics than we should have been capable of.5' [See CA'ien Hah Shu,
ch. 34, ff. 4, 5-]

59. For it is precisely when a force has fallen into
harm's way that it is capable of striking a blow for victory.

Danger has a bracing effect.

60. Success in warfare is gained by carefully accom-
modating ourselves to the enemy's purpose.

Ts'ao Kung says : fa: f^ -Jgj "Feign stupidity" — by an appearance
of yielding and falling in with the enemy's wishes. Chan^ Yii's note
makes the meaning clear : "If the enemy shows an inclination to advance,
lure him on to do so; if he is anxious to retreat, delay on purpose that
he may carry out his intention." The object is to make him remiss and
contemptuous before we deliver our attack.

61. By persistently hanging on the enemy's flank,

I understand the first four words to mean "accompanying the enemy
in one direction." Ts'ao Kung says: ^£ -& [S] ]^ "unite the soldiers
and make for the enemy." But such a violent displacement of characters
is quite indefensible. Mei Yao-ch'en is the only commentator who seems
to have grasped the meaning : [^ ||£ — • |Sj jffi ^ ^ ^ £jj -^ .
The T'u Shu reads jfc ^J .

we shall succeed in the -long run
Literally, "after a thousand /*'."

in killing the commander-in-chief.

Always a great point with the Chinese.

62. This is called ability to accomplish a thing by
sheer cunning.

o

The T'u Shu has ^ g || &j ~fft ffc ^ , and yet another reading,

10

146

mentioned by Ts'ao Kung, is &j jfc jfa ||J . Capt. Calthrop omits
this sentence, after having thus translated the two preceding: "Discover
the enemy's intentions by conforming to his movements. When these
are discovered, then, with one stroke, the general may be killed, even
though he be one hundred leagues distant."

63. On the day that you take up your command,

]£fc J& does not mean "when war is declared," as Capt. Calthrop
says, nor yet exactly, as Ts'ao Kung paraphrases it, gjj! ^j£ "when your
plans are fixed," when you have mapped out your campaign. The phrase
is not given in the Plei Wen Yun Fu. There being no causal con-
nection discoverable between this and the preceding sentence, ^ jtjr
must perforce be left untranslated.

block the frontier passes,

| is explained by Mei Yao-ch'en as

destroy the official tallies,

The locus classicus for these tallies is Chou Li, XIV. fol. 40 (Imperial
edition): ff 1 ffl & $ £ jfc ffl M f* £ *& fl! Jt ft .

The generic term thus appears to be ||j} , ^J being the special kind
used at city-gates and on the frontier. They were tablets of bamboo or
wood, one half of which was issued as a permit or passport by the official
in charge of a gate ( fjj f^ or ^ (^ . Cf. the ^ ^ "border-warden"
of Lun Yu III. 24, who may have had similar duties.) When this half
was returned to him, within a fixed period, he was authorised to open
the gate and let the traveller through.

and stop the passage of all emissaries.

Either to or from the enemy's country.
64. Be stern in the council-chamber,

Show no weakness, and insist on your plans being ratified by the sovereign.
Igfi jiB indicates a hall or temple in the Palace. Cf. I. § 26. It is not

/xii /^yj «y

clear if other officers would be present. Hardly anything can be made
of JJUJ 5 the reading of the standard text, so I have adopted Tu Mu's
conjecture ^ , which appears in the Tlu Shu.

so that you may control the situation.

'47

A n m & & A z •<

Ts'ao Kung explains - by yjpj , and Ho Shih by j . Another
reading is gjj , and Mei Yao-ch'en, adopting this, understands the whole
sentence to mean: Take the strictest precautions to ensure secrecy in
your deliberations. Capt. Calthrop glides rather too smoothly over the
rough places. His translation is : "conduct the business of the govern-
ment with vigilance."

65. If the enemy leaves a door open, you must rush in.

This looks a very simple sentence, yet Ts'ao Kung is the only com-
mentator who takes it as I have done. Meng Shih, followed by Mei Yao-
ch'en and Chang Yii, defines jJB [||j as ^fl ^ "spies," and makes ^
an active verb: "If spies come from the enemy, we must quickly let
them in." But I cannot find that the words ^ |ff] have this meaning
anywhere else. On the other hand, they may be taken as two verbs,
flJc IflJ SK M ' exPressmg tne enemy's indecision whether to advance
or retreat, that being the best moment to attack him. [Cf. Tao Te Ching,

chap. X: ^ PI P| H ^ ^ «l ¥; alsoZ' «'• ft it' Ui' 25-]
It is not easy to choose between this and Ts'ao Kung's explanation; the
fact that ||£ ^ ^ Ef occurs shortly afterwards, in § 68, might be
adduced in support of either. jjfa\ must be understood in the sense of
jgfc or ^ . The only way to avoid this is to put ^ |||j between
commas and translate: "If we leave a door open, the enemy is sure to
rush in."

66. Forestall your opponent by seizing what he holds dear,
Cf. supra, § 1 8.

and subtly contrive to time his arrival on the ground.

Capt. Calthrop hardly attempts to translate this difficult paragraph, but
invents the following instead: "Discover what he most values, and plan
to seize it." Ch'en Hao's explanation, however, is clear enough: j

JJ£\ 3| "If I manage to seize a favourable position, but the enemy does
not appear on the scene, the advantage thus obtained cannot be turned
to any practical account. He who intends, therefore, to occupy a position
of importance to the enemy, must begin by making an artful appointment,

148

67.

68.

so to speak, with his antagonist, and cajole him into going there as well.'
Mei Yao-ch'en explains that this "artful appointment" is to be made
through the medium of the enemy's own spies, who will carry back just
the amount of information that we choose to give them. Then, having
cunningly disclosed our intentions, ^j ^ J^ ^jf -fa J^ gj? "we musl
manage, though starting after the enemy, to arrive before him" (VII. § 4),
We must start after him in order to ensure his marching thither; we
must arrive before him in order to capture the place without trouble,
Taken thus, the present passage lends some support to Mei Yao-ch'en's
interpretation of § 47.

67. Walk in the path defined by rule,

U! stands for ^| jj| "a marking-line," hence a rule of conduct. See
Mencius VII. i. xli. 2. Ts'ao Kung explains it by the similar metaphor
^jj ^g "square and compasses." The baldness of the sentiment rather
inclines me to favour the reading J||J adopted by Chia Lin in place of
f^ , which yields an exactly opposite sense, namely : "Discard hard and
fast rules." Chia Lin says: f£ )$ fe % \\ ^ pf ±J* J^ $f g ffij
^ "Victory is the only thing that matters, and this cannot be achieved
by adhering to conventional canons." It is unfortunate that this variant
rests on very slight authority, for the sense yielded is certainly much
more satisfactory. Napoleon, as we know, according to the veterans of
the old school whom he defeated, won his battles by violating every ac-
cepted canon of warfare.

and accommodate yourself to the enemy until you can
fight a decisive battle.

The last four words of the Chinese are omitted by Capt. Calthrop.
Tu Mu says: |g .j^ A Z J& % % »I % 2 ^ W ft fa
JT^ tfefe "Conform to the enemy's tactics until a favourable opportunity
offers; then come forth and engage in a battle that shall prove decisive."

68. At first, then, exhibit the coyness of a maiden,
until the enemy gives you an opening; afterwards emulate
the rapidity of a running hare, and it will be too late
for the enemy to oppose you.

149

As the hare is noted for its extreme timidity, the comparison hardly
appears felicitous. But of course Sun Tzu was thinking only of its speed.
The words have been taken to mean: You must flee from the enemy as
quickly as an escaping hare; but this is rightly rejected by Tu Mu. Capt.
Calthrop is wrong in translating ^ "rabbit." Rabbits are not indigenous
to China, and were certainly not known there in the 6th century B.C. The
last sixteen characters evidently form a sort of four-line jingle. Chap. X,
it may be remembered, closed in similar fashion.

XII. THE ATTACK BY FIRE.

Rather more than half the chapter (§§ i — 13) is devoted to the subject
of fire, after which the author branches off into other topics.

i. Sun Tzu said: There are five ways of attacking
with fire. The first is to burn soldiers in their camp;

So Tu Mu. Li Ch'uan says: ^Sf^^lftiZJ*^ "Set
fire to the camp, and kill the soldiers" (when they try to escape from
the flames). Pan Ch'ao, sent on a diplomatic mission to the King of
Shan-shan [see XI. § 51, note], found himself placed in extreme peril by
the unexpected arrival of an envoy from the Hsiung-nu [the mortal enemies
of the Chinese], in consultation with his officers, he exclaimed : "'Never
venture, never win ! * The only course open to us now is to make an
assault by fire on the barbarians under cover of night, when they will
not be able to discern our numbers. Profiting by their panic, we shall
exterminate them completely; this will cool the King's courage and cover
us with glory, besides ensuring the success of our mission.' The officers
all replied that it would be necessary to discuss the matter first with the
Intendant ( ^ jtf ). Pan Ch'ao then fell^ into a passion : Mt is to-day,'
he cried, 'that our fortunes must be decided ! The Intendant is only a
humdrum civilian, who on hearing of our project will certainly be afraid,
and everything will be brought to light. An inglorious death is no worthy
fate for valiant warriors.' All then agreed to do as he wished. Accordingly,
as soon as night came on, he and his little band quickly made their way
to the barbarian camp. A strong gale was blowing at the time. Pan
Ch'ao ordered ten of the party to take drums and hide behind the enemy's
barracks, it being arranged that when they saw flames shoot up, they

* yp y^ IS *^* >K ^^ IS -^ "Unless yon enter the tiger's lair, you.
cannot get hold of the tiger's cubs."

should begin drumming and yelling with all their might. The rest of his
men, armed with bows and crossbows, he posted in ambuscade at the
gate of the camp. He then set fire to the place from the windward side,
whereupon a deafening noise of drums and shouting arose on the front
and rear of the Hsiung-nu, who rushed out pell-mell in frantic disorder.
Pan Ch'ao slew three of them with his own hand, while his companions
cut off the heads of the envoy and thirty of his suite. The remainder,
more than a hundred in all, perished in the flames. On the following
day, Pan Ch'ao went back and informed ^|J ^ Kuo Hsiin [the Intendant]
of what he had done. The latter was greatly alarmed and turned pale.
But Pan Ch'ao, divining his thoughts, said with uplifted hand: 'Although
you did not go with us last night, I should not think, Sir, of taking sole
credit for our exploit.' This satisfied Kuo Hsun, and Pan Ch'ao, having
sent for Kuang, King of Shan-shan, showed him the head of the barbarian
envoy. The whole kingdom was seized with fear and trembling, which
Pan Ch'ao took steps to allay by issuing a public proclamation. Then,
taking the king's son as hostage, he returned to make his report to
W [3| Tou Ku." \Hou Han Shu, ch. 47, if. i, 2.]

the second is to burn stores;

Tu Mu says : TJJ ^ "ffi ^ "Provisions, fuel and fodder." In order
to subdue the rebellious population of Kiangnan, ~fjjj jjpj Kao Keng
recommended Wen Ti of the Sui dynasty to make periodical raids and
burn their stores of grain, a policy which in the long run proved entirely
successful. [Kg f&, ch. 41, fol. 2.]

the third is to burn baggage- trains;

An example given is the destruction of ^ j$g Yuan Shao's waggons
and impedimenta by Ts'ao Ts'ao in 200 A.D.

the fourth is to burn arsenals and magazines;

Tu Mu says that the things contained in jj^jj and Jjj[ are the same. He
specifies weapons and other implements, bullion and clothing. Cf. VII. § 1 1.

the fifth is to hurl dropping fire amongst the enemy.

No fewer than four totally diverse explanations of this sentence are
given by the commentators, not one of which is quite satisfactory. It is
obvious, at any rate, that the ordinary meaning of ffi ("regiment" or
"company") is here inadmissible. In spite of Tu Mu's note, ^£ I|L %~J
t£ 69 91 ffij (£ £ i l must reSard "company burning" (Capt. Cal-
throp's rendering) as nonsense pure and simple. We may also, I think,
reject the very forced explanation given by Li Ch'iian, Mei Yao-ch'en

and Chang Yii, of whom the last-tiamed says: Jfe ^ |^ ^ jgl J£
^ wfe Ef "burning a regiment's weapons, so that the soldiers may have
nothing to fight with." That leaves only two solutions open: one, favoured
by Chia Lin and Ho Shih, is to take |^ in the somewhat uncommon
sense of "a road," = ^. The commentary on a passage in the ^ ^

"•y* ^ ' quoted in Klang Hsi, defines [^ (read jw/) as ;gt pjl |Jj^

K^ sfj "a difficult road leading through a valley." Here it would stand
for the 7J|| 2f|" "line of supplies," which might be effectually interrupted
if the country roundabout was laid waste with fire. Finally, the inter-
pretation which I have adopted is that given by Tu Yu in the T'ung

Tien. He reads ||| (which is not absolutely necessary, [^ chut being
sometimes used in the same sense), with the following note : J£j[ 4^

"To drop fire 'mto the enemy's camP- ' The method
by which this may be done is to set the tips of arrows alight by dipping
them into a brazier, and then shoot them from powerful crossbows into
the enemy's lines."

2. In order to carry out an attack with fire, we must
have means available.

Ts'ao Kung thinks that ^ ^ "traitors in the enemy's camp" are referred
to. He thus takes [^| as the efficient cause only. But Ch'en Hao is
more likely to be right in saying: ^l^S^^^^^ ,"We
must have favourable circumstances in general, not merely traitors to
help us." Chia Lin says: pjtj.Jjjj^ j)^ "We must avail ourselves of wind
and dry weather."

the material for raising fire should always be kept in
readiness.

j|g5 ^ is explained by Ts'ao Kung as %& JL "appliances for making

fire." Tu Mu suggests Xffi^Slf^lh/ft^ll "^
vegetable matter, reeds, brushwood, straw, grease, oil, etc." Here we
have the material cause. Chang Yu says: |^^C^^^^^^/
"vessels for hoarding fire, stuff for lighting fires."

3. There is a proper season for making attacks with
fire, and special days, for starting a conflagration.

'S3

&Z Hife-

5 jt -fc # # eg s. 'X z % m m z

«• *. » ft ft fl'J f- Jfi Z ft ft

A fire must riot be begun ^^ "recklessly" or jj^ ^^ "at haphazard."

4. The proper season is when the weather is very dry;
the special days are those when the moon is in the constel-
lations of the Sieve, the Wall, the Wing or the Cross-bar ;

These are, respectively, the yth, 14111, 27th, and 28th of the """*. -p
y\ ^£j* Twenty-eight Stellar Mansions, corresponding roughly to Sagit-
tarius, Pegasus, Crater and Corvus. The original text, followed by the
T'u Shu, has J=J in place of tjfij ; the present reading rests on the au-
thority of the Tung Tien ancl Y&< Lan. ^\\ Mu says: fg ^ ^ ^
)^T & iit • For ^ M ' both TlunS Tien and Y& Lan give the more
precise location H/ ^ W ^ . Mei Yao-ch'en tells us that by 4£

^-^ -^ > >^V ifii ^ -»

is meant the tail of the S| Dragon ; by Jffij , the eastern part of that
constellation ; by !§ and , the tail of the Quail.

for these four are all days of rising wind.

ft m It * is dKp*»l for ^ * llfc PI ?g ^ 0 • If II

Hsiao I (afterwards fourth Emperor of the Liang dynasty, A.D. 552 — 555)

is quoted by Tu Yu as saying that the days p£j ~f of spring, jj^ g,
•of summer, -jj> X^> of autumn, and ffl j^ of winter bring fierce gales
of wind and rain.

5. In attacking with fire, one should be prepared to
meet five possible developments:

I take 3£ as qualifying ^, not »J^, and therefore think that Chang
Yu is wrong in referring ^ J^ to the five methods of attack set forth
in § i. What follows has certainly nothing to do with these.

6. (i) When fire breaks out inside the enemy's camp,
respond at once

The Yu Lan incorrectly reads 1|f for jjl .
with an attack from without.

154

7.

7. (2) If there is an outbreak of fire, but the enemy's
soldiers remain quiet, bide your time and do not attack.

The original text omits ffjj lit . The prime object of attacking with
fire is to throw the enemy into confusion. If this effect is not produced,
it means that the enemy is ready to receive us. Hence the necessity
for caution.

8. (3) When the force of the flames has reached its
height, follow it up with an attack, if that is practicable;
if not, stay where you are.

Ts'ao Kung says: ~fl ift & $ 1$£ tft & "If y°u see a Pos'

sible way, advance; but if you find the difficulties too great, retire."

9. (4) If it is possible to make an assault with fire
from without, do not wait for it to break out within, but
deliver your attack at a favourable moment.

Tu Mu says that the previous paragraphs had reference to the fire
breaking out (either accidentally, we may suppose, or by the agency of
incendiaries) inside the enemy's camp. "But," he continues, Jk jfc

^ ^E jJC ^ im. "^ ^e enemv is settled in a waste place littered
with quantities of grass, or if he has pitched his camp in a position which
can be burnt out, we must carry our fire against him at any seasonable
opportunity, and not wait on in hopes of an outbreak occurring within,
for fear our opponents should themselves burn up the surrounding vege-
tation, and thus render our own attempts fruitless." The famous dJ5 ||fe
Li Ling once baffled the jffi ^ leader of the Hsiung-nu in this way.
The latter, taking advantage of a favourable wind, tried to set fire to the
Chinese general's camp, but found that every scrap of combustible vege-
tation in the neighbourhood had already been burnt down. On the other
hand, $fc ^ Po-ts'ai, a general of the j| (jj |$ Yellow Turban rebels,
was badly defeated in 184 A.D. through his neglect of this simple pre-
caution. "At the head of a large army he was besieging -^ jjff; Ch'ang-she,
which was held by J|[ ^j ^ Huang-fu Sung. The garrison was very

'55

11. <Ji,

12. Jl?

small, and a general feeling of nervousness pervaded the ranks; so Huang-fu
Sung called his officers together and said: 'In war, there are various in-
direct methods of attack, and numbers do not count for everything. [The
commentator here quotes Sun Tzu, V. §§ 5, 6 and ro.] Now the rebels
have pitched their camp in the midst of thick grass (^ t=jf j£j!j 3jj* ),
which will easily burn when the wind blows. If we set fire to it at night,
they will be thrown into a panic, and we can make a sortie and attack
them on all sides at once, thus emulating the achievement of T'ien Tan.'
[See p. 90.] That same evening, a strong breeze sprang up; so Huang-fu
Sung instructed his soldiers to bind reeds together into torches and mount
guard on the city walls, after which he sent out a band of daring men,
who stealthily made their way through the lines and started the fire with
loud shouts and yells. Simultaneously, a glare of light shot up from the
city- walls, and Huang-fu Sung, sounding his drums, led a rapid charge,
which threw the rebels into confusion and put them to headlong flight."
\Hou Han Shu, ch. 71, f. 2 r°.]

io. (5) When you start a fire, be to windward of it.
Do not attack from the leeward.

Chang Yii, following Tu Yu, says: ^ £ *& & 31 Rfi ^ (^
^ *& Ifc %& M!| >5 HI ife "when you make a fire, the enemy will
retreat away from it; if you oppose his retreat and attack him then, he
will fight desperately, which will not conduce to your success." A rather
more obvious explanation is given by Tu Mu: "If the wind is in the
east, begin burning to the east of the enemy, and follow up the attack
yourself from that side. If you start the fire on the east side, and then
attack from the west, you will suffer in the same way as your enemy."

1 1 . A wind that rises in the daytime lasts long, but a
night breeze soon falls.

Cf. Lao Tzu's saying: ||| Jj^ ^ $£ j|J} "A violent wind does not
last the space of a morning." (Tao T<? Ching, chap. 23.) Mei Yao-ch'en
and Wang Hsi say: "A day breeze dies down at nightfall, and a night
breeze at daybreak. This is what happens as a general rule." The
phenomenon observed may be correct enough, but how this sense is to
be obtained is not apparent.

12. In every army, the five developments connected
with fire must be known, the movements of the stars
calculated, and a watch kept for the proper days.

156

Tu Mu's commentary shows what has -to be supplied in order to make
sense out of % jfc ^ £ . He says: ^ ^ g jg £ f{r ^ ^

7J§ ^ 0^"^T^.^C "We must make calculations as to the paths
of the stars, and watch for the days on which wind will rise, before
making our attack with fire." Chang Yu seems to take ^J* in the sense
of Rjfc: "We must not only know how to assail our opponents with fire,
but also be on our guard against similar attacks from them."

13. Hence those who use fire as an aid to the attack
show intelligence;

I have not the least hesitation in rejecting the commentators' explanation
of $J as= $J £|. Thus Chang Yii says: $ #ft "Pf J# Jfc $

". . . will clearly [i.e. obviously] be able to gain the victory." This is not
only clumsy in itself, but does not balance ijtji in the next clause. For
IjjJJ "intelligent," cf. infra, § 16, and Lun Yii XII. 6.

those who use water as an aid to the attack gain an
accession of strength.

Capt. Calthrop gives an extraordinary rendering of the paragraph:
"... if the attack is to be assisted, the fire must be unquenchable. If
water is to assist the attack, the flood must be overwhelming."

14. By means of water, an enemy may be intercepted,
but not robbed of all his belongings.

Ts-ao Rung's note is: ^ pf Jg % ft
^ IF!* Tatf HH "^e can merety obstruct the enemy's road or divide his
army, but not sweep away all his accumulated stores." Water can do
useful service, but it lacks the terrible destructive power of fire. This is
the reason, Chang Yii concludes, why the former is dismissed in a couple
of sentences, whereas the attack by fire is discussed in detail. Wu Tzu
(ch. 4) speaks thus of the two elements :

Hi 15 "BIT ^ BB ^ "If an armv ig encamped on low-lying marshy
ground, from which the water cannot run off, and where the rainfall is
heavy, it may be submerged by a flood. If an army is encamped in
wild marsh lands thickly overgrown with weeds and brambles, and visited
by frequent gales, it may be exterminated by fire."

157

15. Unhappy is the fate of one who tries to win his
battles and succeed in his attacks without cultivating the
spirit of enterprise; for the result is waste of time and
general stagnation.

This is one of the most perplexing passages in Sun Tzti. The diffi-
culty lies mainly in ~jfi jfifa lit ~^J , of which two interpretations appear
possible. Most of the commentators understand 'jj^ in the sense (not
known to Klang Hsi) of ^ "reward" or J^ "promote," and jfc ^
as referring to the merit of officers and men. Thus Ts'ao Kung says:
'H ^ Uf* Jffjj Q "Rewards for good service should not be deferred a
single day." And Tu Mu : "If you do not take opportunity to advance
and reward the deserving, your subordinates will not carry out your com-
mands, and disaster will ensue." -JS? ^ would then probably mean
& ffiff "Bf %& "stoppage of expenditure," or as Chia Lin puts it, >|§ flf
"the grudging of expenditure." For several reasons, however, and in
spite of the formidable array of scholars on the other side, I prefer the
interpretation suggested by Mei Yao-ch'en alone, whose words I will quote :

^ Tii4 lft % )] ^ |X| ^ "Those who want to make sure of suc-
ceeding in their battles and assaults must seize the favourable moments
when they come and not shrink on occasion from heroic measures: that
is to say, they must resort to such means of attack as fire, water and the
like. What they must not do, and what will prove fatal, is to sit still
and simply hold on to the advantages they have got." This retains the
more usual meaning of ^, and also brings out a clear connection of
thought with the previous part of the chapter. With regard to Jjjjjf & ,
Wang Hsi paraphrases it as Wjf j^ ^jir (Jjjj "expending treasure and

tiring out [///., ageing] the army." ^ of course is expenditure or waste
in general, either of time, money or strength. But the soldier is less
concerned with the saving of money than of time. For the metaphor
expressed in "stagnation" I am indebted to Ts'ao Kung, who says: ^
^K ^ @ ~Jfi ^ji 3§ "til • Capt. Calthrop gives a rendering which
bears but little relation to the Chinese text: "unless victory or possession
be obtained, the enemy quickly recovers, and misfortunes arise. The
war drags on, and money is spent."

1 6. Hence the saying: The enlightened ruler lays his
plans well ahead-, the good general cultivates his resnnrres.

158

is. & ^ ftf ff5 Sft ^ £ ^ fU R5 It

As S\m Tzu quotes this jingle in support of his assertion in § 15, we
must suppose ^ £ to stand for ^~^L~Sft or something analogous.
The meaning seems to be that the ruler lays plans which the general
must show resourcefulness in carrying out. It is now plainer than ever
that YJ& cannot mean "to reward." Nevertheless, Tu Mu quotes the
following from the = B&> ch- 2: ft ^ $J ± 1% ft $» ± M

€ m ± M « & ^ W ± « K a IH ± * ffl tfr

"The warlike prince controls his soldiers by his authority, knits them
together by good faith, and by rewards makes them serviceable. If faith
decays, there will be disruption; if rewards are deficient, commands will
not be respected."

17. Move not unless you see an advantage-,

^E » the Yu Lan's variant for "jjjjj , is adopted by Li Ch'iian and
Tu Mu.

use not your troops unless there is something to be gained ;
fight not unless the position is critical.

Sun Tzu may at times appear to be over-cautious, but he never goes
so far in that direction as the remarkable passage in the Tao T£ Ching.

ch. 69: ^ * # £ i tfij^g^tfcJt^flnilM

"I dare not take the initiative, but prefer to act on the defensive; I dare
not advance an inch, but prefer to retreat a foot."

18. No ruler should put troops into the field merely
to gratify his own spleen; no general should fight a battle
simply out of pique.

Again compare Lao Tzu, ch. 68 : || j|£ =jg jfi jjg . Chang Yu says
that »|j|jj is a weaker word than jfeC , and is therefore applied to the general
as opposed to the sovereign. The T'ung Tien and Yu Lan read jg
for $16 > and the latter ^ for gjr .

19. If it is to your advantage, make a forward move;
if not, stay where you are.

This is repeated from XI. § 17. Here I feel convinced that it is an
interpolation, for it is evident that § 20 ought to follow immediately on

159

21.

§ 1 8. For , the Tung Tien and F# Z0« have ^ . Capt. Calthrop
invents a sentence which he inserts before this one: "Do not make war
unless victory may be gained thereby." While he was about it, he might
have credited Sun Tzti with something slightly less inane.

20. Anger may in time change to gladness; vexation
may be succeeded by content.

According to Chang Yii, jj, denotes joy outwardly manifested in the
countenance, *|*j^ the inward sensation of happiness.

21. But a kingdom that has once been destroyed can
never come again into being;

The Wu State was destined to be a melancholy example of this saying.
See p. 50.

nor can the dead ever be brought back to life.

22. Hence the enlightened ruler is heedful, and the
good general full of caution.

l|&, which usually means "to warn," is. here equal to 3ji» . This is a

fc3 y tArf

good instance of how Chinese characters, which stand for ideas, refuse
to be fettered by dictionary-made definitions. The T'u Shu reads ^ Q ,
as in § 16.

This is the way to keep a country at peace and an
army intact.

It is odd that >jfc» jlf should not have the same meaning here as in
III. § i, q. v. This has led me to consider whether it might not be pos-
sible to take the earlier passage thus: "to preserve your own army (country,
regiment, etc.) intact is better than to destroy the enemy's." The two
words do not appear in the Tlung Tien or the Yu Lan. Capt. Calthrop
misses the point by translating: "then is the state secure, and the army
victorious in battle."

1> ^j*^ ' *** v*i. • •'

- . - o; , ;J- « ^.,HT *

XIII.

XIII. THE USE OF SPIES.

is really a vulgar form of |j|j , and floes not appear in, the^ Shuo
In practice, however, it has gradually become a distinct character
with special meanings of its own, and I have therefore followed my
edition of the standard text in retaining this form throughout the chapter.
In VI. §25, on the other hand, the correct form |JJ] will be found.
The evolution of the meaning "spy" is wprth considering for a moment,
provided it be understood that this is very cjoubtful ground, and that any
dogmatism is out of place. The Shuo' W£n defines [Jf] as |5j| (the old
form of jjjj^) "a crack" or "chink," and on the whole we may accept
^ ^g- Hsu Ch'ieh's analysis as not unduly fanciful : -^ Pj ^ ^

^fJB^^Tfeft^liPlifc "At ni§ht' a door is sh"^ if'

when it is shut, the light of the moon is visible, it must come through a
chink" From this it is an easy step to the meaning "space between,"
or simply "between," as for example in the phrase :££ ^jj ffl] §!| "to
act as a secret spy between enemies." Here §ffi is the word which means

K^V

"spy;" but we may suppose that constant association so affected the
original force of |gj , that ^ could at last be dropped altogether, leaving
U|] to stand alone with the same signification. Another possible theory
is that the word may first have come to mean jsjjj "to peep" (see -jf^ jj|| ,
quoted in frang Hsi), which would naturally be suggested by "crack" or
"crevice," and afterwards the man who peeps, or spy.

i. Sun Tzu said: Raising a host of a hundred thousand
men and marching- them great distances entails heavy loss
on the people and a drain on the resources of the State.
The daily expenditure will amount to a thousand ounces
of silver.

Cf. II. §§ i, 13, 14.

There will be commotion at home and abroad, and men
will drop down exhausted on the highways.

J§£ J£ St $& ' which is omitted by the Yti Lan, appears at first sight
to be explained by the words immediately following, so that the obvious
translation would be "(enforced) idleness along the line of march." [Cf.
Too Te Ching, ch. 30: gjfj %, W( & ffl $$ ^fe H "Where tro°Ps
have been quartered, brambles and thorns spring up."] The commentators,
however, say that Jt£ is here equivalent to |g? — a meaning which is
still retained in the phrase ^ Jg^ . Tu Mu refers Jg^ to those who are
engaged in conveying provisions to the army. But this can hardly be
said to emerge clearly from Sun Tzti's text. Chang Yii has the note:
"We may be reminded of the saying : 'On serious ground, gather in plunder'
[XI. § 13]. Why then should carriage and transportation cause exhaustion
on the highways? — The answer is, that not victuals alone, but all sorts
of munitions of war have lo be conveyed to the army. Besides, the in-
junction to 'forage on the enemy' only means that when an army is
deeply engaged in hostile territory, scarcity of food must be provided
against. Hence, without being solely dependent on the enemy for corn,
we must forage in order that there may be an uninterrupted flow of sup-
plies. Then, again, there are places like salt deserts (5j| [^ ^ ^tfa)»
where provisions being unobtainable, supplies from home cannot be
dispensed with."

As many as seven hundred thousand families will be
impeded in their labour.

Mei Yao-ch'en says; |§ J^ ^ 3JR "Men w^ be lacking at the
plough-tail." The allusion is to ^ |jj the system of dividing land into
nine parts, as shown in the character ^ , each consisting of a -^ or
fc|| (about 15 acres), the plot in the centre being cultivated on behalf
of the State by the tenants of the other eight. It was here also, so Tu
Mu tells us, that their cottages were built and a well sunk, to be used
by all in common. [See II. § 12, note.] These groups of eight peasant
proprietors were called |SK • In time of war> one °f tne families had to
serve in the army, while the other seven contributed to its support

( — ' ?? 4& $ -fc ^ ^ 2)' Thus> by a levy °f I00'000 men
(reckoning one able-bodied soldier to each family) the husbandry of
700,000 families would be affected.

2. Hostile armies may face each other for years, striving

I 62

for the victory which is decided in a single day. This
being so, to remain in ignorance of the enemy's condition
simply because one grudges the outlay of a hundred ounces
of silver in honours and emoluments,

"For spies" is of course the meaning, though it would spoil the ettect
of this curiously elaborate exordium if spies were actually mentioned at
this point.

is the height of inhumanity.

Sun Tzti's argument is certainly ingenious. He begins by adverting to
the frightful misery and vast expenditure of blood and treasure which
war always brings in its train. Now, unless you are kept informed of
the enemy's condition, and are ready to strike at the right moment, a
war may drag on for years. The only way to get this information is to
employ spies, and it is impossible to obtain trustworthy spies unless they
are properly paid for their services. But it is surely false economy to
grudge a comparatively trifling amount for this purpose, when every day
that the war lasts eats up an incalculably greater sum. This grievous
burden falls on the shoulders of the poor, and hence Sun Tzu concludes
that to neglect the use of spies is nothing less than a crime against
humanity.

3. One who acts thus is no leader of men, no present
help to his sovereign,

An inferior reading for ^ is fc , thus explained by Mei Yao-ch'en :

no master of victory.

This idea, that the true object of war is peace, has its root in the na-
tional temperament of the Chinese. Even so far back as 597 B.C., these
memorable words were uttered by Prince tj Chuang of the Ch'u State :

Bt 41" ifc "The character for 'prowess' (jj£) is made
up of jj- 'to stay' and ^ 'a spear' (cessation of hostilities). Military
prowess is seen in the repression of cruelty, the calling in of weapons,
the preservation of the appointment of Heaven, the firm establishment of
merit, the bestowal of happiness on the people, putting harmony between
the princes, the diffusion of wealth." [Tso Chuan, *g ^ XII. 3 ad Jin.}

5.
ft BE

e. # Jl* ** A *» « 2 IS *&

4. Thus, what enables the wise sovereign and the good
general to strike and conquer, and achieve things beyond

the reach of ordinary men, is foreknowledge. ^Lfchsinw^

&*^<UsvL*
That is, knowledge of the enemy's dispositions, and what he means to do. (

5 . Now this foreknowledge cannot be elicited from spirits •,

J£t SI JnE "ky Prayers or sacrifices," says Chang Yu. J^ are the
disembodied spirits of men, and jjjjjj supernatural beings or "gods."

it cannot be obtained inductively from experience,

Tu Mu's note makes the meaning clear: ^j|, he says, is the same as
reasoning by analogy; "SaflLJtJRrffiSfc "[know'

ledge of the enemy] cannot be gained by reasoning from other analog-
ous cases."

nor by any deductive calculation.

Li Ch'iian says : ^ -g £g p] ffi $jj[ jj£ /J\ ^ §P "Pf ,|^ ^
1^ J^liA^11W^>S^il^J'tfc "Quantities like

breadth, distance and magnitude, are susceptible of exact mathematical
determination; human actions cannot be so calculated."

6. Knowledge of the enemy's dispositions can only be
obtained from other men.

Mei Yao-ch'en has rather an interesting note: J^ jjjty ^ ff| Iff J^j[

.

ledge of the spirit- world is to be obtained by divination; information in
natural science may be sought by inductive reasoning ; the laws of the
universe can be verified by mathematical calculation : but the dispositions
of an enemy are ascertainable through spies and spies alone."

164

7. Hence the use of spies, of whom there are five
classes: (i) Local spies; (2) inward spies; (3) converted
.spies; (4) doomed spies; (5) surviving spies.

8. When these five kinds of spy are all at work, none
can discover the secret system.

g£ is explained by Tu Mu as 3t ff| fifr ^ ff £ ^ "the way
in which facts leak out and dispositions are revealed."

This is called

'Jjft is the reading of the standard text, but the Tung Tien, Yu Lan
and Tu Shu all have ||} .

"divine manipulation of the threads."

Capt. Calthrop translates jjjjjj ^ "tne Mysterious Thread," but Mei

Yao-ch'en's paraphrase ^j(jj j$ ^ Jjj|jjjj ^j* shows that what is meant is
the control of a number of threads.

It is the sovereign's most precious faculty.

4 Cromwell, one of the greatest and most practical of all cavalry leaders,
had officers styled 'scout masters,' whose business it was to collect all
possible information regarding the enemy, through scouts and spies, etc.,
and much of his success in war was traceable to the previous knowledge
of the enemy's moves thus gained." *

9. Having local spies

^P|5 Rlj ig ^e emended reading of Chia Lin and the Tu Shu for the
unintelligible jjj PJJ , here and in § 7, of the standard text, which never-

theless reads ^|K Rfl in ^ 22.

means employing the services of the inhabitants of a district.

Tu Mu says: "In the enemy's country, win people over by kind treat-
ment, and use them as spies."

* "Aids to Scouting," p. 2.

10. Having inward spies, making use of officials of
the enemy.

^!f includes both civil and military officials. Tu Mu enumerates the
following classes as likely to do good service in this respect: "Worthy
men who have been degraded from office, criminals who have undergone
punishment; also, favourite concubines who are greedy for gold, men
who are aggrieved at being in subordinate positions, or who have been
passed over in the distribution of posts, others who are anxious that their
side should be defeated in order that they may have a chance of displaying
their ability and talents, fickle turncoats who always want to have a foot

in each boat (jjj$ g ^ §£ ^ ^ pg ^ £ & % )• Officials
of these several kinds," he continues, "should be secretly approached and
bound to one's interests by means of rich presents. In this way you will
be able to find out the state of affairs in the enemy's country, ascertain
the plans that are being formed against you, and moreover disturb the
harmony and create a breach between the sovereign and his ministers."
The necessity for extreme caution, however, in dealing with "inward
spies," appears from an historical incident related by Ho Shih: "j|S l8f
Lo Shang, Governor of ^ ^| I-chou, sent his general [^ >f£j Wei Po

to attack the rebel ^ $j| Li Hsiung of -§J Shu in his stronghold at
fjiJJ P'i. After each side had experienced a number of victories and
defeats, Li Hsiung had recourse to the services of a certain ^\ •jfig P'o-
t'ai, a native of jj£ ^ Wu-tu. He began by having him whipped until
the blood came, and then sent him off to Lo Shang, whom he was to
delude by offering to co-operate with him from inside the city, and to
give a fire signal at the right moment for making a general assault. Lo
Shang, confiding in these promises, marched out all his best troops, and
placed Wei Po and others at their head with orders to attack at P'o-t'ai's

bidding. Meanwhile, Li Hsiung's general, ^ ^ Li Hsiang, had prepared

an ambuscade on their line of march; and P'o-t'ai, having reared long
scaling-ladders against the city walls, now lighted the beacon-fire. Wei
Po's men raced up on seeing the signal and [began climbing the ladders
as fast as they could, while others were drawn up by ropes lowered from
above. More than a hundred of Lo Shang's soldiers entered the city in
this way, every one of whom was forthwith beheaded. Li Hsiung then
charged with all his forces, both inside and outside the city, and routed
the enemy completely." [This happened in 303 A.D. I do not know
where Ho Shih got the story from. It is not given in the biography of
Li Hsiung or that of his father 'Li T'e, Chin Shu, ch. 120, 121.]

1 66

ir. Having converted spies, getting hold of the enemy's
spies and using them for our own purposes.

By means of heavy bribes and liberal promises detaching them from
the enemy's service, and inducing them to carry back false information
as well as to spy in turn on their own countrymen. Thus Tu Yu:

On the other hand>

JJ£ gjj? Hsiao Shih-hsien in denning the ^ ^j] says that we pretend
not to have detected him, but contrive to let him carry away a false
impression of what is going on ( j|£ $J \ %£ fj| ^ J£ f^ ^ £fl
B5 7T* i5>l Ift ^ )• Several of the commentators accept this as an
alternative definition ; but that it is not what Sun Tzu meant is conclusively
proved by his subsequent remarks about treating the converted spy generously
(§21 sqg.\ Ho Shih notes three occasions on which converted spies were
used with conspicuous success : i) by T'ien Tan in his defence of Chi-
mo (see supra, p. 90); 2) by Chao She on his march to O-yii (see p. 57);

and by the wily ^jj $|| Fan Chii in 260 B.C., when Lien P'o was con-

ducting a defensive campaign against Ch'in. The King of Chao strongly
disapproved of Lien P'o's cautious and dilatory methods, which had been
unable to avert a series of minor disasters, and therefore lent a ready
ear to the reports of his spies, who had secretly gone over to the enemy
and were already in Fan Chii's pay. They said: "The only thing which

causes Ch'in anxiety is lest jjjjj^ j^ Chao Kua should be made general.

Lien P'o they consider an easy opponent, who is sure to be vanquished
in the long run." Now this Chao Kua was a son of the famous Chao
She. From his boyhood, he had been wholly engrossed in the study of
war and military matters, until at last he came to believe that there was
no commander in the whole Empire who could stand against him. His
father was much disquieted by this overweening conceit, and the flippancy
with which he spoke of such a serious thing as war, and solemnly declared
that if ever Kua was appointed general, he would bring ruin on the armies
of Chao, This was the man who, in spite of earnest protests from his
own mother and the veteran statesman j||j ^ig $ff Lin Hsiang-ju, was
now sent to succeed Lien P'o. Needless to say, he proved no match for
the redoubtable Po Ch'i and the great military power of Ch'in. He fell
into a trap by which his army was divided into two and his communi-
cations cut; and after a desperate resistance lasting 46 days, during which
the famished soldiers devoured one another, he was himself killed by an
arrow, and his whole force, amounting, it is said, to 400,000 men, ruthlessly
put to the sword. [See ^ j^ |g ^ ^ g|, ch. 19, ff. 48—50].

i67

a *

12. Having doomed spies, doing certain things openly
for purposes of deception, and allowing our own spies to
know of them and report them to the enemy.

^ is Li Ch'iian's conjecture for 3£ , which is found in the T'ung Tien
and the Yu Lan. The Tlu S/iu, unsupported by any good authority,
adds ffl -fy after &£. In that case, the doomed spies would be those
of the enemy, to whom our own spies had conveyed false information.
But this is unnecessarily complicated. Tu Yu gives the best exposition
of the meaning: "We ostentatiously do things calculated to deceive our
own spies, who must be led to believe that they have been unwittingly
disclosed. Then, when these spies are captured in the enemy's lines, they
will make an entirely false report, and the enemy will take measures ac-
cordingly, only to find that we do something quite different. The spies
will thereupon be put to death." Capt. Calthrop makes a hopeless muddle
of the sentence. As an example of doomed spies, Ho Shih mentions the
prisoners released by Pan Ch'ao in his campaign against Yarkand. (See
p. 132.) He also refers to ^ ^ T'ang Chien, who in 630 A.D. was
sent by T'ai Tsung to lull the Turkish Khan §| TJcjJ Chieh-li into fancied
security, until Li Ching was able to deliver a crushing blow against him.
Chang Yu says that the Turks revenged themselves by killing T'ang Chien,
but this is a mistake, for we read in both the Old and the New T'ang
History (ch. 58, fol. 2 and ch. 89, fol. 8 respectively) that he escaped and
lived on until 656. J|$ ^ l|t Li I-chi* played a somewhat similar
part in 203 B.C., when sent by the King of Han to open peaceful negoti-
ations with Ch'i. He has certainly more claim to be described as a ^ Rjj ;
for the King of Ch'i, being subsequently attacked without warning by
Han Hsin, and infuriated by what he considered the treachery of Li I-chi,
ordered the unfortunate envoy to be boiled alive.

13. Surviving spies, finally, are those who bring back
news from the enemy's camp.

This is the ordinary class of spies, properly so called, forming a regular
part of the army. Tu Mu says: ^ Rjj ^ fa ^( jXj tyj #\> ^

jib £ "Your surviving spy must be a man of keen intellect, though
* Cfrien Han Shu, ch. 43, fol. i. ^ gj|j "jjf Yen Shih-ku in loc. says: j£

1 68

in outward appearance a fool; of shabby exterior, but with a will of iron.
He must be active, robust, endowed with physical strength and courage;
thoroughly accustomed to all sorts of dirty work, able to endure hunger
and cold, and to put up with shame and ignominy." Ho Shih tells the fol-
lowing story of ^ ^| jj£ Ta-hsi Wu of the Sui dynasty : "When he was
governor of Eastern Ch'in, jjj||j jj£ Shen-wu of Ch'i made a hostile
movement upon ffi ~fifa Sha-yuan. The Emperor T'ai Tsu [? Kao Tsu]
sent Ta-hsi Wu to spy upon the enemy. He was accompained by two
other men. All three were on horseback and wore the enemy's uniform.
When it was dark, they dismounted a few hundred feet away from the
enemy's camp and stealthily crept up to listen, until they succeeded in
catching the passwords used by the army. Then they got on their horses
again and boldly passed through the camp under the guise of night-
watchmen ( 30& ^ ^ ) ; and more than once, happening to come across
a soldier who was committing some breach of discipline, they actually
stopped to give the culprit a sound cudgelling ! Thus they managed to
return with the fullest possible information about the enemy's dispositions,
and received warm commendation from the Emperor, who in consequence
of their report was able to inflict a severe defeat on his adversary." With
the above classification it is interesting to compare the remarks of Frederick
the Great:* "Es giebt vielerley Sorten von Spions: i. Geringe Leute,
welche sich von diesem Handwerk meliren. 2. Doppelte Spions. 3. Spions
von Consequenz, und endlich 4. Diejenigen, welche man zu diesem
unglucklichen Hankwerk zwinget." This of course is a bad cross-division.
The first class ("Biirgersleute, Bauern, Priesters, etc.") corresponds roughly
to Sun Tzu's "local spies," and the third to "inward spies." Of "Doppelte
Spions" it is broadly stated that they are employed "um dem Feinde
falsche Nachrichten aufzubinden." Thus they would include both con-
verted and doomed spies. Frederick's last class of spies does not appear
in Sun Tzu's list, perhaps because the risk in using them is too great.

14. Hence it is that with none in the whole army are
more intimate relations to be maintained than with spies.

The original text and the T'u Shu have |Jj in place of the first ^ .
Tu Mu and Mei Yao-ch'en point out that the spy is privileged to enter
even the general's private sleeping-tent. Capt. Calthrop has an inaccurate
translation: "In connection with the armies, spies should be treated with
the greatest kindness."

"Umerricht des Konigs von Preussen an die Generate seiner Armeen," cap. 12
(edition of 1794).

169

None should be more liberally rewarded.

Frederick concludes his chapter on spies with the words: "Zu allem
diesem fiige ich noch hinzu, dass man in Bezahlung der Spions freygebig,
ja verschwenderisch seyn muss. Ein Mench, der um cures Dienstes halber
den Strick waget, verdienet dafiir belohnet zti werden."

In no other business should greater secrecy be preserved.
Tu Mu gives a graphic touch : {f| p ^ Jf ^ , that is to say, all

communications with spies should be carried on "mouth-to-ear." Capt.
Calthrop has: "All matters relating to spies are secret," which is distinctly
feeble. An interior reading for t&& is ;gp . The following remarks on
spies may be quoted from Turenne, who made perhaps larger use of them
than any previous commander: "Spies are attached to those who give
them most, he who pays them ill is never served. They should never be
known to anybody; nor should they know one another. When they
propose anything very material, secure their persons, or have in your
possession their wives and children as hostages for their fidelity. Never
communicate anything to them but what it is absolutely necessary that
they should know." *

15. Spies cannot be usefully employed
This is the nuance of Tu Yu's paraphrase ^
without a certain intuitive sagacity.

Mei Yao-ch'en says: & £ ft ft $ £ ^ j£ g|J fa $

"In order to use them, one must know fact from falsehood, and be able
to discriminate between honesty and double-dealing." Wang Hsi takes
Bg and ^ separately, denning the former as j|| jfjj ^Q ^ "intuitive
perception" and the latter as HH "fc^ jif. "practical intelligence." Tu

• • •

Mu strangely refers these attributes to the spies themselves : -yfa j|f ^Jj

HiZ&M^^^B&vlftZ "Before usi"g si>ies we

must assure ourselves as to their integrity of character and the extent of
their experience and skill." But he continues: J|[ ^ '$? '|f| |J^ ^
Uj JH ^ IE A ^ Hi 9& "A brazen face and a crafty disposition
are more dangerous than mountains or rivers; it takes a man of genius
to penetrate such." So that we are left in some doubt as to his real
opinion on the passage.

* "Marshal Turenne," p. 311.

i/o

17..

is. ftft * ft* ft 7 )B B ft

1 6. They cannot be properly managed without bene-
volence and straightforwardness.

Chang Yii says that ^ means "not grudging them honours and pay;"
^g , "showing no distrust of their honesty." "When you have attracted
them by substantial offers, you must treat them with absolute sincerity;
then they will work for you with all their might."

17. Without subtle ingenuity of mind, one cannot make
certain of the truth of their reports.

Mei Yao-ch'en says: "Be on your guard against the possibility of spies
going over to the service of the enemy." The Tlung Tien and Yu Lan
read gj& for ^?,

1 8. Be subtle! be subtle!

Cf. VI. § 9: fjfjj; 5p. ;j|£ 3J1. Capt. Calthrop translates: "Wonderful
indeed is the power of spies."

and use your spies for every kind of business.

19. If a secret piece of news is divulged by a spy
before the time is ripe, he must be put to death together
with the man to whom the secret was told.

The Chinese here is so concise and elliptical that some expansion is
necessary for the proper understanding of it. ^ ijjf. denotes important
information about the enemy obtained from a surviving spy. The sub-
ject of -jff ^, however, is not this information itself, but the secret
stratagem built up on the strength of it. ^ ^ means "is heard" —
by anybody else. Thus, word for word, we get: "If spy matters are
heard before [our plans] are carried out," etc. Capt. Calthrop, in trans-
lating ^ Jjjl ffi &f ^ "the spy who told the matter, and the man
who repeated the same," may appeal to the authority of the commen-
tators; but he surely misses the main point of Sun Tzu's injunction.
For, whereas you kill the spy himself S& J^ jfjjf- "as a punishment for
letting out the secret," the object of killing the other man is only, as
Ch'en Hao puts it, J£J p "to stop his mouth" and prevent the

20.

9 it •& ft it £

news leaking any further. If it had already been repeated to others, this
object would not be gained. Either way, Sun Tzu lays himself open to
the charge of inhumanity, though Tu Mu tries to defend him by saying
that the man deserves to be put to death, for the spy would certainly
not have told the secret unless the other had been at pains to worm
it out of him. The T'ung Tien and Yii Lan have the reading . . .

•4r ^ it fM ^ fi , etc., which, while not affecting the sense, strikes
me as being better than that of the standard text. The Tu Shu has ...

|^j ffi ffi -§• ^ , which I suppose would mean : "the man who heard
the secret and the man who told it to him."

20. Whether the object be to crush an army, to storm
a city, or_ to assassinate an individual, it is always neces-
sary to begin by finding out the names of the attendants,

-fc ~jb+ is a comprehensive term for those who wait on others, ser-
vants and retainers generally. Capt. Calthrop is hardly happy in rendering
it "right-hand men."

the aides-de-camp,

IfJI =f£ , literally "visitors," is equivalent, as Tu Yu says, to :j: ^
]j! ^j£ "those whose duty it is to keep the general supplied with infor-
mation," which naturally necessitates frequent interviews with him. Chang
Yii goes too far afield for an explanation in saying that they are J& ^pf
?Sr ^ s$° "tne lea(^ers of mercenary troops.".
the door-keepers and sentries

HfJII and <?& £ A-
of the general in command.

TJ* $$> according to Chang Yu, is simply ^f* ^ Q ffiJc ^ $£

• "a general on active service." Capt. Calthrop is wrong, I think, in making
£j* $£ directly dependent on ^ ^g (. . . "the names of the general
in charge," etc.).
Our spies must be commissioned to ascertain these.

As the first step, no doubt, towards finding out if any of these important
functionaries can be won over by bribery. Capt. Calthrop blunders badly
with: "Then set the spies to watch them."

172

22.

24. ;

21. The enemy's spies who have come to spy on us
must be sought out,

jj£\ ^^ is omitted by the Tlung Tien and Yii Lan. Its recurrence is
certainly suspicious, though the sense may seem to gain by it. The Tlu
Shu has this variation: ... " etc.

tempted with bribes, led away and comfortably housed.

^ is probably more than merely Jj| j£ or ;3p|| ^ "detain." Cf. §25
ad fin., where Sun Tzu insists that these converted spies shall be treated
well. Chang Yii's paraphrase is Bg -^g- .

Thus they will become converted spies and available for
cur service.

22. It is through the information brought by the con-
verted spy that we are able to acquire and employ local
and inward spies.

Tu Yu expands @ Jf [ft ft £ into @ ^ gjjr f^ fffi ^J

]^ jp| "through conversion of the enemy's spies we learn the enemy's
condition." And Chang Yii says: ^% & %. ffl %H $.M X Z,

^ *fl * W A 2 # SK * if ffij ® £ "We must templ the

converted spy into our service, because it is he that knows which of the
local inhabitants are greedy of gain, and which of the officials are open
to corruption." In the Fung Tien, ^Jj has been altered to |g| , doubtless
for the sake of uniformity with § 9.

23. It is owing to his information, again, that we can
cause the doomed spy to carry false tidings to the enemy.

"Because the converted spy knows how the enemy can best be deceived"
(Chang Yu). The T'ung Tien text, followed by the Yu Lan, has here
the obviously interpolated sentence ^ ^ "Sf ^ fffl ^ -^ .

24. Lastly, it is by his information that the surviving
spy can be used on appointed occasions.

Capt. Calthrop omits this sentence.

>73
25.

25. The end and aim of spying in all its five varieties
is knowledge of the enemy,

I have ventured to differ in this place from those commentators — Tu
Yu and Chang Yu — who understand ij: as ^ :jr, and make 3^
^jj ^ Iff, the antecedent of £ (the others ignoring the point altogether).
It is plausible enough that Sun Tzu should require the ruler to be familiar
with the methods of spying (though one would rather expect iteC "general"
in place of £JT). But this involves taking ^JJ ^ here in quite a dif-
ferent way from the ^Jfl ^ immediately following, as also from those

in the previous sentences. ^ there refers vaguely to the enemy or the
enemy's condition, and in order to retain the same meaning here, I make
ij: a verb, governed by 3L R!j £ iff- Cf. XI. § 19, where IJT is
used in exactly the same manner. The sole objection that I can see in
the way of this interpretation is the fact that the 7fa ^f] , or fourth
variety of spy, does not add to our knowledge of the enemy, but only
misinforms the enemy about us. This would be, however, but a trivial
oversight on Sun Tzti's part, inasmuch as the "doomed spy" is in the
strictest sense not to be reckoned as a spy at all. Capt. Calthrop, it is
hardly necessary to remark, slurs over the whole difficulty.

and this knowledge can only be derived, in the first in-
stance, from the converted spy.

As explained in §§ 22 — 24. He not only brings information himself,
but makes it possible to use the other kinds of spy to advantage.

Hence it is essential that the converted spy be treated
with the utmost liberality.

26. Of old, the rise of the Yin dynasty

Sun Tztt means the j§j Shang dynasty, founded in 1766 B.C. Its
•name was changed to Yin by j^ J^f P'an Keng in 1401.

was due to I Chih

Better known as ^ ^ I Yin, the famous general and statesman
who took part in Ch'eng T'ang's campaign against |j| ^ Chieh Kuei.

,

174

27.

who had served under the Hsia. Likewise, the rise of
the Chou dynasty was due to Lii Ya

S IpJ Lu Shang, whose "style" was -^ ^f, rose to high office
under the tyrant &J- rfe Chou Hsin, whom he afterwards helped to over-
throw. Popularly known as ^ ^ , a title bestowed on him by Wen
Wang, he is said to have composed a treatise on war, erroneously identi-
fied with the -fc Ipg .

who had served under the Yin.

There is less precision in the Chinese than I have thought it well to
introduce into my translation, and the commentaries on the passage are
by no means explicit. But, having regard to the context, we can hardly
doubt that Sun Tzu is holding up I Chih and Lii Ya as illustrious examples
of the converted spy, or something closely analogous. His suggestion is,
that the Hsia and Yin dynasties were upset owing to the intimate know-
ledge of their weaknesses and shortcomings which these former ministers
were able to impart to the other side. Mei Yao-ch'en appears to reseat
any such aspersion on these historic names: "I Yin and Lii Ya," he
says, "were not rebels against the Government ( ife ^ ~jfe [|| -{^ ).
Hsia could not employ the former, hence Yin employed him. Yin could
not employ the latter, hence Chou employed him. Their great achieve-
ments were all for the good of the people." Ho Shih is also indignant:

"How snould two divinely inspired men
such as I and Lu have acted as common spies? Sun Tzu's mention of
them simply means that the proper use of the five classes of spies is a
matter which requires men of the highest mental calibre like I and Lu,
whose wisdom and capacity qualified them for the task. The above
words only emphasise this point." Ho Shih believes then that the two
heroes are mentioned on account of their supposed skill in the use of
spies. But this is very weak, as it leaves totally unexplained the significant
words ^g jj and ^ jj*£ . Capt. Calthrop speaks, rather strangely, of
"the province of Yin . . . the country of Hsia . . . the State of Chu . . .
the people of Shang."

27. Hence it is only the enlightened ruler and the wise
general who will use the highest intelligence of the army
for purposes of spying,

Ch'en Hao compares § 15 : ^ || Jj* jfi |£ ^ pjj . He points

out that ^ jit ;£ H ffr § 3lt $ "the god-like wisdom of Ch'eng
T'ang and Wu Wang led them to employ I Yin and Lii Shang." The
T'u Shu omits ^ .

and thereby they achieve great results.

Tu Mu closes with a note of warning: ^ ^fC ffi J£J j|| ^ -jfj-

* W 0 ^K rfii 1 & ^ Rg #f K il ^c HJ * W H RB

pjj /|ij| ^ ^" "Just as water, which carries a boat from bank to bank,
may also be the means of sinking it, so reliance on spies, while produc-
tive of great results, is oft-times the cause of utter destruction."

Spies are a most important element in war, because on
them depends an army's ability to move. ^ r

The antecedent to |H/ must be either Rfl 5& or ffl Rfl 4£ understood

**- w I w V PI / I -9 I M V M

from the whole sentence. Chia Lin says that an army without spies is
like a man without ears or eyes.

CHINESE CONCORDANCE

[PROPER NAMES ARE INDICATED

Ai

^ VIII. 12; X. 25, 26; XL

cheng

18, 66; XIII. 2.

,,

gg X. 21.

„

an

^ II. 20; V. 22; VI. 4;

XII. 22.

,,

Cha

ftfc VII. 15.

ch'eng

ch'a

H? L 2; VIII. 14; IX. 39;

,,

X. 13, 20; XL 41.

chan

jgfe passim.

~T>N •*

,,

fg XL 28.

,,

chang

f^ IX. 21.

"

n

ft IX. 29.

„

chi

ch'ang

^ VI. 32, 34; X. 18; XL

29.*

»

ft VI. 34.

•**^»

,,

»

if V' 9-

chao

j|f} VII. 28.

„

die

^H" passim.

,,

„

#r v. i3; XL 63.

,,

chen

^ XII. 4.*

,?

ch'en

Hi VII. 32; IX. 25,27; X.i8.

„

,,

JO. ix. 23.

,5

cheng

^ III. 7; VII. 3, 5,6,7,9,

10, 22; VIII. 3; XI. i,

4, n, 47, w, XIII. 2.

V. 3, 5,10, ii ; VII. 32;

XL 35.
III. 3, 14; IV. 16; VII.

23; XL 32, 56, 63.
XL 1 8.

III. 4; XL 62; XIII. 4, 27.

II. 2; III. 3, 4, 5, 6;
VIII. 3; XL 7, 55;

XIII. 20.

ff|2 II. 4, 17; XL 19.

7pP| IV. 17, 18, 19.

ff I. 3, 12, 15,16; VI. 22;

VII. 4, 22; X. 21;
XL 22.

2fc VI. 10; VII. 6; XI. 15,
19, 68.

$k IX- 3°-
i? n. "•

£, III. 18; IV. 2; VI. 18;

X. 31; XI. 55-
|£ XIII. 8.

II II. 15-

lj£ VI. 15,30; VII. 29,32;

VIII. 3; IX. 4; X. 7,
15,19, 27, 28,29; XL
9, 29; XIII. 20.

chi

ch'i

chia

IX. 7, 15; XL 65.
VI. 25; XII. 8.
IX. 32; XL 16.

177

chia

chiang

III. 16; VIL 25.

V, 12, 13; VII. I7; IX.
12; XL 10.

V. 15; XI. 38.

VI. 4; VIL 31; IX. 29.

IV. 20; VIL ii ; XL 22;
XII. i.

XII. 4.*

IX. 4; XL 30.

XL 49-
_ passim.
I IX. 2 7; XL 38, 66; XIII. 24.

" II. 17; VIL 23, 24, 26,

32; IX. 33.
IIL 4.

IL i.

II. 4; IX. 22; XII. 3, 4;

XIII. 8.
IIL n; IX. 15.

IX. 43; XL 16, 32.
II. 13; XIII. i.

V. 3, 5, 6> I0> n.

IV. 20; X. 25.

VII. 27, 28, 29; XL 22.

I. 25; II. 13, i4,2o;XIII. i.
^ II. i, 14; VIL 7.
1j(\ V. 4; XL 54, 55-

ch'iang

chiao

ch'iao

chieh

ch'ieh

H IX ^

XT v. 6.

?I V. 17, 18.

^' XL 18,46, 47, 48, 49, 50.

^4L4, 9, ii, i3, i5; IL

15, 20; IIL 5, 11,17;

VII. i, 7, 9, 27; VIII.

!» 4, 5, I2, 13, I4J

IX. 33; X. 13, 14,
17, 18, 19, 20, 21;
XL 35, 40, 61; XII.

16, 18, 22; XIII. 3,
4, 20, 27.

3? IX' '7-

3Jg I.i3,2i;II.i8; III.n;

IX. 24; X. 16, 19;

XII. 13.
3g IH.3; VII. 2, 12; VIII.

2; IX. 8; XL i, 5,

12,28,48,52,54,55.
^ L 3, 12.
^ IX. 44; X. 18.
J|| I. 22; X. 26.

W n- «•

X^ II. 5; XL 62.

tl IX' 23«

Jg IL ii, I2; V. 6.

•||> VI. 275X1.33; XIII. 19.
?S XL X9> 25-

n vm- iz-

|f| V. 13, 14, 15.

^ VI11- 9-

^ XL 48.

JL HI. 16; XL 23.

12

ch'ieh
chien

V. 17, !8; VII. 25.

ch'ien

chih

sim.

VII. 7.
IX. 17.
III. 10.

IX. n; XL 15,
XL 67.

I. 26; IV. 8, 10 ; VII. 23;

IX. 31.

II. i; IV. 20; V. 23; VI.
6, 19; XL 6i;XlII. i.

XL 42, 44.

VI. 17, 20; IX. 9; XL

15, 45-
passim.

I. 91 II. 4, 15; IV. 12;

VIII. 7; XIII. 15,27.
passim.

[= =g] VI. 12; XL 39.

V. 22; XL ii, 17; XII.
8, n, 19.

X. i, 6, 7.

VIL 3, 4, 22.

I. 7, 10, 17: VI. 27, 31;

X. 21.
XL 46.

XIII. 26.*

V. i, 17, !8; VII. 29, 30,
31, 32; VIII. 6; X.26;
XL 35-

III. 16; V. 12, 13; VI.
3, 9* 25; VII, 4, 8, 9,

chih

chin

ch'in

ching

ch'ing

10; IX. 14, 37; X. 13,
20; XL 6, 26, 29;

XIII. 2.

Ifc VI. 2; XII. 18.
S^ II. i.
jf IX. 7, 8.

I. 8, 19; II. n; VI. 20;
VIL 31; IX. 15, 16,
18; X. 21.

III. 13; VI. 10; VIL 25;

IX. 19, 24, 28, 31,40;

X. 24; XL 49-

II. 7; XL 23.

II. i; VIL 23, 24; XIII.
i, 2.

IX. 17, 39; XL 22, 48.
XL 26.
XL 28.

I. 23; IX. 42; XL 25;
XIII. 14.

III. 10 ; VII. 7; IX. 41.

VIL 18.

V. 22; VI. 23; VIL 30;
IX. 18; XL 35; XII. 7.

II. 17: VII. 23, 24, 26;
IX. 33-

IX. 15, 17.

VII. 8.

I. 3-
IX- 37-

XII. 22.

XL 43-

I. 3, 12; XL 19, 41, 51;

XIII. 2, 6.
IX. 26.

ch'ing $| IX. 25; XI. i, 3, u,

44, 46.
chio ^ VI. 24.

g XIII. 2.

chiu ;/(, IV. 7; VIII. 4, 5, 6;

XL 41.
^ II. 2, 3, 5, 6, 19; III.

6; IX. 39; XII. ii.
$fc VI. n, 20; XI. 15, 30.

Ch'ill ^ IV. 15; V. 21 ; X. 24;

XI. 25.

„ jfc U. 12, 14.

£fl VII. 33; IX. 13.
|K IV. 10.
chiung jjlf IX. 36.

ch'iung1|| V. 6, 10, n; VI. 28;

VII. 36; IX. 34; X. 30.
cho ffl II. 5.

chou |J! VII. 26, 28; XII. n.
-^ XI. 30, 39.
Jg III. n: XIII. 26.*

g II. U.

chu 3: I. 10, 13; II. 20; X. 23,
24; XI. 19, 20; XII.
16, 18; XIII. 3, 25.
H II. 4; HI. 16; VII. 1 2;

VIII. 10; XL 2, 6,
28,* 38, 52.

^ IX. 45-

|jf/ IX. 13; X. 21.

I3c XL 64.

H XL 6, 46.

ch'u ^3 VI. 1,24,30; VII. 7;

IX. i, 2, 6, 8, 9, 12,
13; XL 68.

ch'u

JlplX. '7-

chuan

,,

ft I. 24; V. 6; VI. 5;
IX- 25; X. 5, 6, 7;
XIII. i, 4.
^ VI. 13, i4; VII. 25;

XL 20, 42.

-^ V. 22, 23.

ch'uan

^ L 25; XIII. 12.

chui

a vi. 10.

chun

n ix- 35.

chung

j^J passim.

,,

g VII. 6, u; IX. 33; XL

i, 7, 13, 44, 49-

,,

M n- is-

»

$? V. 6.

5,

p£ II. 13; IX. 8; XL 29.-

ch'ung

tif vi. 10.

chii

,,
„

Jg IX. 20, 25; X. 3,8,9,
10, n; XL 37.
^ II. i; IV. 10 ; VII. 6;
X. 30; XL 63.
JP< VIL2;VIILi;XL4o,54.

,,

ffi II. i, 14, 17; IX. 23, 25.

,,

_P_. III. 4; XII. 2.

,,

^ X. 25; XL 29; XIII. 8.

„

{ft VII. 13; XL 8, 52.

,,

TP XL 68.

,,

•fg III. 4.

»

^pj XL 24.

,,
ch'u

ti XL 24.
^ I. 15; II. 13, 14; IX. 7,
15, 39; X. 7, n; XL

26, 38, 43.

I 80

ch'ii

chiian

ch'uan

chueh

ch'iieh
chiin

ch'iin
Erh

erh

Fa

I. 20; II. 9, 16; V. 19;
VI. 7, 33; IX. 40, 43.
XII. 15; XIII. 5, 6.

II. 2, 4, 13; III. 2, 6;
VIII. io; XL 41.

VI. i, 5, 29, 30; VII.
7; VIII. ro; XL 47-

IX. 24; XL 39-

VIII. 2; XL j, 6, 12,
43, 48.

I. io.

VII. 7.

IX. 33-

III. i, 7; IV. 7;X.3i;
XII. 22.

I. 17; HI. 15; VII. 21 ;
XL 55-

VIII. 2; IX, i, 3, 4, 7,
15; XL 22, 43; XII. 14.

IV. 20; XL 67.

VII. 9.

VII. 36; XL 50.

III. 1 2, 17; VII i;VIII.
i, 3; XII. 22; XIII.

4, 8, 27.
passim.

X. 12, 15.

XL 39-

H I. 4; II. 15; IV. 17;

VII. io ; XII. I.
^f IV. io ; VII. 24, 26;

XL 36.
ft X. 25.
ffl} passim.

I. 4, io, 13; II. i; III.
i, 45 7,8; IV. 16,17;

Fa

55

fan

fang

55

fei

fen

fou

f«

VII. i, 8, 9, 22, 25,
33, 37; VIII. i, n;
XL i, 56.
V. 15; VII. 4; XL 28,38;

XII. 35 6, 7, 9, io;

XIII. 19.

I. 13; IX. 36, 42.
III. 3; XL 54.

XIII. 7, IT, 13, 21, 25.

*» IX. 34; X. 4, 5-

isstm.

XL 56, 57.

VIII. 12.

V. 22; XL 31.

IX. 13.

II. i, 13, 14; XII. 15;
XIII. i.

III. 2, 6; IV. 8, 9; IX. 40;
X. 14; XL 27, 53; XII.
17; XIII. 3, 15, 16, 17.

III. 5, 8; V. i; VI. 13, 14,

VII. io, 16, 20.
III. 5; VIII. 12.
V. 16.
XL 39.
III. 4.
VII. 17; XL 30; XII. 4,

IO, II.

II. i; XIII. i.

X. 19.
IX. 34-
IX. 22.
XL 63.

|^ III. 5; IX. 5,42.

fu

Hai

ban
hao
heng
ho

hou

hsi

passim.
XL 15.
V. 6; VI. 28; XII. 20,21.

VIII. 14; IX. 17.

IX. 17, 22.

I. 14, 26; III. 18.

IX. 42, 44; X. 17.
XL 39-

X. 25.

III. ii.

II. 7; VI. 3; VIII. 7, 9,
10; XL 57, 59.

I. 7.

IV. 10.
X. 18. .

V. 5; VII. 2, 16; VIII.
i, 2; IX. 39; X. 19,
24; XL 12, 16, 17, 54;
XII. 19.

XL 65.

XL 18.

^P VII. 2; IX. 26.

J|f X. 26; XIII 14, 25.

^ II. 4; HI- 16; VII. 12;
VIII. 10; XI. 2, 6, 52.
^ passim.
=g^ IV. i; XIII. 26.
HI IX. ii ; XII. 20.
^ VI. 21.

^ IX' 35-
,t IX. 38.
m XL 34.

hsia

hsia
hsiang

hsiao
hsieh

hsien

hsien
hsin

»
hsing

HI- 3, 7, i7; IV. 7,
9; VI. 29; IX. ii ; XL
6, 15, 55; XII. 10.

XIJI. 26.* r

I. 8.

'..V. 1 1; VII.- 13; IX. 39,
45; XL 1 5, 30; XIII. 2.

VII. 14, 20; XL 52;
XIII. 7, 9, 22. :?>:;[
|6J VII. 33; XI. 61.
~ VI. 29; XIII. 5.

XL 26.

XL 60.

III. 10; IX. 17.

III. 4.

IX. 22.

IX. 38.

passim.

I. 8; V. 14; VII. 13;
IX. 17, 18; X. i, 10,
21 ; XL 8, 40, 52.
£. 15; X. 14, 16; XL

IX. 15

24, 58> 59
XIII. 4, 27.
I. 9; IX. 45; XL 25.
VII. 27, 30.

i. 13; v. 22; vi. 6, 29,

34; VII. 7, 13; IX.

42, 445 XL 8,13,52;

XIL 2.
J|J passim.
Jgl XIL 18; XIII, i, 26.

V. 22.

182

hsing
hsiu

hsiung
hsii

hsiian

hsiin
hu

hua

5)

huan

huang

»
hui

hun
huo

II. 10, II, 13; XIII. I, 20.

III. 4; IV. 6; XL 25;
XII. 15, 16.

IX. 38.

|XJ xii. 15.

II. 13; V. 4; VI. 10;

IX. 32.
VII. 17; IX. 35.

ft XII. 4-

VII. 21; IX. 34; XL 56.

X. 19.

V. ii.

I. 26; VI. 9; XL 30.
IX. 32.
XL 68.

VI. 33-

VI. 12.

VII. 30.

VII. 3; VIII. 9.

III. 12;

V. ii.
IX. 10.*
IX. 17.

III. 6; V. 13.

XL 55-

VI. 19.
V. 1 6.

II. 4, 16; XL 27.

III. 14, 16.
f§ XL 50.

— • passim.

a ii. i7; in. 4; iv. i3

IX. 40, 42; XL 24, 34, 51.
^j I. 8; IV. ii; IX. 9, 20,

41; XL 37.

|f; I. 5, 24; VI. 5; XL 60.
;g£ II. 18; VI. 21 ; IX. 24, 40.

$ft IV. 19-

|J III. 15, 16; IX. 21; XL 26.

fft I. 23; VI. i, 4; VII. 31.

^ II. 8, 12; VIII. 10.

^ VI. 21 ; XL 4.

$C IX. i, 8.

^ IX. 29

ffi XIII. 26.*

el XL 7.

gg XL 28.
H XL 63.
lH XIII. 16.

ift III. 5.

ff XII. 4.*

J[/j[ passim.

^ passim.

^ II. i; XL 29, 30, 58, 59.

IS IX. 33-

m XL 21.

Jl passim.

„ fr i. 9; xiii. 2, 16.

„ fff; III. 15; V. 21, 22j X. 13, 20.

„ ^ IV. 20; V. 23.

jih 0 II. i; IV. 10; V. 6; VI. 19.
20, 34; VII. 7; XL 28,
63; XII. 3, 4; XIII. i, 2.

Jan
jao

»

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jo

%> III. 9; IV. 19, 20; IX. 8;

ku

U VII. 23, 24, 26.

X. 5, 9, ii ; XL 18, 32,

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Jfi XII. i.

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34, 39, 56-
|$ III. ii; V. 17, 18; X. 16,

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^ III. 17; V.i, 2; VI. 14,

18, 19.

15, 16, 17, 18; XL

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|* I. 10; XIII. 10.

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7V IX. 35; XL passim.

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»

jj(U V passim; VII. 17, 18, 19;

21 I. 26- V 8

X. 25, 26: XL 29, 30,

,,

ftj/£ " »

38, 68; XIII. 24.

kuang

R i. «; IX. a3.

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|j£ II. 2, 4; VII. 28, 29, 34;

k'uang

yfl^ I. 26; VI. 20.

IX. 23.

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sff X.IL 12, 2-?.

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HI XL 65, 68.

|W-L ' «5*

kan

tfc XL 18, 30.

kuei

jjf VII. 28, 29, 35; XL 9.

»

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4 XIII 5.

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kang

g|l XL 33.

.*"%

^

^11 XL 28.*

kao

|gj VI. ii, 29; VII. 33; IX.

-**vJ

2, 6, 9, ii, 23: X. 3,

„

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10 ; XL 38.

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^t II. i; XL 37.

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5,

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„

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„

ffj passim.

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^ IX. 32.

kou

^ VI. II.

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g| I. i; II. 3, 6, 9, 10,20;

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*g VII. 36; IX. 34.

III. i, 6, ii ; X. 24;

ku

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XL 43, 54, 55; XII.

21, 22.

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H

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VIIL 1 3; X. 14; XL 5 1.

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k'uo
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lang
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lei

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55
55

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lin
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vii. 20.. ,,

VIII. 1 1; IX. 4, 21, 23,
38 ;X. 2; XL 5, 18,39;

XIII. 21.

XI. 64.

I. 23; VJ.i,4,:6; VII. 31;
IX. 31; XL ...22.

IX. 15.

VI. ii.

IV. 10; VII. 19.

IX.' 33; X. 16, 17, 18.

II. i; VI. 6, 19, 20; VII. 7,
9, 10; XI. 61; XIII. i.

VI. 23; XI. 33, 41.

II. 2, 4, 13; IV. 10; VII.
31; IX. 40; XI. 22,23;
. XII. 8.

IV. I4; VII. i5; IX. 29.

I. 23; XL 16.

passim.
IV. 17, 18.

II. i, 8,9; VII. ii ;X. 3.

XII. 16, 22. ,

IX. 40; X. 19, 21.
VIII. 12.

I. 13.

VII. 13, 17; IX. 17; XI.

8, 52-

I. 5> 13; IX. 4, 43, 44,
45; X. 7, 26; XL 25, 28,

56 ^ XIII. 12, 20.

vii. 33; ix. 13.

II. 14; X. 13, 14, 20.

184

tin

luan

lun

lung

lu

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Ma

mai

mei
men
mi

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mn

1.15; VIII. 2; IX. 7; XII. 15.

VI. 31; IX. 6.
IX. 15.

VIII. 12.

II. 14; III. 4.
XIII. i.

IX. 9/
XIII. 2.

I. 20; III. 16; V. 16, 17,
18; VII. 30; IX. 33; X.
14, 18, 26.

V, 4,

XL 31.
IX. 2.

VIII. 7; IX. 41- XI. 375
XII. 1 6.

XIII. 26.*

in. i. y

IX. 36.

VII. 18, 20; XL 13, 21,

II. I4; IX. 34; XL 31.

II. ii.
XL 31.

III. 18.
XIII. 20.
III. 13-

X. 30.
XIII. 14.

I. 26; XL 64.
XIII. 17.

I. 5, 6; II. 20; IV. 20;
VII. 24, 25, 26; VIII.
12; IX. 44; X. 124.

fgj II. 20; VI. 9; VII. i; VIII.

i, 3; XI 27; XII. 15.
ig IV. 12; V. 2; X. 24;

XIII. 20.
9fj I. 13; IV. 10; X. 18; XII.

13, 16, 22; XIII. 4, 27.

t£ ix. 14.

§ XL 67.

J| I. u; VI. 27; VII. 3; XL

39; XIII. 8, 14-
f| III. 3, 7; VI. 25; VII. 12;

VIII. 2; IX. 26; XL 14,

22, 37, 52-
g IV. 10; VII. 24, 26; XL 36.

^C V. 22.

j|: VIL 28«
J*j I. 16; X. 31.

H III. 16; VIL 3, 19; IX.
42; X. 4, 5, 12; XL 8.

m i- "•

pj II. i, 13; IX. 4; XII. 6,
9; XIII. i, 7, 10, 22.

|t|i passim.

|f VIL 35-

$i VII. 33-

J^ v- J3J IX. 22, 32.

^ XIII. 2.

^ II. 14.

$t I. 22; II. 16; IX. 33,39:
X. 17; XII. 18, 20.

^ II. 14; V. 15.

-£ XL 68.

& VIL 35-

*£ III. 5, 6; XL 55-

pa
pai

pan

P'ang
pao

pei

P'eng
Pi

p'i

p'iao

H XL 53, 54.

$ I. 15; IV. 13, 14, 15, 16,
19; V. 3, 16; VI. 21 ;
X. 20, 22; XL 59.

£ VII. 9; IX. 4, 28; X. 7,

27, 28, 29.

^ IX. 17.

fc IV. 7, 16; X. 24.

If X. 24: XIII. 8.

•*""%

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^ II. 3; IX. 37-

|(8 VI. 4; VIL 31.

fg III. 8; VIL 7.

ft VII. 34; X. 14, 19; XL 23.

flf VII. 33; IX. 8, 9, 13,16;

XL 7, 45-
^. I. 22; IX. 23, 24.

j|| I. 21, 24; VI. 16, 17,18;

IX. 24; X. 5.
j^» pen IX. 27.

m X« '4> 17-

i! XIL 4.*

•g| I. 21; III. 9; VI. 29; VIL

29; X. 24.
P£ IL 4.
^ II. 14.
|J\ passim.
^ III. 18; X. 2, 6, 31; XL

4, 5, 9-
§ X. 26; XL 29.

tjj VIII. 2; XL i, 8, 13,49-
H II. 14; VII. 8.

II V- I2'

13

i86

pien *JR V. 7, 8, 9, 10; VI. 33;
VII. 16, 26, 32; VIIL
4, 5, 6; XL 41; XII. 5, 12.
pin 5t IL i.
p'in ^ II. 10.
ping ^ XL 61.
„ f# IX. 40; XL 22.
„ -|£ passim.
p'ing 2p ix. 9.

po |:J II. 10, n, 13; III. 2, 18;
VII. 7; IX. 12; XIII.
i, 2.

» jfl vii. 36.

p'o ^ II. 14; III. i; XL 39-
pu ^ passim.

san — I. 4; II. 8; III. passim;
IV. 17; V. 2; VII. 7,
10, 27; XL 6, 21, 40,
56; XII. i; XIII. 14, 27.
„ ^ IX. 23; XL 1,2, 11,42,46.
sao tyjfc XII. 4.
„ j|| XIII. i.
se ^ V. 8.

sha ^ II. 16; III. 5; VIIL 12,

14; XL 61; XIII. 20.
shan iJj V. 23; VII. 13, 18; IX.

i, 2; XL 8, 29, 52.
„ 5a|£ passim.

shang_t L5; III. 1,3, 17; IV. 7;
VII. 9; IX. 6, 14; X.
21; XL 15, 64; XII. 10;
XIII. 27.

„ H I. 13; ILi7; IX. 36; XL
56; XIII. 14.

shao

shen

[,> 1.26; III. 9; IX. 23; X. 19.
§ VII. 2; VIIL 2; IX. 34;

XIII. 20, 21.

XL 29.
IX. 14.

VI. ii, 25; X. 25; XL

passim.

f=f VIIL 8; XL 55. [See under
/ism.]

sheng

shih

. , XL 4L
|$ VI. 9, 331 XIII. 5, 8.
XL 24.

XII. 22.
passim.

I. 2, 6, 8; IV. 18; V. 6,
n, 17; VI. 23, 34; VIIL

12; IX. 2, 6, 9. 12, 17;

XL 58; XII. 21 ; XIII.

7, 13, 24.
V. 7; VI. 9.

XIII. 15.
passim.

II. 14.

IV. 14; VI. 22; IX. 35.

II. 15; V. 12, 22, 23.

V. 6; XL 68.
ft I. 19; XL 50.

XL 56.

X. 14, 16.

I. 7; V. 6; VI. 34; XII.

3, 4, 9-

III. 17; XL 37.

V. passim.

I. 16,17; VI. 32; X.12,15.

:87

-J-1 II. I, 13, 14, 15, 17; III.

8; VI. 14, 20; VII. 8,
9, 10; X. 15; XIII. i.

i I. 13; HI- 5, M, 15; XL

23, 24, 27, 28, 36.
ff I. 21; V. 4; VI. 30; IX.

12; XIII. 17.
Hf IV. 3; V. 3; VI. 3, 18,

22; X. 26; "XL. passim;

XIII. 16, 22, 23, 24.
^ I. i; III. 14; XI, XIII,

passim.
>\**f VIII. n; IX. 18; XL 15,

31; xm. 27.

ftfj II- i, 3, 10, 1 1; VII. 36;

XL 43; XII. 18; XIII. i.

jjjl VII. 23; IX. 2, 6; X. 25.

^ II. 9, 15; VII. ii, 35; IX.
34; XL 21, 49.

<g V. 3; VII. i; VIII. T, 3.

^ IV. 5, 6,7; VI. 7, 8, I2;
XL 48; XII. 12; XIII.

2, 20.

-^ XL 30, 34-

IR IX- 22-

-||- XL 29.

g£ IV. 17, 18; V. r, 18; VI.

20; IX. 36; XII. 12;

XIII. 2.
ffi IX. 8, 21.
gft I. 13; V. ii.
$fc IV. 19.

^Ht I* 7*
ftr VIII. 6.

shuai

shui

shun

so

sstt

suan
sui

sun
Ta

tai

XL 29, 30.
XL 38.

IV. 20; V. 12; VI. 29, 31,
32; IX. 3, 4, 5,6,8,14;
XII. 13, 14.

II. 14.

XL 60.

passim.

; I. 2, 6, 8; V. 6; VI. 23,
34; VIII. 2, 12; IX. 9,
10 ; X. 25; XI. passim;
XII. 21 ; XIII. 7, 12, 19,
23-

[ I. 4; IV. 17 jV. 6; VI. 34;
XL 43, 53; XII. i, 4.

| II. i.

II. 20: VI. 9.
, XL 55.

II. 5; VI. 10 ; VIII. 12;
XL 19.

IX. 44, 45; XII. 2.
: IX. 34.
'. I. 26.

II. 4; VI. II, 21, 22;

VIII. 5, 6; X. 7.
XL 67.

passim.*

I. i; II. 14; III. 10; X.

17; XL 54; XIII. 27.
IX. 23; XL 43.

III. 17; IV. i; V. 20; VI.
i ; VII. 30, 31; VIII. ii ;

IX. 14; X. 8, 10; XL
18; XII 7, 9-

tai

tan
tang
fang
tao

III. 18; X. 31.

t'ao
te

t'6
teng

ti

t'i

t'iao

t'ien

ting

II. I.

II. 4, 13-

II. 15; XL 30.
VII. 32.

I. passim; III. 17; IV. 16;
VII. 7; X. passim; XL
8, 19, 20, 32, 42; XII.
22; XIII. i, 8.

VII. 14; XI 52; XIII. « i.

III. 9.
passim.

IV. 13.

IX. 2; XL 38.

I. 2, 4, 8, 13; IV. 7, 14,
18; V. 6; VI. passim;
VII. 14, 20; VIII. 2, 3,

5; ix. 13, 15; x. i, 13,

21, 29, 31; XL passim.

II. 9, 15, 16, 18; III. 9,

; IV. i, 2, 3, 14; V.

10;

. i, 2, 3, 14;
3, 19; VI, IX, X, XI
XIII. passim.
IX. 10.

IX. 13.

XL 38.

XL 28.

IX. i9; X. 12.

IX. 23.

I. 4, 7, i3; m. 7; IV. 7,
9; V. 6; IX. 15; X.i4,
31; XL 6, 55; XII. 4.

IX. 14.

t'ing |g I. 15, 16; V. 7; XL 18.

„ g IV. TO; VII. 19.
to Jg IV. 18; VI. 21 ; XIII. 5.

f|| VII. 28, 29.
„ ^ VII. 27; XL 18; XII. 14.

^ I. 26; IV. 10; VI. 16,21;
VII. 26; IX. 21, 40;
XL 7.
fo $£ XL 68.

ton pj V. 2, 16; VI. 22; XL

24, 51-
fou ^ V. 4; XL 23, 28, 40, 58.

tsa ^ II. 17; VIII. 7, 8, 9.
tsai ~ffi passim.

„ ^ III. 5; VIII. 13; X. 14;

XL 26.
„ f*£ VI. 21 ; XIII. 1 8.

„ H II. 8.

ts'ai Hj- II. n, 12, 13; XL 27.
„ \% II. i.

ts'angp^ IV. 7; IX. 17-
tsao Jp. XII. 6.
ts'ao IjjS; IX. 8, 21.

„ ^ XIII. i.
tse ^|J passim.

„ g| VII. 13; IX. 7, 8; XL

8, 52-

„ ^ V. 21.

ts'e >[||J IX. 25.
JBll XL 22.

189

ts'e
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VI. 22.

VI. 17,20; XL 30; XIII.

20.

I. 16; XII. 13; XIII. 3.

t'ui

» f£

VI. 23.

»

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XL 28.

tung

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IX. 27; X. 14, 15.

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20; VII. 34; IX. 42;
X. 16, 18, 25, 27, 28,
29; XL 16, 28, 36.
II. 3, 9; IV. 6; VI. 24;
IX. 40; XL 21, 31.
VII. 13; IX. 17; XL 8, 52.
X. 24.

tzti

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I. 2; XL 10,58; XII. 21.
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V. 19; VIL34;X.9,ii;
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IV. 7; V. 19, 20, 22; VI.
4, 23; VII. 15, 18, 19,
21; IX. 21, 33; X. 30;
XL 17; XII. 17, 19;
XIII. i, 4, 27.

VIII. 4, 55 X. i, 2, 3;
XL 63.

I. 5; III. 14, 15, 17; XL 30.

I. i; X. 25, 26; et al.
IV. 7; VI. 3; X. 17; XL 2.
VII. 6, n; XII. i.

passim.

I. 16; II. i; XII. 6, 9;
XIII. T, 12.

II. i; XIII. i.

IX. 23; X. 2, 4; XL 5,
23, 24, 28, 39, 45.

I. 2; VII. 11; XL 10, 58;

XII. 21.
XL 53, 54.
passim.

II.I8; IILi3,i6; IV. n;
VI. 33; IX. 12, 43; XL
15, 40, 62; XIII. 8.

L 6; IX. 37-

I. 6; II. 20; V. 22; VII.
5; VIII. 12, 14; XII. 17.

X. 24.

IX. 7, 40, 41; XIII. 27.
XL 29.

wei

wen

wo

wu

JJ

Ya
yai

XL 54, 55-
passim.

1 90

yang

VI. 34.
IX. 17.

VII. 6, ii; IX. 38.

VI. 9; XI. 66; XIII. 17,18.

III. 8; VII. 36; VIII. 2;
XL i, 9, 14, 45, 50, 51.

IX. 43-

g XII. 1 8, 20.
PS XL 18, 30.

gf] [. n; II. 5; IV. 10; VII.

23; XIII. 19.
^ VI. n, 12, 13, 14, 27;

X. 2, 6, 7, 8, 10 : XL

4, 5; XIII. 21.
g\ XL 28.
4&| passim.

ty] VII. 32, 33, 34, 35, 36;

IX. 4, 15; X. 9, n;

XL 22, 57; XII. 7.
3t passim.
f& HI. i.
^* passim.
|$ II. 15; VIII. 8.

ffjf VIII. 12.

3| IX. n; XL 27, 30.

^ IX. 40, 43-

% XL 30.*

*f XIII. 26.*

^ X. i, 8; XL 9, 45.

XL 39-
VII. 34-

II. 17; IX. 12; XL 22,55.
» @| L 7; IX. ii, 13; X.3, 10.

yao Jg£ VII. 32; XIII. 27.
yeh -jjj^ passim.

„ |j| VIII. 10.

„ gj XL 21.

„ fg XIII. 20.

„ ^ VII. 7, 26; IX. 32: XII. ii.
yen j|| XL 23.
„ S vil. 23; IX. 35; XL 57.

I. 9; X. 18.

XIII. 5.

XII. 2.
XL 28.

yin |tj| III. 16; X. 7, n.

I. 7; VIL 19; IX. ii.

IX. 30.

III. 4.

XIII. 26.*

1.17; IL9; VI. 26, 31, 33;
XII. 2, 5; XIII passim.
ying m IX. 23.

X. 8, 9.
X. 25.

/AJ_ VI. 28; XII. 5j 6.
„ $1 IX. 4, 5, 6, 16, 39-
yo $J VI. 15; IX. 26; XI. 25.
yu >& passim.

VI. 17, 20; IX. 9, 13;
XL 30; XIII. 20.

yu

yung

yu

VIII. 3; XL 9, 19.

I. 20; VII. 4; IX. 28.
HI. 4; IX. 39
XL 35-

passim.

I. 9; IV. 12; V. 17, 18;
VII. 25; XL 28, 32.

IX. 14.

passim.

V. 19.
III. 17.

VI. 10; XL 51.
XL 36.

X. 17; XL 30.
III. 17; XL 19.

VII. 12; XL 52.

VII. 3, 4, 22; XL 9, 37-

yu

yuan

yiieh

yun

IV. 6; VI. 24; XL 27.

III. 17; VI. 1 1, 12; IX. 5,

J4, 19, 38; XIII. 20.
passim.

I. 8, 19; II. 10; VI. 20;
VII. 31; IX. 3, 16,19;

X. I, 12, 21.

VII. 6.

V. l6, 22, 23.

passim.

III. 4; IV. 10; V. 6; VI.
34-

VI. 21*; XL 30*, 43.

V. 1 6.
L III. 4.
XL 22.

INDEX

[The numerals refer to pages]

Abstract ideas of degree, 50.
Accessible ground, 100, 101, 119.
Accommodating oneself to the enemy,

145, 148.

Adaptation to circumstances, 23.
Aides-de-camp, 171.
"Aids to Scouting," quoted, 88, 89,

107, 164.

Alliances, 60, 119, 140, 142.
Allotments of land, 62.
Alps, crossings of the, 57.
Amiot, Pere, vii, i.
Anger, succeeded by gladness, 159.
Army, divisions of the, 17, 33.
Army on the march, 140.
Arsenals, burning of, 151.
"Art of War," quoted by Han Hsin,

144.

Art of war in a nutshell, 44.
Athletics, 124.
Attack, skill in, 28.
Attack and defence, 25, 44.
Autumn hair, 29.

Baden-Powell, General. See "Aids to

Scouting."
Baggage, 58.
Baggage-train, 60.
Baggage-trains, burning of, 151.
Bait, offered by the enemy, 68.
Balancing of chances, 31.
Banners. See Flags and banners.
Bases of supply, 60.

Beasts, startled, sign of surprise at-
tack, 89.

Belgians at Waterloo, 130.
Benevolence to spies, 170.
Biot's Chou Li, ix.
Birds rising, sign of ambuscade, 89.
Blucher, 48.
Bluster, 95.
Boers, 18.

"Book of Army Management," 63.
Buff-coats, 58.
Burning one's boats, 133.

Calamities, six, 105.

Calthrop, Capt. : his edition of Sun
Tzti's text, xxxii; his translation
of Sun Tzu, viii ; quoted, passim.

Camp, shifting, 133.

Camping, 80 sqq.

Cannae, battle of, u.

Casinum, 140.

"Catalogue of Chinese Books," xxxiv.

Chan Kuo Ts'e, quoted, 10; referred
to, xxiv.

Chan Ton Ta Chia Ping Fa, xviii.

Chang Ao, a commentator, xlii.

Chang Hsiu, 69.

Chang Liang, li, 109, 116.

Chang Ni, 144.

Chang Shang-ying, lii.

Chang Shou-chieh, xvi, xvii.

Chang Tsai, li.

Chang Tzu-shang, a commentator, xli.

INDEX

193

Chang Yii's commentary on Sun Tzu,
xl; quoted, 5, 8, 9, n, 20, 21, 22,
24, 25, 27, 30, 33, 34, 35, 39,42,
44, 46, 49, 50, 51, 55, 56, 58, 60,
63, 64, 65, 66, 68, 69, 72, 73, 74,
75, 76, 77, 78, 80, 81, 82, 83, 85,
87, 88, 89, 90, 92, 94,97,99, 103,

105, 107, 109, in, 112, 119, 124,
125, 126, 127, 131, 132, 133, 134,
i36> T39» I4i, J42, 143, !45> I52,
155, *56, J58, J59, l6l> l63> l67>
170, 171, 172; referred to, 6, 15,
17, 31, 36, 45, 71, 86, 95,96, 106,
147, 153, 173.

Ch'ang mountains, 128.
Ch'ang-cho, battle of, 66.
Ch'ang-she, siege of, 154.
Chao State, army of, 28, 143; defeated

by Ch'in, 166; King of, 57.
Chao Chan, 106.
Chao Kua, xlviii, 166.
Chao She, famous march of, 57, 136;

his use of spies, 166.
Chao Yeh, xiv.
Chao Ying-ch'i, 78.
Chao Yiian-hao's rebellion, xli.
Ch'ao Kung-wu, quoted, xxxvi,

xxxvii, xxxviii, xl, xli.
Chariots, 9, 91.
Chariot fighting, 15, 16.
Chariot wheels, burying of, 129.
Chavannes, M.: his "Memoires Histo-

riques" referred to, xiii, xvi, xlvi,

57-

Ch'en Chen-sun, quoted, xxiii.

Ch'en Hao's commentary on Sun
Tzu, xxxvi, xxxviii; quoted, 30,
44, 56, 62, 65, 69, 73, 81, 93, 97,

106, 108, no, 117, 118, 122, 124,

133, 136, 141, 147, IS2, 170,175;

referred to, 18, 68.
Ch'en-ts'ang, siege of, 94.
Cheng, principality of, 104, 116.
Cheng and ch'-i. See Tactics, direct

and indirect.
Cheng Ch'iao, xl.
Cheng Hou, quoted, xliii.

Cheng Hsiian's commentary on the
Chou Li, xviii.

Cheng Tuan, xlii.

Cheng Yu-hsien's / Shuo, xxxii,
xxxiv; referred to, 36, 53, 58,
70, 136.

Ch'eng-an, city of, captured by Han
Hsin, 28.

Ch'eng-hung, battle of, 78.

Ch'eng T'ang, xvi, 173, 175.

Chi Hsieh, editor of commentaries
on Sun Tzti, xxxviii, xli.

Chi-mo, siege of, 90.

Chi T'ien-pao's edition of Sun Tzti,
xxxi, xxxii, xxxiii, xxxvi, xxxvii.

Ch'i State, xii, xvi, 128.

Ch'i Chieh, 90.

Chia Hsu, a commentator, xli.

Chia-ku, meeting at, xlvii.

Chia Lin's commentary on Sun Tzu,
xxxvi, xxxviii; quoted, 20, 30,34,
46, 5°, 57, 72, 75, 76, 86, 92, 94,
95, 97, "7, 120, 133, 143, 148,
152, 157, 175; referred to, 51,55,
62, 65, 96, 108, 164.

Chia Yu, referred to, xlvii.

Chiang-ling, town of, in.

Chiang Yuan, a spurious work, Hi.

Chieh Kuei, the tyrant, 173.

Chieh-li, a Tiukish Khan, 167.

Ch'ien Ch'io Lei Shu, liii.

Cfrien Fu Lun, referred to, xxiv.

Cfrien Han Shu, quoted 81, 145,
167; referred to, li, 28, 34, 57,69;
bibliographical section of, quoted,
xvii, xix, li; referred to, xviii, xx,
liii.

Ch'ih Yu, 84.

Chin State, xii, xvi, 106.

Chin Shu, quoted, 78, 116; referred
to, 123, 165.

Ch'in State, 142.

China's experience of war, xliv.

Chinese characters, elasticity of, 159.

Chinese sentiment opposed to mili-
tarism, xliv.

Ching, Duke of Ch'i, xv.

14

194

INDEX

Ching-chou Fu, 123.
Ching-hsing pass, battle of, 143.
Ching K'o, 127.
Ching Wang, period of, xxiii.
Chiu T'ang Shu, referred to, 104,

167; bibliographical section of,

referred to, liii.
Chou C/i'm Shih I Tzu, text of Sun

Tzti in, xxxi.
Chou dynasty, 174.
Chou Hsin, the tyrant, 1, 174.
Chou Li quoted, 14, 55, 60, 68, 92,

146; referred to, xxxix, xlviii, 64;

Biot's translation of, ix.
Chu Chih-wu, xxi.
Chu Fu's edition of Sun Tzu, xvii,

Chu Hsi, corrected by Legge, 32:

quoted, xliii, xlvii.
Chu-ko Liang, 46, 51, 74, 82, 117,

122; supposititious works of, Hi.
Chu-ko Wu-hou. See Chu-ko Liang.
Ch'u State, xii, xiii, xvi, 124; the

hereditary enemy of Wu, xxvii;

Viscount of, no.
Chuan Chu, xxi, 128.
Chuan She-chu. See Chuan Chu.
Chuang, Duke of Lu, 66.
Chuang, Prince of Ch'u, 141, 162.
Chuang Tzu, referred to, 29, 85.
Chung Yung, xix.
Circumstances, art of studying, 68.
Classics, compared with Sun Tzti, xliii.
Clearness of orders, 107.
Clever fighter, the, 29, 41, 42.
Cohesion, 134.
Collapse, one of the six calamities,

105, 106.

Columns, marching in, 49.
Commander, the, 2, 3. See also

General.
Commander-in-chief, killing the, 145;

presence of mind of the, 66.
Commentary, native, on Sun Tzu,

ix, xxxivj^.

Communications, line of, 101, 119.
Compactness, 61.

Confucius, and the art of war, xlvi,
xlvii, xlviii; contemporary with
Sun Tzu, xxx ; violates extorted
oath, xlix.

Constellations, 153.

Contentious ground, 115, 118, 136.

Contraction and expansion, 134.

Conventional canons of warfare, 148.

Co-operation, 129.

Council-chamber, sternness in the,
146.

Country, natural features of, 60.

Courage, one standard of, 130.

Courant's "Catalogue des Livres
Chinois," Hi.

Cowardice, 78.

Critical ground, 134, 135.

Cromwell's use of spies, 164.

Cross-divisions, 100.

Cunning, 145.

Danger, bracing effect of, 139, 145.
Dangerously isolated ground, 72.
Deception, war based on, 6, 132.
Decision, 37, 38.
Deductive calculation, 163.
Defence, skill in, 27.
Deliberation, 63.
Demosthenes, the Athenian general,

118.

Desertion, 134, 136.
Desperado, running amok, 125.
Desperate foe, not to be pressed,

69, 94.
Desperate ground, 72, 114, 117, 120,

125, 126, 135, 138, 143.
Deviation, artifice of, 57, 63.
Difficult grond, 71, 117, 120, 137.
Disaffection, signs of, 95.
Discipline, 2, 3, 4, 98, in.
Disorder, seeming, 38.
Disorganisation, 105, 107.
Dispersive ground, 114, 118, 135.
Disposition of troops, 26.
Dispositions, concealment of, 51, 52;

knowledge of the enemy's, 163.
Dissimulation, 6r.

INDEX

195

Dividing the enemy, 47.
Divination, to be prohibited, 126.
" Divine manipulation of the threads,"

164.

Door, left open by the enemy, 147.
Doorkeepers, 171.
Drums, 34, 64, 65.
Dust, sign of the enemy, 89.

Earth, as opposed to Heaven, 2, 4,
27, 28, 113; six principles con-
nected with, 104.

Economy, false, 162.

Energy, 38, 39, 41; concentration
of, 124.

Entangling ground, 100, 102.

Enterprise, the spirit of, 157.

Enticing the enemy, 102.

Erh-chu Chao, 138.

Erh Ya> quoted, 94.

Excellence, supreme, 17; the acme
of, 28.

Expenditure on war, 9, 10, 160.

Fabius Cunctator, u. 120.

Facile ground, 115, 118, 135, 136.

Fan Chii's use of spies, 166.

Fei River, battle of the, 25.

Feng Hou, Hi, 84.

Feng I, a student of Sun Tzu, xlii.

Fire, as an aid to the attack, 156;
dropping, 151, 152; five ways of
attacking with, 150; material for,
152; proper seasons for attacking
with, 152, 153; to be started on
the windward side, 155.

Five advantages, the, 72, 74, 75.

Five cardinal tastes, 36.

Five cardinal virtues, 3.

Five classes of State ceremonial, xlviii.

Five dangerous faults, 77.

Five developments in attacking with
fire, i53->W.

Five elements, the, 53.

Five essentials for victory, 23, 24.

Five factors in war, i.

Five musical notes, 36.

Five Pa Wang, xlix, 141.

Five primary colours, 36.

Flags and banners, 16, 34, 64, 65.

Flat country, campaigning in, 83, 84.

Flight, 105.

Foraging, 12, 15, 123, 161.

Foreknowledge, 163.

Forestalling the enemy, 147.

Forethought, want of, 97.

"Forty-one Years in India," referred

to, 35-

Four seasons, the, 54.
Frederick the Great, quoted, 48,

1 68, 169.

Frontier passes, 146.
Frontal attacks, 45.
Fu Ch'ai. xvi.
Fu Chien, 25, 115.
Fu-ch'u, King of Ch'u, 124.
Fu Kai, xxiii, xxix.
Fu-k'ang-an, 63.
Fu Yen-ch'ing, 69, 70.

General, the, 4, 5, 7, 8, 15, 16, 19,
21, 44, 55, 66, 77, 98, 107, 109,
no, 130, 131, 134, 157, 159, 163,
171, 174.

Generals, professional, xxii.

Generalship, degrees of, 17, 18; the
highest, 48.

Giles' Biographical Dictionary, quo-
ted, 128.

Giles' Chinese-English Dictionary,
referred to, 57, 134.

Gongs, 34, 64.

Grant, General, 47.

Great Wall of China, xliv.

Greeks, Homeric, 9.

Grindstone and egg, 35.

Ground, high and low, 84; of inter-
secting highways, 71, 116, 119,
i35» J37; proper use of, 130.

Grounds, the nine, 114, 134, 138.

Guides, local, 60, 140.

Han, red banners of, 144.
Han Chih. See Cfrien J/iin .S'////,
bibliographical section of.

196

INDEX

Han Kuan Chieh Ku, quoted, xx.
Han Hsin, xliv, 28, 33, 34, 81, 143,

167; a student of Sun Tzti, xlii;

quoted, 68.

Han Shu. See Ch'ien Han Shu.
Hannibal, n, 57, 66, 120, 140.
Hasty temper, 78.
Hearing, quick, 29.
Heaven, 2, 4. 28, 113.
Heights, precipitous, 100, 103.
Hemmed-in ground, 72, 117, 120,

135. r37-

Henderson, Col., quoted, 6, 42, 48,
52, 59, 101, 130, 131.

Herodotus, referred to, 129.

Ho Ch'u-fei, xl.

Ho Kuan 7zti, referred to, xxiv.

Ho Lu (or Ho Lii), King ofWu, xi,
xiii, xvi, xvii, xviii, xxvi, 5, 128.

Ho Shih. See Ho Yen-hsi.

Ho-yang, night ride to, 65.

Ho Yen-hsi's commentary on Sun
Tzu, xl; quoted, n, 14, 16, 18,
21, 29, 30, 34, 56, 69, 74, no,
115, 116, 122, 147, 165, 166, 167,
168, 174; referred to, xvii, 31,43,
62, 152.

Horses, tethering of, 129.

Hou Han Shu, quoted, 10, 94, 132,
139, 151, 155; referred to, xlii.

Hsi, the graduate, xxxiii.

Hsia dynasty, 174.

Hsiang, Duke of Sung, xlix, 141.

Hsiang Chi, xlix, 133,

Hsiang Liang, xlix.

Hsiang Yu. See Hsiang Chi.

Hsiao State, no.

Hsiao Chi, a commentator, xli.

Hsiao Hsien, 123.

Hsiao I, 153, 166.

Hsiao Shih-hsien. Sec Hsiao I.

Hsieh An, 25.

Hsieh Yuan, a commentator, xlii.

Hsien Hu, 106.

Hsin-ch'eng, town of, 122.

Hsin Hsu, xiv.

Hsin Shu (by Ts'ao Kung), xix, xxxvi.

Hsin Shu (a work attributed to Chu-

ko Liang), Hi.
Hsin Tang Shu, referred to, 65,

104, 105, 123, 167; bibliographical

section of, referred to, xviii, liii.
Using Li Hui Yao, quoted, xliii,

xlviii.

Hsing Shih Pien Cheng Shu, xv.
Hsiung-nu, 39, 139, 150.
Hsu Ch'ieh, quoted, 160.
Hsii-chou, invaded by Ts'aoTs'ao, 73.
Hsu We*n Hsien Tung K'ao, liii.
Hsiian Tsung, T'ang Emperor, xxxii.
Hsun TzU, quoted, 80.
Hsiin Ying, 73.
Hu Yen, xiii.
Hua-pi, city of, 73.
Hua-yin temple, xxxii.
Huai-nan Tzu, plagiary of Sun Tzu,

xxiv; quoted, xiv.
Huan, Duke of Ch'i, 128, 141.
Huan Ch'ung, 25.
Huan Hsiian, 78.
Huang Ch'ao Ching Shih Wtn Pien,

liii.
Huang Chih-cheng, a commentator,

xlii.

Huang Jun-yu, a commentator, xli.
Huang Mei, 78.
Huang-shih Kung, li; quoted, 109,

126.

Huang Ti. See Yellow Emperor.
Huang-fu Sung, 94, 154, 155.
Human nature, to be studied, 134.
Humanity, misplaced, xlix; soldiers

to be treated with, 98.
Husbanding one's strength, 67.
Husbandry, impeded by war, 161.

I river, 127.

I Chih, 173, 174, 175.

I Ching, quoted, xv.

I-chou, 165.

I-ho, 115.

/ Pu Che Chung, xliii.

/ Shuo. See Cheng Yu-hsien.

I-wu pass, 115.

INDEX

197

I Yin. See I Chih.

Iliad, heroes of the, 127.

Impoverishment of the people, 13, 14.

Induction from experience, 163.

Inhumanity, the height of, 162.

Insubordination, 105.

Intuition necessary in dealing with
spies, 169.

Invading force, principles to be ob-
served by an, 123.

Jackson, Stonewall, 59, 131.

Jan Yu, disciple of Confucius, xlvi,

xlviii.

Jang, siege of, 69.
Jingles, 149, 158.
Jn-nan, in.
Julius Caesar, 12; his "De Bello Gal-

lico" referred to, 108.
Junction of forces, 48.

K'ang Hsi's dictionary, referred to,
10, 18, 35, 68, 95, 117, 152, 157,
1 60.

Kao-ch'ang, 115.

Kao-fan. See Hu Yen.

Kao Huan, afterwards Emperor, 137.

Kao Keng, 151.

Kao Tsu, first Han Emperor, 33,

39» "9-

Kao Tsu, Sui Emperor, 168.

Kao-wu pass, 115.

Khitans, 69.

Khotan, 132.

Kiangnan rebels under Sui dynasty,

151-

Kindness to the soldiers, no, in.
Kou Chien, King of Yiieh, xvi, 50
Ku Chin Tu Shu ChiC.frtng, quoted,

xvi, xxxvii, xxxix ; referred to, xix,

xli, li, liii. See also Sun Tzu, T'u

Shu text of.
Kuan Chung, 128.
Kuan TzG, xxi.

Kuang, King of Shan-shan, 139, 151.
Kuang Po Wu Chih, liii.
Kuang Wu, Han Emperor, li.

Kuei-ku Tzti, li.

K'uei-chou, 123.

A''//// Wai Cfrun Cfriu, xxxvi.

Kung-sun Hung, lii.

Kuo Cfrao Shih Jen Chtng Lilch,

xxxii.

Kuo Hsiin, 151.
Kutcha, King of, 132.

Ladder, kicking away the, 133.

Ladysmith, relief of, 79.

Land-tenure, ancient system of, xxv,
161.

Lao Tzu, the Tao of, 2 ; quoted, 155,
158. See also Tao Te Ching.

Legge's "Chinese Classics," referred
to, ix, xxiv, 23, 32.

Lengthy operations, 10, 11.

Li, length of the, 9.

Li Chi, referred to, 23, 147.

Li Ching, the general, xliv, 41, 123,
167; quoted, 35, 66, 87, in, 118;
supposed author of a work on
war, lii.

Li Ching Ping Fa, lii.

Li Chu, 29.

Li Chilian's commentary on Sun Tzu,
xxxvi; quoted, 9, n, 18, 21, 22,
24, 25, 28, 30, 32, 34, 38, 46, 49,
5°> 5T> 55> 6o» 65> 67, 68, 72, 73,
81, 83, 84, 89, 92, 97, 105, 106,
no, 113, 114, 115, 117, 118,119,
136, 142, 150, 158, 163, 167; re-
. ferred to, 52, 95, 123, 127, 151.

Li Hsiang, 165.

Li Hsiung, 165.

Li I-chi, 167.

Li Kuang-pi, 65.

Li Ling, 154.

Li Shih-min, afterwards the Emperor
T'ai Tsung, xliv, lii, 35, 104, 167.

Li Shou-cheng, 70.

Li Tai Chi Shih Nien Piao, quoted,
70, 116, 166.

Li T'e, 165.

Li Ts'ai, a commentator, xlii.
\ Li Wei-kung. See Li Ching.

198

INDEX

Li Wei Rung Wen Tui, lii.

Liang, kingdom of, 94.

Liang-chou, 115.

Liang Hsi, 115.

Lien P'o, 57, 166.

Lin-chin, in Shensi, 34.

Lin Hsiang-ju, 166.

Line of least resistance, 53.

Liu Chou-tzu, 53.

Liu Hsiang, quoted, xiv, xxiv.

Liu Pei, 59.

Liu Piao, 69.

Liu T(ao (attributed to T'ai Kung),

xxi, 1, li, 144, 174; quoted, 22,

62, 78, 84.
Liu Yii, 78.

Livy, quoted, 66, 120, 140.
Lo Shang, 165.
Lo-yang, 104.

Logs and stones, rolling, 41.
Longevity, 127.
Lou Ching, 39.
Lu State, 128.
^Lu Te-ming, quoted, li.
Lii Kuang, 115.
Lii Meng, a disciplinarian, in; a

student of Sun Tzu, xlii.
Lii Pu, xxxv.
Lu Shang, known as T'ai Kung, 1,

174, 175. See also Liu T'ao.
LirShih Ch'un Cfriu, referred to,

xxiv, 37.

Lii Wang (or Lii Ya). See Lu Shang.
Luan Yen, 106.
Lun Yii, quoted, xv, 146; referred

to, xlvii, xlix, 47. 64, 156.
Lung Chii, 81.

Ma Lung, lii.

Ma Tuan-lin, xl. See also Wen Hsien

Tung Klao.
Ma Yiian, 80.
Maiden, coyness of a, 148.
Mansfield, Lord, 143.
Mantlets, 14, 18.
Marches, forced, 59.
Marengo, battle of, 57.

"Marshal Turenne," quoted, 73, 169;
referred to, 61.

Marshes, 60.

Measures, of land, 14; of length, 32;
of weight, 15, 32.

Mei Yao-ch'en's commentary on Sun
Tzu, xxxviii; quoted, 4, 6, 7, n,
29, 34, 38, 40, 44, 47, 61, 63, 79,
84, 85, 86, 93, 94, 95, 96, 100, 102,
121, 129, 130, 131, 135, 136, 137,
138, 141, 145, 147, 148, 153, 155,
157, 161, 162, 163, 164, 168, 169,
170, 174; referred to, 15, 23, 43,
46, 51, 106, 151.

"Memoires concernant les Chinois,"
quoted, vii.

"Memoires Historiques," referred to,
xvi. See also Chavannes.

Mencius, quoted, xxv, xliii, 14, 85;
referred to, 29, 32, 112, 148.

Meng K'ang, xxxvi.

Meng Shih's commentary on Sun
Tzu, xxxvi; quoted, 2, n, 15,61,
77, 78, 116, 137, 147.

Meng Ta, 122.

Method, 2, 3, 31.

"Military Classic," 144.

Military tactics like water, 53.

Military virtues, 22.

Misfortune, three ways in which a
ruler can cause, 2 1 sqq.

Mistakes, making no, 30.

Modem text of Sun Tzu. See Sun
Tzu.

Modification of plans, 5.

Moltke, 17.

Moods, art of studying, 67.

Moral Law, the, 2, 4, 31.

Mounds, used in sieges, 19.

Mountains, 80.

Movable shelters, 18.

Mu, Duke of Ch'in, 141.

Mu-so, an instrument of torture, xlvi.

Mu T'ien Tzu Chuan, 152.

Mystification of one's men, 131.

Xang Wa, xiii.

INDEX

199

Napoleon Bonaparte, 5, 12, 148; his
passage across Alps, 57; not ham
pered by central authority, 24; his
"Maximes de Guerre," quoted, 84,
109; his "Pensees," quoted, 101.

Nelson, at Trafalgar, 37.

Nervousness, a sign of, 93.

Nicias, the Athenian general, 118;
speech of, quoted, 125.

Night-fighting, 65.

Nine grounds (or situations), the, 72,
114.

Nine punitive measures, the, xxxix.

Nine variations, the, 71, 72, 74, 138.

"North hill", battle of the, 57.

O-yii, town of, 57.

Omens, not to be regarded, 126.

Onset of troops, 37, 38.

Open ground, 116, 119, 137.

Opportunism, xlix.

Orders, not to be divulged, 142, 143.

Original text of Sun Tzu. See Sun

Tzu.
Ou-yang Hsiu, quoted, xxxiv, xxxv,

xxxviii.

Overawing the enemy, 141.
Over-caution, 158.
Over-solicitude for one's men, 79.

Pa Chtit T'tt, xviii.

Pa Wang, the five, 141.

Pan Ch'ao, 63; at Shan-shan, 139,
150; his attack on Yarkand, 132,
167.

P'an Keng, 173.

P'ang Chiian, xii, 40.

Passes, narrow, 100, 103.

Peace, the true object of war, 162.

Pel Cfci Shu, referred to, 138.

Pel Lun, xl.

Pei Tang Shu Cfrao, 25, 36, 64, 67.

P'ei Hsing-chien, 103.

P'ei Wen Yun Fu, quoted, 94; re-
ferred to, xlvi, 69, 146.

Pelliot, M., xxxvi.

Pi, battle of, 106.

Pi I-hsiin, xviii, xxvi, xxxiv. See also
Sun Tzti Hsu Lu.

Pi Kua, xxxiii.

Pi-yang, city of, 73.

P'i, siege of, 165.

Picked soldiers in front rank, 107,
108.

Ping Pa Tsa Chan, xviii.

Ping Shu Yao Chiieh, 67.

Pique, battles not to be fought out
of, 158.

Pitfalls, 60.

Plagiaries of Sun Tzu, xxiii, xxiv.

Plans, baulking the enemy's, 17;
change of, 5, 132.

Plataea, battle of, 129.

Playfair's "Cities and Towns of
China", referred to. 57.

Plunder, 62.

Po Ch'i, xliv, 117, 166.

Po Chiang Chuan, xli.

Po P'ei, xiii, xxiii, xxix.

Po-teng, battle of, 39.

Po-ts'ai, a leader of the Yellow Tur-
ban rebels, 154.

Po Ya, referred to, 160.

P'o-t'ai, a spy, 165.

Polybius, referred to, 120.

Port Arthur, siege of, 19.

Presence of mind, 66.

Punishment, 95, 97, 98.

Rabbits, not indigenous to China,

149.
Rapidity, 12, 61; the essence of war,

122.

Rewards, 15, 95, 142-
Reward and punishment, constancy

in, 4.

Riches, soldiers not to acquire, 127.
River, crossing a, 129.
River warfare, 81, 82.
Roberts, Lord, night march of, 35;

on Sun Tzti, xlii.
Rout, 105, 107.
Ruin, one of the six calamities, 105,

106.

200

INDEX

Ruler, military commander indepen-
dent of the, 109; the enlightened,

157, J59. J74-
Rules of warfare, conventional, 148.

Salt-marshes, 83.

San Kuo Chih, quoted, 69, m; re-
ferred to, xxxv, xli, xlii. See also
Wei Chih.

San Lueh, li; quoted, 62, 158.

San Shih Erh Lei Ching, xviii.

San Ts'ai Tu Hui, liii.

San-yuan, 79.

"Science of War," quoted, 101, 130.

Scouts, 88, 89.

Screens, grass, 88.

Secrecy, 45, 131.

Secrets, divulged by a spy, 170.

Sedan, capitulation of, 17.

Self-possession, 67.

Sensitiveness in a general, 79.

Sentries, 171.

Serious ground, 117, 119, 135, 137.

Seven considerations, i, 4.

Sha-yiian, 168.

Shan-shan, 139; King of, 150, 15 c.

Shang dynasty, 173.

Shen, Duke of, no.

Shen-wu of Ch'i, 168.

Shen Yu, a commentator, xli.

Shepherd driving sheep, 133.

Sheridan, General, 47.

Shih Chi, objection to the chronology
of, xxvi; quoted, xi, xiii, xv, xx,
xlv, 40, 58, 80, 84, 90, 124, 128;
referred to, xvi, xxii, xxiv, xxxiv,
xlvi, xlvii, xlix, 1. See also Ssu-ma
Ch'ien.

Shih Ching, quoted, xvi, 61, 62; re-
ferred to, 14.

Shih Huang Ti, 127, 142.

Shih K'uang, 29.

Shih Liu Tsle, Hi.

Shih Ssu-ming, the rebel leader, 65.

Shu Ching, quoted, xv; referred to,
xlvii, xlviii.

Shu Lu Chieh Ti xxiii.

Shuai-jan, the, xxvi, 128, 129.

Shuo Wen, quoted, 94, 117, 160.

Sicilian expedition, 118.

Sieges, 10, 18, 19, 73.

Sight, sharp, 29.

Signal-fires, 65.

Signals, 33.

Signs, observation of, 88.

Situations, the nine. See Nine grounds.

Six Chancellors of the Ch'in State,
142.

"Six States" period, xxii.

Skilful fighter, the, 30.

Skilful leaders of old, 120.

Solidarity of troops, 123.

Sophanes at Plataea, 129.

Sovereign, the, 55; the wise, 163.

Spies, xlix, 52, 147, 148; converted,
90, 1 66, 172, 173; doomed, 167,
172, 173; five classes of, 164;
Frederick's classification of, 168;
importance of, 175; intimate re-
lations to be maintained with,
168; inward, 165, 172; local, 164,
172; surviving, 167. 172; to be
properly paid, 162, 169.

Spirit, an army's, 65, 66.

Spirits, 163.

"Spy," evolution of the character
meaning, 160.

Spying, end and aim of, 173.

Ssu K'-u Ch'uan Shu Chien Ming
Mu Lu, quoted, 1, li, Hi.

Ssu K'u Chilian Shu Tsung Mu
Ti Yao, quoted, xx, xli, 1; referred
to, xl, Hi, liii.

Ssu-ma Ch'ien, xiv, xx; quoted, xi,
xii, xlv ; credibility of his narrative,
xxvi; his letter to Jen An, referred
to, xlvi; his mention of the 13
chapters, xxx. See also Shih Chi.

Ssu-ma Fa, 1; quoted, xvi, 14, 17,
78, 126, 143.

Ssu-ma I, 46, 51, 122.

Ssu-ma Jang-chii, xxii, 1, 98.

Stagnation, 157.

Standard text of Sun Tzu. See Sun Tzu.

INDEX

2O I

Stellar Mansions, the twenty-eight, 153.

Stonewall Jackson, biography of,
quoted, 42, 59, 131.

Strategy and tactics, 52.

Strength, great, 29.

Stupidity, to be feigned, 145.

Su Hsiin, quoted, xlii.

Su Shu, an ethical treatise, li.

Subdivisions of an army. 17, 33, 39.

Sui Shu, quoted, 151; bibliographi-
cal section of, quoted, xviii, xli;
referred to, xxxvi, liii.

Sun Hao, a commentator, xli.

Sun Hsing-yen, xxxii; his edition of
Sun Tzu, ix; his preface, xxxiv;
quoted, xvi, xxix, xxx, xxxi, xxxii,
xxxiii, xxxvi, xlviii.

Sun Pin, xii, xv, xvi, 40.

Sun Tz%, archaic words in, xxiv;
bibliographical description of edi-
tion used, xxxiv; corruptions in the
text of, xxxi ; difficult passages in,
xxxiv; state of the text, 138; pro-
bable date of the work, xxviii.

- Modern text, 25, 26, 27, 33.

— Original text, xxxii, xxxiii, 2, 16,
27, 29, 43, 47, 53, 58, 62, 64, 67,
84, 86, 87, 88, 91, 92,95,98,113,
119, 121, 153, 154, 168.

- Standard text, xxxiv, 10, 58, 91,
95, 117, 127, 164.

- Tai I Tun Chia text, xxxvi.

— Tku Shu text, xxxi, 16, 21, 25,
29, 30, 32, 33, 35, 37, 4°, 43, 46,
47, 5°, 52, 58, 64, 67, 69, 84, 87,

91, 92, 94, 95, 96, 105, no, 114,
117, 120, 121, 133, 135, 140,145,
146, 153, 159, 164, 167, 168,171,

i?2, 175-

- T'ung Tien text, xxxiii, i, 10,
12, 19, 22, 23, 25, 41, 45, 47, 50,
53, 58» 59, 62, 64> 65, 67, 68, 74,
77, 81, 83, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 91,

92, 93, 94, 95, 98, 101, 104, 108,
112, 113, 117, 119, 136, 137, J52,
r53, !58, *59, l64, l67, i?0*1?1*
172.

— Yii Lan text, xxxiii, 3, 7, 10,
12, 14, 15, 19, 25, 27, 37, 42,
45, 47, 5°, 52, 53, 62, 64, 67, 68,
77, 81, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89,

92, 93, 94, 95, 98, Io8, II2> I2i,
129, 141, 153, 158, 159, 161, 164,
167, 170, 171, 172.

Sun Tzu Hsu Lu, xviii, xxxiv; quoted,
xxiii, xxiv, 118.

Sun Tzu Hui Chtng, xlii.

Sun Tzu Ts'an Tung, xlii.

Sun Tzu Wtn Ta, xvii.

Sun Wu, a practical soldier, xxv;
conjectural outline of his life, xxix;
not a man of eminent position,
xxviii; probable origin of the legend
connected with, xxix; Sstt-ma
Ch'ien's biography of, xi; sup-
posititious works of, xvii, xviii.
See also Sun Tzu.

Sun Wu Sun Tzu, xvii.

Sung Shih, referred to, xlii; biblio-
graphical section of, xvii, xxxi,
xxxvi, Hi, liii.

Superstitious doubts, 126.

Supplies, 137, 161: line of, 101.

Ta-hsi Wu, 168.

Ta Ming / Tung Chih, quoted,

xxxii.

Taboo character, 124.
Tactical manoeuvring, 56.
Tactician, the skilful, 128.
Tactics, direct and indirect, 20, 34

sqq.; modification of, 52, 53; not

to be repeated, 52; variation of,

26, 71, 74-

T'ai Kung. See Lu Shang.
Tai Kung Ping Fa, li.
Tai P'ing Yu Lan, xvi, xxxiii, liii.

See also Sun Tzti, Yu Lan text.
Tai-po Shan-jen, quoted, 132.
Tai Po Yin Ching, xxxvi.
T'ai Tsung, the Emperor. See Li

Shih-min.

Tai Yuan Ching, referred to, xxiv.
Tallies, official, 146.

202

INDEX

T'ang, prince of, xiii.

Tang, the Completer. See Ch'eng
T'ang.

Tang Chien, 167.
T'ang Shu, bibliographical section
of, referred to, xxxviii, xli. See also
Hsin T'ang Shu and Chiu T'ang
Shu.

Tao Te* Ching, quoted, xlix, 147,
155, 158, 161.

Temple, used for deliberations, 7, 8.

Temporising ground, 100, 102.

Tenacity, 125.

Teng Ch'iang, 78.

Teng Ming-shin, quoted, xv.

Terrain, natural advantages of, 108;
six kinds of, 100.

Textual criticism and emendations,
i, 7, 13, H, 25, 29, 30, 36, 41,
43, 46, 47, 49, 71, 74, 86, 87, 91,
94, 99, 113, 117, 121, 124, 127,

133, i58. l67-
Thermopylae, 115.
Three ancient dynasties, the, xxxix.
Thucydides, quoted, 125; referred

to, 1 1 8.
Ti river, 144.
Tien Chi, 40.
T'ien-i-ko catalogue, quoted, xxxvi,

xl.

Tien Pao, xv.
Tien Pu, 105.
Tien Tan, defender of Chi-mo, 90,

120, 155; his use of spies, 166.
Time, value of, 12; waste of, 157.
Ton Chien-te, King of Hsia, 104.
Tou Ku, 151.
Trafalgar, battle of, 37.
Training of officers and men, 4.
Trebia, battle of the, 66.
Ts'ai, prince of, xiii.
Ts'ao Kuei, mentioned in the Tso

Chuan, xxi; on the advantage of

spirit, 66; threatens Huan Kung,

128.
Ts'ao Kung or Ts'ao Ts'ao, xix, xxxi,

xxxvi, xiii, xliv, 4, 59.69.76,151; i

his commentary on Sun Tziti, xxxv,
xxxvii, xxxviii, xl; quoted, i, 7,
9, ii, 13, 15, 17, 18, 20, 22, 24,
26, 28, 34, 35, 39, 40, 4i, 44, 46,
51, 52, 55, 56, 59, 60, 67, 71, 73,
75. 76, 77, 78, 81, 84, 86, 88, 91,
94, 95. 96, 97, 98. IC3. i°4, 106.

Ill, 115, Il6, Il8, 119, 120, 122,
125, 126, 127, 131, 137, 140, 142,
143, 145, 146, 147, 148, 152,154,

156, 157; referred to, 19, 43, 62,
136; his preface, xx, xxxiv; trans-
lated, xv sqq.

Tseng Shen, xxiv.

Tso Chuan, delivered to Wu Ch'i,
xxiv; has no mention of SuiiTzu,
xx, xxvi, xxviii; quoted, xxvii, xxix,
xlix, 19, 59, 65, 89, 97, 106, in,
162; referred to, xxi, xlvii.

Tso Tsung-t'ang, 63.

Tsui-li, battle of, xxx.

Tu Chung-wei, 69, 70.

Tu Mu's commentary on Sun Tzii,
xxxvi, xxxvii, xxxviii; quoted, 4,
n, 14, 15, 18, 19, 23, 26, 28, 29,
3°. 31. 33. 34, 37. 39. 40, 41, 42,
44, 45. 46, 5°. 52, 55. 56, 57, 59.
60, 61, 62, 64, 67, 68, 69, 75, 76,
77, 78, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 86, 88,
89, 90, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 98, 101,
105, 106, 107, no, in, 112, 114,

115, Il8, 119, 122, 124, 126,131,

133, 136, 137, 138, 146, 148, 149.

151. !52, r53> i54, 155. J56, i57,
158, 161, 163, 164, 165, 167, 168,
169, 171, 175; referred to, 20,65,
73, 150; his preface, quoted, xix,
xxxvii, xxxviii, xlv.

Tu Shu Chih, Hi.

Tu Yu, xxxiii; his notes on Sun Tzii
in the Tlung Tien, xxxvii; quoted,
4, 6, n, 19, 23, 24, 36, 38, 47,
56, 60, 61, 62, 77, 83, 88, 91, 92,

93. 94, 95. I0°. I01. I02, I03. I04,

116, 117, 120, 137, 138, 152, 153,
166, 167, 169, 171, 172; referred
to, 28, 51, 74, 155, 173.

INDEX

203

Tlu Shu encyclopaedia. See Ku

Chin T^u Shu Chi Ch'eng.

- Text of Sun Tzti in the. See

Sun Tzu.

Tung Cho, xxxv, 94.
Tung Chou Lieh Kuo, quoted, 56.
Tliing Chih, referred to, xxxii, xxxvi,

xl, xli, liii.
T'ung Tien, xvii, xxxiii, xxxvii, Hi,

liii. See also Tu Yu.
- Text of Sun Tzu in the. See

Sun Tzu.
Turenne, Marshal, on deceiving the

enemy, 61 ; on sieges, 73; on spies,

169.

Tzu-ch'an, saying of, xlix.
Tzu-ch'ang. See Nang Wa.

"Unterricht des Konigs von Preus-

sen," quoted, 168, 169.
Uxbridge, Lord, 5.

Valleys, 80.

Victory, halfway towards, in. 112;

without fighting, 17.
Virtues, the five cardinal, 3.

Wan, town of, 122.
Wang Chien, 124.
Wang Hsi's commentary on Sun Tzu,
xl; quoted, i, 2, n, 13, 14, 23,

26, 33, 34, 38> 44, 52» 53> 55. 6o
61, 63, 71, 78, 84, 92, 94, 95, 96,
106, 114, 117, 119, 124, 132, 133,
i35> J37, 142, i55> J57> 169; re-
ferred to, 67, 76.

Wang Kuo, the rebel, 94.

Wang Liao, 128.

Wang Ling, a commentator, xxxvii,
xli. See also Wang Tzu.

Wang Shih-ch'ung, 104.

Wang T'ing-ts'ou, 105.

Wang Tzu, quoted, 4, 6, 24.

Wang-tzu Ch'eng-fu, xiii.

War, want of fixity in, 54.

Warlike prince, 141, 158.

Water, an aid to the attack, 156.

Waterloo, battle of, 5, 48, 130.

Weapons, 14

Weeping, 127.

Wei, kingdom of, xxxv; province

of, 105.
Wei river, 81.
Wei Chih (in the San Kuo Chili},

xix, xxxvi.
Wei I, 106.
Wei Liao Tzu, li; quoted, 35, 73,

97, 99, 107, 125; referred to, xxiv.
Wei Po, 165.

Wei Wu Ti. See Ts'ao Kung.
Well-being of one's men, to be stu-
died, 123.
Wellington, his description of his

army at Waterloo, 130; on the

eve of Waterloo, 5 ; saying, of, no;

skilful in dissimulation, 6.
Wen, Duke of Chin, 141.
Wtn Hsien T'ung K'ao, quoted,

xxxvii, xxxviii, xl, xli; referred to,

xxi, xxiii, xxxvi, liii.
Wen-su, King of, 132.
Wen Ti, Emperor of Sui dynasty, 151.
Wen Wang, 1, 174.
Western Sacred Mountain, xxxii.
Wind, days of, 153; duration of, 155.
"Words on Wellington," quoted, 5.
Wu, city of, xiv; king of, 118. Sec

also Ho Lu.
Wu State, xxv, 49, 50, 129, 159;

dates in the history of, xxvii, xxviii;

first mentioned in history, xxvii.
Wu Ch'i, 1, 64, 65, no; compared

with Sun Wu, xliii; plagiary of

Sun Tzti, xxiv. See also Wu Tzu.
Wu C/i'i C/iing, Hi.
Wu Huo, 29.
Wu Jen-chi, xxxiii.
Wu-lao, heights of, 104.
Wu Nien-hu, xxxiii.
Wu-tu, town of, 165.
Wu-tu Ch'iang, 80.
Wu Tzu, xix, 1; quoted, 24, 56,66,

77, 80, 81, 98, 107, 115, 131, 142,

156; referred to, xxiv.

204

INDEX

Wu Tzu-hsii, xxix, xlviii. See also

Wu Yuan.

Wu Wang, xvi, 20, 175.
Wu Yuan, xiii, xxiii, 56; a spurious

treatise fathered on, xxix.
Wu Yiieh Chlun Ch'iu, quoted, xiv,

xviii.
Wylie's "Notes," referred to, xli, Hi.

Ya, King of Chao, 144.

Yang Han, 115.

Yang-p'ing, city of, 46.

Yangtsze river, 123.

Yao Hsiang, 78.

Yarkand, battle of, 132.

Yeh Shih or Yeh Shui-hsin, his theory

about Sun Tzu, xxi, xxiii, xxv;

on Sun Tzu's style, xxiv.
Yellow Emperor, the, xvi, 84.
Yellow Turban rebels, 154.
Yen, King of Hsu, xvi, xlix.
Yen Shih-ku, 167.
Yen Ti, 84.
Yen Tzti, quoted, 98.

Yin and Yang, 2.

Yin dynasty, 173, 174.

Yin Fu Ching, xxxvi, in.

Ying, capital of Ch'u, xii, xiii, xvi,

xxix.

Ying K'ao-shu, xxi.
Yo Fei, a student of Sun Tzu, xiii.
Yo I, 117.
Yu Hai, quoted, xiii; referred to,

xxxvi, xl, Hi, liii.
Yu Lan encyclopaedia. See T'ai

P'ing Yu Lan.
— Text of Sun Tzu in the. See Sun

Tzti.
Yuan, the two, opponents of Ts'ao

Ts'ao, xxxv.

Yuan Chien Lei Han, liii.
Yuan Shao, 151.
Yiieh State, 129; compared with Wu,

xxvi, 49, 50; first mentioned in

history, xxvii.

Yiieh Chiieh Shu, quoted, xiv.
Yiieh Yu, xxi.
Yung Lo Ta Tien, Hi.

CORRIGENDA

P. ix, note: For "edition" read "translation."

„ 14, line 3: For "by" read "in the."

„ 16, line 5: For "T." read "T'u Shu:'

„ „ §19, note: Before "War" insert "Soldiers are not to be used as
playthings."

„ 17, § i: ^ jtF , etc. The more I think about it, the more I prefer
the rendering suggested on p. 159, §22, note.

„ „ §i note, and p. 78, line 6: Insert "the" before "Ssu-ma Fa."

„ 33, note on heading: Cf. X. § 12, where fife is translated "strength,"
though it might also be "conditions." The three words ^Jj , ^jjjfa
and fife have been much confused. It appears from the Shuo
W£n that the last character is post-classical, so that Sun Tzii
must have used either ^fj or ijjjjfc in all senses.

„ 45, line i: For "sublety" read "subtlety."

„ 63, line 4: M. Chavannes writes in the T'-oung Pao, 1906, p. 210:
"Le general Pan Tch'ao n'a jamais porte les armes chinoises
j usque sur les bords de la mer Caspienne." I hasten to correct
my statement on this authority.

„ 80, 9th line from the bottom: For Q read pj .

„ 109, § 23, note, and p. 126, 5!h line from bottom: For "Huang Shih-
kung" read "Huang-shih Kung."

„ 124, line 7: For "Ch'en" read "Ch'en Hao."

„ 136, nth line from bottom: Insert "to" before "select."

„ 152, § 2: Substitute semi-colon for full stop after "available."

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